TAJ MAHAL HOTEL Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question referred to us for decision under Section 66 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, is as follows:

(2.) THE facts as mentioned in the statement of the case are as follows;- THE assessee, the Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad, is a registered firm running a hotel at Secunderabad, with branches in Hyderabad. THE assessment-year under reference is 1960-61, for which the previous is the year ending on 30-9-1959. In the previous year, the assessee incurred an expenditure of Rs. 57,154/- for installing sanitary fittings, and a further sum of Rs. 1,370/- for pipe-line fittings. On both these items, the assessee claimed development rebate before the income-tax Officer under Section 10 (2) (vi-b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) THE Income-tax Officer held that they did not come within the definition of 'Plant' and 'machinery' and disallowed the same. THE Appellate Assistant Commissioner, in appeal, affirmed that order. On second appeal, the Appellate Tribunal took the view that the sanitary fittings and pipe-line fittings did not constitute 'machinery' and the only point to decided was, whether they would come under the heading 'plant'. THE assessee claimed depreciation allowance on those items under Sec. 10 (2) (vi) as 'furniture and fittings' at the rate of 9 per cent , instead of 7 per cent which would be allowed in the case of plant. Holding that the word 'plant' must receive the same meaning in both the cases and also having regard to the dictionary meaning, the Tribunal held that the assets in question did not constitute 'plant' and upheld the disallowance of the claim by the Tribunals.

(3.) THE definition of 'plant' extracted above does not throw any light on the meaning of that word, but it only shows that it is of wide import. intended to include even vehicles, books, scientific apparatus and surgical equipment purchased for the purpose of business, occupation or vocation. As observed by Lord Watson in Dilwarth v. Commissioner of Stamps, 1899 AC 99 (105-6) "include is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute." When it is so used, these words and phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. THE word 'include' is susceptible of another construction which may become imperative if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the word or expressions defined. When it is mentioned that a particular definition 'includes' certain things, it should be taken that the Legislature intended to settle a difference of opinion on the point or wanted to bring in other matters that would not properly come within the ordinary connotation of the word or expression or phrase in question, (vide: Madras Central Urban Bank Ltd. v. Corporation of Madras, AIR 1932 Mad 474) THE Legislature uses the word 'means' where it wants to exhaust the significance of the term 'defined' and the word 'includes' where it intends that while the term defined should retain its ordinary meaning its scope should be widened by specific enumeration of certain matters which its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise so as to make the definition enumerative but not exhaustive vide Province of Bengal v. Hingul Kumari, AIR 1946 Cal 217.