VENKATA SUBBAREDDI Vs. PAPIREDDI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are applications filed under Section 5 of the LIMITATION ACT, 1963 for excusing the delay in filing applications for special leave under Section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by Act XXVI of 1955, and they raise an important and interesting question of law. The period of limitation for preferring an appeal under Section 417 (1) Cr. P. C. is fixed under Art. 157 of the LIMITATION ACT, 1963. To such appeals it js not disputed that Section 5 of the LIMITATION ACT, 1963 applies. Even in regard to other criminal appeals provided under articles 150, 150-A, 154 and 155 the provisions of Section 5 of the LIMITATION ACT, 1963 apply. The decision of the Madras High Court in Janakiramayya v. Brahmayya and of the Punjab High Court in The State v. Datu Ram clearly hold that Sections applies to all criminal appeals.

(2.) The main question that arises for decision in these petitions is, whether the terms of Section 417 (4) Cr. P. C. preclude the application of the provisions of Section 5 of the LIMITATION ACT, 1963. Subsection (4) of Section 417 Cr. P. C. is in the following terms :

(3.) The next question is, Whether sub-section (4) of Sec. 417 Cr.P.C. excludes the application of the provision of Section 5 of the LIMITATION ACT, 1963 by reason 6f the words employed, namely, that no application for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal "shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal." Sec. 48 C. P. C. is also in similar terms. It enacts that" no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of 12 years from (a) the date of the decree tought to be executed ; " The Question whether the provisions of Sec. 15 (1) of the limitation Act control the terms of Section C. P. C. arose before the Pull Bench of the Madras High Court in the case referred to supra in Kandaswami Pillai v. Kannappa Chetty and it was held that the LIMITATION ACT, 1963 and the Civil Procedure Code Ought to be read together "because both ate Statutes relating to procedure and they are in 'part materia and therefore to be taken and construed together as one system as explanatory of each other." It was further held that even though the period of limitation Was not prescribed in Schedule I but by the Cttde of Civil Procedure, Sec. 15 (1) of the Limitation Att has to be read in conjunction With the terms of Sec. 48 C. P. C. The conclusions of the learned Chief justice are in the following terms :