V L VENKATRAMAYYA Vs. D NAGARATNAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision raises a question of court fee. The facts are simple. The 1st defendant, who was a tenant under the plaintiffs in respect of the plaint schedule property executed a fresh lease for himself and on behalf of the other defendants for the year 1953-54, for a rental of Rs. 7.000/- payable to the plaintiffs by the end of February 1954. Under the lease deed, the defendants also agreed to vacate the land and deliver possession to the plaintiffs by 31-3-1954. The plaintiffs issued notice to the defendants on 31-12-1953, requesting them to pay rent before the due date and vacate the land by 31-3-1954. The plaintiffs alleged in the plaint that, notwithstanding the notice, the defendants did not vacate the suit land nor did they pay them the rent due under the document. On those allegations, they filed the suit for evicting the defendants and for recovery of the rent dus to them. The cause of action in para 12 was described thus:

(2.) In view of the sharp cleavage of judicial opinion on the construction of the said provision, the question was decided by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in In Re D. Lakshminarayana Chettiar '. The Full Bench held that 'distinct subjects' in section 17 of the Court Fees Act mean distinct causes of action in respect of which separate suits should be filed but for the enabling provisions allowing them to be clubbed in one suit and that the distinctness or identity of the cause of action is the only criterion for the application of the section. After the question referred to the Full Bench was answered, the Division Bench had to consider the incidental question in regard to the meaning of the words "distinct causes of action". The Division Bench observed at page 323:

(3.) If the tests laid down by the Full Bench and by the Division Bench are applied to the present case, I have no doubt that the plaint comprises two distinct causes of action and, therefore, two "distinct subjects" within the meaning of section 17 of the Court Fees Act. The Division Bench defined "cause of action" in the same decision at page 316 thus: