KUNDURTHI VENKATESWARA CHARI Vs. REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ appeal is directed against the judgment of our learned brother Jaganmohan Reddy, J., dismissing the writ petition with costs. The facts giving rise to this appeal are. The post of Village Munsif of Ganga Donakonda was held by a minor, and consequently the 3rd respondent herein, K. China Chenchi Reddi, was appointed as proxy to the minor incumbent. During his term of office as deputy to the minor, there were charges of misappropriation, and insubordination against the said person and corsequently he was suspended from acting as proxy and in his place the appellant was appointed. In the enquiry against the proxy the Revenue Divisional Officer came to the conclusion that there was no proof against the 3rd respondent. After the 3rd respondent was exonerated of the charges, orders were passed for his reinstatement. But, it appears, certain other charges were levelled against him. viz., that he had misappropriated a sum of Rs. 90 as evidenced by two receipts, one for Rs. 40 and another for Rs. 50. As a result of this, he was again suspended and an enquiry was held. In this enquiry also the Revenue Divisional Officer came to the conclusion that there was no proof against him. He was accordingly exonerated and orders were passed for his reinstatement and the appellant was directed to hand over charge to the 3rd respondent.

(2.) The appellant did not hand over charge, but instead came in writ petition to this Court contending that a proxy had no right to the office and having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court striking down section 6 of the Hereditary Village Offices Act, no village officer can be appointed on the basis of heredity and descent. This writ petition has been dismissed by our learned brother. In this appeal against that order of our learned brother, the contention of Shri Rama Sarma is that the Tahsildar could not direct the appellant to hand over charge. On the other hand, he ought to have declared the post vacant and called for applications. We do not find any substance in this argument. It is indisputable that the appellant was appointed temporarily in the vacancy of the 3rd respondent caused by his suspension. The term of his appointment should be determined by the duration of the suspension, and once that suspension is set aside and that person is reinstated, it cannot be denied that the appellant, who was holding the post during the perod of suspension, has to vacate the office.

(3.) Relying on the case of Secretary of State v. Raghavulu, A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 607. it is further contended by Shri Rama Sarma that notwithstanding the fact that the appellant was appointed in a vacancy caused by the suspension of the proxy, can only be ordered to vacate when the " holder of the office " returns. He relies on section 10 (4) as exhaustive of the cases where only he could be directed to vacate and that could have been done where a holder of the office is suspended, etc., in which case on his return the person appointed in his place will vacate and contends that it does not apply to the case of appointment of a proxy who is not a holder of the office. This argument is equally devoid of force. It is no doubt true that section 10 (4) applies to a case where a holder of the office is suspended and on his return the person appointed in his place will vacate and it does not apply to the case of appointment of a proxy. But it may be noted that the appellant was appointed during the period of suspension of the proxy temporarily and once that suspension was set aside and he was reinstated, the appellant, whose appointment was only during that period, cannot take Shelter under that provision and say that he cannot vacate the post. The case cited by the learned Counsel does not help the case of the appellant. On the other hand, it goes against it. There is, therefore, no merit in this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. G.S.M. Writ Appeal dismissed.