LAWS(APH)-1956-3-36

RAHAMTULA Vs. MASTAN SETH

Decided On March 09, 1956
SHEIK MURUGULA RAMTUMIA ALIAS RAHAMTULA Appellant
V/S
YADALA PEDA MASTAN SETH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiff is the petitioner. He filed a suit against the four defendants for recovering a sum of Rs. 437-3-0. The claim was founded on a document described as ' Gurthu Lekha.' The main defence to the suit was that the document called ' Gurthu Lekha ' was really a promissory note as it contained a recital that the money would be paid on demand and since this document was not stamped no suit could be based on it. To get over thil objection, the plaintiff sought the permission of the court to amend the plaint by allowing him to base the claim on the original borrowing. It was alleged that the money wag borrowed at about 9 a. m. on 21-1-1950, but the document originally relied on was executed two or three hours later as a security for repayment of the debt. This application was opposed by the defendants on various grownds:

(2.) The main point for determination in this revision is whether the amendment should have been allowed: In support of the contention that if the facts alleged in the proposed amendment of the plaint were known to the plaintiff at the date of the institution of the suit and yet he did not mention them in the original plaint, it would not be open to allow an amendment permitting the plaintiff to introduce these recitals where it would result in a new case being made out, reliance is placed on a judgment of Mr. Justice Krishnaswamy Naidu in Gopalakrishna Murthi v. Sreedhara Rao . The learned Judge decided that if a party was in possession of certain facts and yet did not refer to them he should not be permitted to amend the plaint so as to enable him to state those facts if the facts would constitute a new case. On the other hand, the petitioner cites to me a judgment of Mr. Umamaheswa- ram J. in Gopalarao v. Kitamma , in which the learned Judge dissented from that. In the opinion of Mr. Justice Umamaheswaram, it would not be right to refuse an amendment on the ground that the facts which were sought to be introduced in the plaint by way of amendment were known to the parties at the time when the action was laid. He referred to the observations of Lopes, L. J. in Weldon v. Neal: "However negligent or careless the first omission and however late the proposed amendment, the amendment, should be allowed if it can be allowed without injustice to the other side." 1 respectfully agree with the opinion expressed by Mr, Justice Umamaheswaram in Gopala Rao v. Kitamma . Whether an amendment should be allowed in a given case or not depends upon its particular facts. It could not be postulated that in every case where certain facts were available to a party and yet were not mentioned in the plaint he should be precluded from alleging them in the plaint by way of amendment of the plaint. The opinion expressed by Mr. Justice Krishnaswamy Naidu in Gopalakrishna Murthy v. Sretdhara Rao seems to be opposed to the trend of decisions which lay down the proposition that the amendment should be allowed in order to effectually adjudicate upon the real issues arising in a case. As pointed out by Justice Venkata Subbarao in Srirangam Chettiar v. M. Sornam Pillai in an application under Order 6 rule 17 G.P.C. which gives the court power to order amendment, 'the general rule is that leave to amend will be granted so as to enable the. real question in issue to be raised, where the amendment will occasion no injury to the opposite party except such as can be sufficiently compensated for by costs or other terms to be imposed by the order." The principal question to be borne in mind in considering whether an amendment should be allowed or not is whether such amendment is necessary in the interests of justice and to adjudicate upon the real issues arising in the suit. Of course, if the court comes to a conclusion that an application is not a bona fide one, it is always open to it to reject it.

(3.) The order of the trial court is also sought to be supported by Mr. Narasimharao on the ground that the allegations in the affidavit based on the original borrowing are obviously false and therefore no useful purpose would be served by allowing such amendment. But I do not think that this is the stage at which the truth or otherwise of the allegations could be decided upon. This would be gone into at the time of the trial of the suit, and if the recitals are false the suit fails. This view of mine gains support from Dharamalinga chetti v. Krishnaswamy Chetty