PUDI RAMULU Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application under Article 134 of the Constitution for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against our judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 33 of 1955 by which the convictions of the three petitioners under section 302, Indian Penal Code and their sentences of transportation for life were confirmed and their appeal from the judgment of the Court of Session, West Godavari, in Sessions Case No. 58 of 1954 was dismissed. The issue of a certificate is prayed for under sub-clause (c) of clause (1) or Article 134, which is in the following terms : (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court- (c) certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court : Provided that an appeal under sub-clause (c) shall lie subject to such provisions as may be made in that behalf under clause (1) of Article 145 and to such conditions as the High Court may establish or require.

(2.) The proviso is immaterial for the purpose of this petition as no rules or conditions mentioned therein have been framed. Sri R. V. Rama Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the sub-clause ought to be liberally construed so as to enable an appeal to the Supreme Court whenever a party raises a substantial question of law or complains of grave injustice. We are of opinion that the proposition in such wide terms would carry the sub-clause far beyond its true scope. Prior to the Constitution, no appeal was provided for against the judgment of High Courts in criminal proceedings. Section 411-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, provided for an appeal only to the High Court itself against judgments in trials held in exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction. The principles enunciated by the Privy Council for their interference in criminal matters were based on the view that they were not sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal but were merely exercising the prerogative of the Sovereign in Council to review the course of criminal justice. They cannot therefore be of much assistance in construing the provisions of the Constitution, which constituted for the first time a Court of Criminal Appeal over the High Courts. Under Article 132 (1), an appeal to the Supreme Court is provided for from decisions of High Courts in all proceedings including criminal proceedings, if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Article 134 (1), a limited right of appeal is given, namely, in cases where a High Court on appeal reverses an acquittal and sentences the accused to death and where a High Court withdraws for trial before itself any case from a subordinate Court and after trial sentences the accused to death. Sub-clause (c) provides for appeals from decisions of High Courts in other criminal proceedings, but subject to the condition that the High Court certifies the case as fit for appeal to the Supreme Court. Under clause (2) of Article 134, the Parliament is empowered to make laws conferring further appellate powers on the Supreme Court. Under clause (1) of Article 136, the Supreme Court is vested with an overriding discretion to grant special leave to appeal in any civil or criminal case. From these provisions it is clear that the intention of the Constitution is to retain the finality of decisions of High Courts in criminal matters until Parliament makes a law under Article 134 (2), and to provide for no appeals in criminal matters as of right, except in cases where an accused has been sentenced to death and has had no chance to appeal against his conviction by the High Court.

(3.) It cannot be said that there is anything in the history or the setting of sub-clause (c), which calls for, in the words of the learned counsel, a "liberal construction". It follows that sub-clause (c) has to be construed in accordance with the ordinary rules and principles of construction. Sub-clause (c) has been authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court in Baladin v. Slate of U.P.., A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 181.