LAWS(APH)-1956-2-18

K VENKATASWAMY AND SON Vs. RAYALASEEMA BANK LTD

Decided On February 03, 1956
FIRM OF KOPPULA VENKATASWAMY AND SON TIMMACHERLA, GUNTAKAL. Appellant
V/S
RAYALASEEMA BANK LTD. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal is posted for orders by reason of an objection taken by the office that the court-fee paid by the appellant is insufficient and is not in accordance with the terms of section 17 of the Court Fees Act. The suit was instituted by the respondent for the enforcement of two separate mortgage deeds dated 13-2-1945 and 31-3-1949 executed by the appellant for the sums of Rs. 30,000/- and Rs. 24,000/- in respect of distinct loan accounts. The court-fee was paid on the plaint by the respondent in accordance with the terms of section 17 of the Court-fees Act. The court below passed a decree for a single consolidated amount due in respect of the two mortgages and the defendant-appellant has paid court-fee on the aggregate amount of Rs. 80,684-13-0 decreed by the court below. The office took an objection that in accordance with the terms of section 17 court-fee should be separately calculated on the amounts due under each of the mortgages and that the aggregate amount shold be paid.

(2.) The scope and effect of section 17 of the Court-fees Act was recently considered by the Madras High Court in Lakshminarayana Chettiar In Res on a court-fee reference made by the Master. The Full Bench accepted the view of the Allahabad High Court and laid down that the words "distinct subjects" should be understood as meaning separate causes of action. As to how the court-fee should be paid under the terms of the section is made clear at page 408 in the following terms:

(3.) In view of this Full Bench decision, it is no longer open to the appellant to contend that the words " distinct subjects" are not equivalent to "distinct causes of action." Sri Ch. Ramakrishna Rao, the learned Advocate for the appellant, sought to contend that, even assuming that the words "distinct subjects" mean distinct causes of action, the terms of section 17 would only apply when a single suit is brought by reason of the enabling provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and not when a single suit has to be compulsorily filed under the mandatory terms of section 67 -A of the Transfer of Property Act. In support of this contention, the learned Advocate referred me to several passages in the judgment of Subba Rao J. (as he then was) delivered on behalf of the Full Bench. He particularly referred to the answer given by the Full Bench which runs in the following terms :