D SATYANARAYANAMURTHY Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Although various grounds have been raised in support of this writ petition, we do not think it necessary to go into all of them as this matter can be disposed of on one short point, covered by a recent decision of the Supreme Court It appears from the counter-affidavit sworn to by the Assistant Secretary to Government, that the Commissioner of Police (the and respondent herein), who is the licensing authority under the Andhra Pradesh Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955 purported to act on a Memorandum issued by the Government (Memo. No. 3390/E 11/62-5, Home, dated 17th September, 1963). By that Memorandum which was communicated to the Commissioner of Police, it was made clear that " the Government consider it not desirable to give permission for construction of a cinema hall in that small site". On receiving that Memorandum, the Commissioner of Police passed the impugned order dated 5th October, 1963 refusing to grant permission in view of the unsuitability of the site as disclosed by the report of the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad (the 3rd respondent in the writ petition), and also the Government Memorandum referred to supra. An appeal preferred to the Government against the order of the Commissioner of Police was dismissed by an order dated 29th January, 1964.

(2.) The action of the Commissioner based upon the Memorandum issued by the Government, is clearly illegal in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Harikishan. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1081. In that case their Lordships pointed out while considering the scope of analogous provisions in the Punjab Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1952, that the control of Government contemplated by the Act, may justify the issue of general instructions or directions for the guidance of the licensing authority in dealing with applications for licence, but the control of the Government does not extend to issuing directions in individual cases, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the licensing authority and usurping all its functions. They also pointed out that since under the Act the Government was constituted as the appellate authority, it would lead to an anomalous situation if the Government itself were to act as the licensing authority. It is obvious that in such a case an appeal to the Government would be an idle formality and would be an instance of an appeal from Caesar to Caesar.

(3.) In view of the Supreme Court's decision, we set aside the impugned order of the Commissioner of Police as well as that of the Government passed on appeal.