NALLURU BASAVAIAH NAIDU Vs. TAKKELLA VENKATESWARULU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiff is the appellant in this second appeal. The suit was brought on an insufficiently stamped promissory note which was for this reason rcjected by the Courts below and the suit was dismissed. The question is whether having regard to the provisions of section 36 of the Stamp Act, the Courts below were right in rejecting the promissory note ; in other words, whether the promissory note had not already been admitted in evidence. The Courts below were of the opinion that the stage had not been reached at which the admissibility of the promissory note could not be questioned. Section 36 of the Stamp'Act prohibits the rejection of a document once it has been admitted in evidence even in a subsequent stage of the same suit and it is clear that under this section, objection could not be taken when there had been such admission. If a promissory note had in fact been admitted in evidence, though in disregard of the provisions of section 35, it will be available as evidence in that proceeding for all pruposes as if it had been properly stamped at the outset. This is the effect of section 36 and the section would apply even where, as in the present case the document is the foundation of the suit: Lakshmappa v. Masood Sahib, (1934) 67 M.L.J. 539. Venkara Reddi v. Hussain Setti.(1933) 66 M.L.J. 709 : I.L.R. 57 Mad. 779 Section 36 would apply even though the document had been wrongly admitted or admitted without objection. The object of the Stamp Act is to provide revenue for the State and not to arm a litigant with a weapon of defence and section 36 proceeds on that basis. If the objection as to the defective stamping is not taken or is overruled and the document is admitted in evidence, the matter stops there and neither the parties nor the Court can thereafter agitate the question of its admissibility. The trial Court which admits the document, as well as the appellate and revisional Courts are all bound to act upon the document once it has been admitted in evidence as pointed out in Alagappa Chetti v. Narayanan Chsttiar, (1932) 63 M.L.J. 548. and Lakshmappa v. Masood Sahib ., (1934) 67 M.L.J. 539.

(2.) The provisions of Order 13, rule 3, Civil Procedure Code, empowering the Court to reject at any stage of the suit any document which it considers irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, is subject to the provisions of section 36 of the Stamp Act. See Satyavathi v. Pullaiah., A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 431. The crucial question is, whether in the circumstances of the case, there has been an " admission " of the promissory note in evidence within the meaning of section 36 of the Stamp Act. The promissory note was produced along with the plaint and filed into Court on 19th January, 1951. The objection was taken in the written statement to the validity of the promissory note and an issue was framed in these terms :- "Whether the suit promissory note is not true, valid and binding on the defendant?" The trial began on 4th September, 1951 and on that date the defendant's pleader put in a memo., stating that he did not question the genuineness of the promissory note but questioned its validity. The plaintiff was examined as P.W. 1 and in the course of his evidence, the promissory note was put to him and he proved it. The promissory note was thereupon marked as Exhibit A-1 in the case. I have looked into the document and find that it bears the following endorsement :-

(3.) There are the initials of the District Munsif " P.A.R." below these entries in his own handwriting. The usual appendix of evidence attached to the judgment contains the following entry :- " Documents marked for plaintiff. Ex. A-1. 12-9-1948. Suit pronote executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff." The effect of the entries on the document has to be understood in the light of Order 13, rules 4 and 6 of the Civil Procedure Code. The particulars required by Order 13, rule 4, to be endorsed on a document which has been admitted in evidence in the suit are endorsed on Exhibit A-1. When questions as to the admissibility of evidence are raised during the course of the trial, they should be decided as they arise and should not be reserved until judgment in the case is given. If the document is not rejected with an endorsement or the particulars required under Order 13, rule 6 and on the other hand the document bears all the particulars of the endorsement required to be made by Order 13, rule 4 and the endorsement of the particulars is initialled by the Judge it has to be taken that there was admission of the document in evidence for the purposes of section 36 of the Stamp Act. In spite of the objection taken to the admissibility of the promissory note before the trial began, the document was proved by P.W. 1 and was marked as Exhibit A-1. The District Munsif, who tried the case, has initialled in his own hand at the foot of the entries required to be made by Order 13, rule 4. Nevertheless, it is argued that the admission of the document Exhibit A-1 in evidence was not the result of a judicial determination of the question whether it could be admitted in evidence or not for want of stamp. It is said that the Court did not apply its mind consciously to the question whether the document is admissible or not. Reliance was placed on Venkanua v. Parasuram Byas,(1939) 56 M.L.J. 633 : I.L.R. 53 Mad.137 Sadasiva Aiyar v. Meenakshi Aiyar, (1933) 65 M.L.J. 673. and Abdul Wahab v. Anjaneyulu, A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 888 for the position that unless the question of the admissibility of a document was actually considered by the trial Judge after applying his mind consciously to the question whether the document was admissible or not, the endorsement thereon of the particulars required by Order 13, rule 4, does not preclude him from considering the question of the admissibility of the document in evidence at a later stage of the case. To some extent, the argument involves nice considerations of human psychology into which a Court is reluctant to be drawn. This is particularly so where an admission of a defectively stamped document in evidence without the Court being alive to or aware of the provisions of section 35 of the Stamp Act, is rendered unassailable under section 36 of the Act. In the case of a judicial proceeding which is required to be reduced to writing, the record made by the Judge is the authentic evidence of what he intended to do. In applying the provisions of section 36 of the Stamp Act, the Court should have regard to what has been actually done and not to the unexpressed intentions of the Judge. The Judge might have intended to reject the document, but if in fact he had not rejected it, but admitted it in evidence, it must be acted upon at the subsequent stages of the litigation.