MUNICIPAL COUNCIL NELLORE Vs. VEERABHADRA RAO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This batch of civil revision petitions is filed against the judgment of the District Judge of Nellore setting aside the decision of the arbitrator made on the claims made by the Municipal Council, Nellore under the Madras Town Planning Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Scheme framed by the Municipal Council for the Trunk Road Eastern Extensions was approved by the Government. Under Clause 10 of the said Scheme, the claims for betterment contribution should be submitted to the arbitrator to be appointed under Section 27 of the Act. The Government appointed an arbitrator by their G. O. dated 19-5-1944. He entered upon his duties on 10-7-1944. Before him, the Municipality filed claims for contribution against the various persons who owned the sites.

(2.) The Municipality, by its resolution dated 22-12-1946, requested him to stay his hands as the matter of fixing the rate was pending before the Government, The matter was pending before the Government for three years and thereafter he proceeded to continue his enquiry from 20-2-1950. The persons, against whom claims for contribution had been made, filed counters raising their objections to the claims. The Land Acquisition Clerk of the Revenue Divisional Officer was examined on 4-9-1950 and he was cross-examined on behalf of the objectors. On 1-10-1950, 8-10-1950 and 11-10-1950 the Town Planning Surveyor was examined but before his evidence was closed, the enquiry was adjourned to 20-12-1950. On that date the objectors requested for an adjournment on the ground that they were negotiating with the Municipal Council for fixing a lump sum and the matter was adjourned to 21-1-1951. Between 21-1-1951 and 31-12-1951, nothing happened. The proposal to pay contribution at a flat rate was not accepted by the Municipality. On 31-12-1951 the arbitrator made an award without giving notice or opportunity to the objectors to adduce their evidence. The objectors filed appeals to the District Judge. The District Judge set aside the awards. He held that he had no power to remand the cases to the arbitrator for fresh disposal. Hence, the revision. The first question is whether the award was valid notwithstanding the fact that no opportunity was given to the objectors to place their evidence before the arbitrator. Learned Counsel for the Municipality contends that the proceedings before him were adjourned by the arbitrator to 21-1-1951 at the instance of the objectors and, if they did not subsequently pursue the matter, it was due to their default and the arbitrator could not be blamed for it. But the proceedings clearly show that the matter was adjourned only for compromise and the arbitrator slept over the matter for one year and suddenly without giving notice to the parties made his award. If he intended to proceed with the enquiry, he should have fixed the date of hearing and given notice of the same to the parties concerned. Rule 56 of the Rules framed under the Act clearly enjoins a duty on the arbitrator to give notice of the date of hearing to the parties and Rule 55-A enables the parties to examine their witnesses. In the events that happened the arbitrator should have given notice to the parties concerned and in making the award behind their back, he violated the principles of natural justice and the rules of procedure prescribed under the Act. The learned Judge was, therefore, right in setting aside the award. The next quetion is whether the District Judget should have remanded the matter to the arbitrator for fresh enquiry. If under the Act the District Judge was functioning only as persona designata, he had no power to remand, if the Act does not confer on him any such power. If he was acting as a Court he would have inherent power to remand the case if the facts necessitated it.

(3.) The Madras Town Planning Act of 1920 was enacted to secure to the present and future inhabitants of towns sanitary conditions, amenities and conveniences. To carry out those purposes, Municipal Councils with the sanction of the Government can frame schemes and provide for amenities. They have correlative power to collect contributions from the persons who are benefited by the schemes. To prevent abuse and to decide objections made by persons against whom claims are made a machinery for a speedy decision of the disputes is provided. Chapter V, while is a self contained one, prescribes the said machinery. Under Section 27, Government appoints an arbitrator to discharge all or any of the duties conferred under that section. One of such duties is to determine, with reference to claims made, the properties which are liable to betterment contribution. Section 28, says that the arbitrator shall give notice of his proceedings and conduct them in the prescribed manner. The rules framed under the Act prescribe the manner in which the aribitrator should conduct the proceedings. The arbitrator is r.ot made a Court but, under sub-section 2 of section 28, he is given the powers of a civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code only for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and for enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and material objects. Section 29 confers a right of appeal on a person aggrieved by the decision of an arbitrator under clause (c) or (d) of sub-section 1 of Section 27 to the District Judge concerned in cases arising outside the city of Madras and to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes in cases arising in the City of Madras. Section 29 (2) makes the decision of the Appellate Judge under sub-section (1) final and his decision shall be read as part of the scheme sanctioned under Section 14. This Chapter, therefore, provides for expeditious disposal of the claims. If the Legislature intended to confer on the persons aggrieved a right of appeal to the District Judge or to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes as a Court, they would have stated so expressly. What ever ambiguity there may be in the case of an appeal to the District Judge, no such exists in the case of an appeal to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes. If the object is to provide an appeal to the Court of Small Causes, the Legislature would not have confined the appeal only to the Chief Judge of that Court. That indicates that the appellate tribunal is not the Court of Small Causes but the Chief Judge as persona designata. It cannot be contended that the Chief Judge can allocate the appeals preferred against orders of the arbitrator to another Judge of the Court which he is entitled to do under the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. If in the case of Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, an appeal lies to him as persona designata a different construction is not permissible in the case of a District Judge, Therefore, in the case of a District Judge also an appeal lies to him only as persona designata. That that was the intention of the Legislature is also made clear by making his order final under Section 29 (2). If the District Judge acts as a Court, the High Court's revisional powers cannot he curtailed under sub-section 2. The said sub-section indicates the intention of the Legislature. The object of the Legislature, namely, expeditious disposal of the claims would als.o be defeated if I substitute the word ''Court for the word "Judge" and it is not permissible to substitute words particularly when they defeat the intention of the Legislature. A similar question arose under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XV of 1946) in Rajam Ayyar v. Pasanambal. Under Section 12 (1) of the Act, the Subordinate Judge was appointed as the appellate authority.