M V N RAMANUJACHARI Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) .Criminal Revision Case No. 854 of 1965 has been referred to us by our learned Brother Mirza, J., in view of the substantial questions of law involved in the case. The petitioner herein was seeking to quash the criminal proceedings instituted against him in C.C. No. 2 of 1965 on the file of the Special Judge, Kurnool under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947) and section 161, Indian Penal Code. His main contention is that the Deputy Superintendent of Police who had laid the trap and later authorised one of his subordinates to investigate the case was not properly vested with Magisterial powers under section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code and, therefore, the investigation conducted by his subordinates was vitiated. To appreciate the contention of the petitioner, the facts of the case may briefly be stated : The petitioner (hereinafter called the accused) is an Electrical Inspector, Kurnool having jurisdiction extending upto Srikakulam. There was a complaint against him to the Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau on 10th December, 1963, about his demand of illegal gratification for according permission to energise the transformer of Sri Sadguru Khandasari Sugars, Jaggannadharpuram, Bobbili in the first week of November, 1963 and that he had accepted a part of the illegal gratification and was making demands for the balance. Thereupon on 11th December, 1963, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, one Madhav Rao made arrangements to lay a trap by providing Rs. 500 currency notes to the decoy S. Rajagopala Rao, the complainant in the case. The numbers of the notes were noted in the Panchanama and they were treated with phenolphthalein in the presence of the mediators. The decoy then proceeded to the office of the Electrical Inspector who received the amount and the same were recovered at about 3-30 P.M. under a Panchanama. The Dy. S. P. Examined the decoy and registered a crime drime No. 22 of 1963 under section 151, Indian Penal Code, and section 5 (a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sent the report to the Court along with the arrest card etc. On the next day i.e., 12th December, 1963, he sent the tainted money to the Court. Later purporting to act under G.O. Ms. No. 253, Home (Courts-B) Department, dated 3rd February, 1961, he authorised one Subrahmanyam, an Inspector on the Anti-Corruption Bureau to investigate further into the case. Accordingly the Inspector took up investigation and examined all the witnesses and finally laid a charge-sheet against the accused before the Special Judge, Kurnool. It is conceded that the accused did not raise any objection before the Special Judge either to his jurisdiction to enquire into the matter or to the competency of the Inspector to investigate the case. He, however, filed this criminal revision case in the High Court for quashing the proceedings against him mainly on the ground that the subsequent investigation by the Inspector was vitiated. It is conceded by Sri T. V. Sarma, the learned Counsel for the petitioner that these objections were not raised before the Special Judge for the obvious reason according to him that the Special Judge was not competent to quash the proceedings and the matter lay exclusively within the jurisdiction of the High Court. The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, contended that a revision did not lie at this stage and the objections raised herein should have been urged before the lower Court and thereafter the matter moved in the High Court if the petitioner was aggrieved by the finding of the lower Court, particularly so when the investigating officer had yet to be examined in the case. However, to obviate further delay in the matter he did not press this objection. It is well-settled that normally objections as to the jurisdiction of a Court or competency of an officer to investigate a case should be taken at the earliest opportunity in the trial Court itself, but having regard to the circumstances of this case viz-, that as a result of this revision the trial has been held up for more than two years, we think it expedient to dispose of the case on merits instead of directing the petitioner to seek a decision in the lower Court and approach this Court again if the finding goes against him. The main attack, as stated earlier, is directed against the G.O. issued by the State Government conferring Magisterial powers on certain Police Officers under section 14of the Criminal Procedure Code. The said G. O. omitting the details not necessary for your purpose reads as under. " II. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (i) of section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Central Act VI of 1898), the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby confers upon the officers mentioned below all the ordinary powers of a Magistrate of the first Class under section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Central Act II of 1947), within the limits of the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh :

(2.) Sri J. Madhavarao, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad." The conferment of power is under sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Code of -Criminal Procedure. Purporting to act under this G.O. Sri J. Madhavarao has authorised the Inspector Sri M. V. Subrahmanyam of Anti-Corruption Bureau, Kurnool to investigate further into Crime No. 22 of 1963 under section 161 and (5) (1) (a) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act by his proceedings dated 12th December, 1963. The contention in brief is that the delegation of powers under G.O. Ms. No. 253, dated 3rd February, 1961, was itself in excess of the authority and, therefore, subsequent authorisation by the said Officer purporting to act under the Government Order was void ab initio. Section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure falls under Chapter II of the Code dealing with the constitution of criminal Courts and offices. It makes provisions for the constitution of Special Magistrates in the following terms :- " 14. (1) The State Government may confer upon any person who holds or has held any judicial post under the Union or a State or possesses such other qualifications as may, in consultation with the High Cc urt, be specified in this behal by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette all or any of the powers conferred or conferrable by or under this Cede on a Magistrate of the first, second or third class in respect to particular cases or to a particular class or particular classes of cases, or in regard to cases generally in any local area outside the presidency town. (a) Such Magistrates shall be called Special Magistrates, and shall be appointed for such term as the State Government may by general or special order direct. (3).................................................. (4) No powers shall be conferred under this section on any Police Officer below the grade of Assistant District Superintendent, and no pc wers shell be conferred on a Police Officer except so far as may be necessary fc r preserving the peace,. preventing crime and detecting, apprehendirg and detaining offerders in order to their being brought before a Magistrate, and for the performance by the Officer of any other duties imposed upon him by law for the time being in force." Section 14 (1) obviously provides the necessary qualification fcr conferment of Magisterial powers on any person, provided he has the necessary qualifications mentioned therein viz-, he holds or has held any judicial post under the Union or a State or possesses such other qualifications as may have been specified by the State Government in consultation with the High Court. It is to be noted that the qualifications under section 14 (1) have been inserted by section 4 of Act XXVI of 1955. and prior to the amendment, the State Goverrment had the powers to confer the Magisterial powers on any person it might deem fit to hold that office. The limitation on its power has been imposed only by the Amendment Act XXVI of 1955. The question is whether sub-section (4) is subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) or is independent of it. In other words, whether it enlarges the scope of section 14 (1) or imposes a further restriction on conferment of such powers on the Police Officers. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that sub-section (4) imposes a further limitation on the powers of the Government i.e., the Police Officers on whom such powers have to be conferred have not only to possess the requisite qualifications as laid down in section 14(1) but also hold a rank not below Assistant District Superintendent and such conferment shall be confined for the preservation of peace and prevention of crime etc., i.e., they will be precluded from trying cases as Magistrates. The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, had urged that while section

(3.) (i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a general provision, section 14(4) specially deals with conferment of powers on Police Officers and, therefore, on the analogy of special law over-riding the provisions of general law section 14 (4) has to be given effect to irrespective of the conditions laid down in section 14 (1). In our opinion, the difficulty has arisen obviously due to the fact that while amending section 14 (1) the provisions of section 14 (4) have not been correspondingly amended. If section 14 (1), as it stood before the amendment of 1955, is taken into consideration, the provisions of section 14 (4) do not in any way impinge or clash with the provisions of sub-section (i). Under section 14 (1) the State Government was competent to confer Magisterial powers upon " any person " which would also include a Police Officer, but by the amendment the words ' any person' have been qualified as meaning to be only those who hold or had held any judicial post or possessed such other qualifications as may be specified by the Government in consultation with the High Court. Thus the scope of ' any person' has been narrowed down. In the light of it, it is difficult to held that the words ' any person ' for purposes of Police Officers under sub-section (4) must be taken to having the same connotation as they were meant to carry prior to the amendment.