(1.) This is a revision against the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Guntur, setting aside the order of the Taluk Magistrate refusing to commit the first accused to the Court of Session and discharging him under section 209 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. The prosecution case may be briefly stated thus : The 1st accused borrowed a sum of Rs. 80, from the respondent on a promissory note executed prior to 2nd August, 1954. That promissory note was attested by Bellamkonda Peda Lakshmiah (P.W. 5) and Sheik Mahaboob (D.W. 4). The scribe was one Madala Venkata Satyanarayana (P.W. 4). When the respondent showed it to P.W. 2, he told her that it would get barred in ten days, whereupon she demanded (he accused for the money. At his request, she went to his houce. The second accused took the promissory note from her hands and, asking the first accused to repay the money, gave it to the first accused, who tore away the promissory note into pieces and threw the pieces into the oven. On those allegations, she filed a complaint against the first accused and the second accused for an alleged offence under sections 477 and 109, Penal Code. After recording the sworn statement of the complainant, the complaint against the second accused was dismissed under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code. The case is triable exclusively by the Sessions Court. The complainant examined five witnesses. P.W. I is the complainant and she gave her version of the borrowing the execution of the promissory note and the destruction of it. P.W. 2 spoke to the fact that he told her that the promissory note was about to become barred. P.W. 4 is the scribe and P.W. 5 is the attestor of the promissory note. P.W. 3. spoke to the fact that the first accused tore away the promissory note. The first accused examined four witnesses stating the circumstances which prompted the complainant to file a false case and also filed documents to establish that he was not in the village at the time the promissory note was alleged to have been executed. The Taluk Magistrate held, on the evidence, that no prima facie case was made out against the accused and discharged him accordingly. The complainant filed a revision to the Sessions Court. The Sessions Judge, after going through the evidence, came to the conclusion that, the case being one triable exclusively by the Court of Session and as there was evidence which might be accepted by another Court and if accepted would establish the case of the complainant, the Taluk Magistrate was wrong in discharging the accused. On that finding, he set aside the order of discharge and directed the District Magistrate to enquire into the case himself or send it to a competent Magistrate to make further enquiry and commit the accused to the Court of Session.
(2.) The first question is whether the Sessions Judge was wrong in setting aside the order of discharge made by the Taluk Magistrate under section 209, Criminal Procedure Code. Section 209, Criminal Procedure Code, reads :
(3.) The terms of the section are very wide and comprehensive. Under this section, the Magistrate can discharge an accused if he finds that there are no grounds for committing him for trial. But the case law has placed limitations on the exercise of that power in an attempt to reconcile two facts : (i) the trial is by the Sessions Court and (ii) the Magistrate is empowered to discharge an accused for sufficient grounds. This reconciliation is effected by laying down the following test. If there is credible evidence which, if accepted, may lead to a conviction, the Magistrate ought to commit the accused. If, on the other hand, he is convinced that the evidence is such that no Court would ever convict, he should not commit. See Rama Chandra Babaji Core v. Emperor., (1934) I.L.R. 59 Bom. 125. While it is important for the committing Courts to take the responsibility of throwing out frivolous cases, it is also necessary that, in cases triable exclusively by a Court of Session, they should commit the accused to Sessions, if there is a prima facie case on which the accused can be put on trial or if there is credible evidence on record. In the present cafe, the Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that there was credible evidence on record, which another Court might accept and that the Taluk Magistrate was wrong in discharging the accused. After going through the judgment of the Sessions Judge, I cannot say that he was not justified in his conclusion. There are no grounds, therefore, to interfere with the said order.