YEDUGUNDLA RAMANAIAH Vs. STATE S H O ALLUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners were respondents Nos. 7, 26 and 41 to a proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kavali, started on the Police report under section 107, Cr. P. C. in M.C. No 61 of 1965. It appears there took place more than one incident on 26th November, 1965, and a single incident on 29th September, 1965, in the village, Allurpet and several person were directly involved therein. These incidents were in relation to different persons in the village in different hours. On the reports of the respective persons concerned, the Sub-Inspector of Police moved the Sub Divisional Magistrate to start proceedings under section 107 Criminal Procedure Code. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, on the basis of the report, issued an order under section 112, Criminal Procedure Code, informing the respondents that they had committed wrongful and violent acts involving breach of peac and calling upon them to appear in person and show cause why each one of them should not be ordered to execute a bond for Rs. 1,000 with two sureties for a like sum for keeping peace for a period of one year. The petitioners contend that section 107, Criminal Procedure Code, is intended to be preventive and not punitive and as the present proceedings have been started for completed past acts and do not suggest that the respondents are likely to cause breach of peace in future, such proceedings are unwarranted under section 107, Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Sessions Judge was under the impression that what the respondents had prayed was that the proceedings as against them should be separated. He further thought that what the said respondents had in fact complained of was that they were not involved in any incident. He noticed though it is alleged now that the actual reports do not bear it out, that according to the reports there was definite information before the Sub- Divisional Magistrate that the said respondents (Petitioners herein) were involved in incident No. 2 of 26th November, 1965, and respondent No. 41 was involved in incident No. 5 and respondent No. 7 in incident No. 6. On that basis he rejected the petition filed by the petitioners herein. The real controversy raised by the petitioners herein does not appear to be what has been observed by the learned Sessions Judge. What the petitioners request is not that they should be separately tried but that the proceedings should be dropped as against them as such proceedings were not warranted by section 107, Criminal Procedure Code.

(2.) There can be little doubt that section 107, Criminal Procedure Code, has to be resorted to in anticipation of a breach of the peace with a view to preventingit. Where wrongful acts have been committed for which they should be prosecuted, this section is most inappropriate. Where the information as laid against person or persons is that he or they have done some acts involving breach of peace in the past, that by itself will not be sufficient to justify an order directing them to furnish security for keeping the peace. The section being preventive and not punitive it is intended only for preventing apprehended breach of peace. The information that there is strong probability of breach of peace in the immediate future is the foundation for the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, and the Magistrate has to be satisfied that the breach of the peace or disturbance is likely to take place in the near future. It is this conviction that gives him jurisdiction. The information further should not be vague but definite directly affecting the persons concerned and should disclose all the facts and details. An offence already committed can be" punished under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. This provision is therefore, intended only for cases for prevention of the apprehended breach of peace. Unless that reasonable apprehension or probability is there or the Magistrate is in possession of information of such likelihood of committing breach of peace, there could be no occasion for requiring the person to furnish security. The crucial words in the section are "is likely" and not "was likely" and so mere acts of violence in the past would not justify an action under this section. The apprehension of breach of peace being the main or essential condition, the order must show that there is likelihood of breach of peace in future and not merely that he had committed certain acts in the past which constituted criminal offences.

(3.) It may be seen that the proceedings against the preseno petitioners had started on the basis of the reports given by various persons. In these reports, the names of these three persons do not find place except in the alleged report No. 6 and even that report is vague. The order further refers to the past acts and does not say that there is apprehension that the petitioners herein are likely to commit wrongful acts which will probably occasion breach of peace. Resort to section 107 in relation to these respondents was inappropriate. As already noticed the section being preventive, unless it be to prevent the apprehended breach of peace, proceedings under that section are not justified. I am supported in this view by the decision of the Madras High Court in Maruthapali Gounder v. Emperor, (1937) M.W.N. 48. The decision In re Rangaswami Naidu and others, (1943) 1 M.L.J. 246 : A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 394. relied on by the learned Public Prosecutor is not applicable to the facts of this case. In view of the language used in the order passed under section 112, Criminal Procedure Code, I am of the view that since the proceedings had been started for the acts already committed and not in order to prevent any contemplated acts which are likely to cause breach of peace, the proceedings as against these three petitioners cannot be said to be justified. Therefore they must be quashed and they are accordingly quashed. Revision allowed.