NARAYANAM SESHACHARYULU Vs. NARAYANAM VENKATACHARYULU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The two plaintiffs, father and son, are the appellants in this second appeal preferred against the decree of the Subordinate Judge, Ongole, reversing the decree of the District Munsif and dismissing their suit for a declaration that a sale-deed, Exhibit B-1, dated 14th March, 1946, executed by the first plaintiff and his undivided father, the second defendant, in favour of the first defendant, was invalid and inoperative to convey title to ac. 3-12 cents of Archaka service inaml and purported to have been sold thereunder. It is common ground that the lands sold under Exhibit B-1 are Archaka service inam lands ; that the vendors and the vendee are descendants of the original grantee of the service inam lands ; that the lands sold under Exhibit B-1 were allotted to the share of the vendor at a previous family partition and were thereafter solely enjoyed by them ; that on 14th March, 1946, they sold the lands for a consideration of Rs.1000, paid to them by the vendee ; and that the vendee, though not next in succession to the vendors as heir-at-law, was their agnatic relation qualified to perform the archaka service and was indeed required to do so by terms of Exhibit B-1. On these facts the lower Appellate Court upheld the validity of the sale Exhibit B-1 and dismissed the suit for its cancellation. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that the sale of the archaka service inam lands, was illegal and opposed to public policy and that they were therefore entitled to a declaration of the invalidity of Exhibit B-1 or its cancellation.

(2.) This contention comes with bad grace and sounds disingenuous in the mouth of the first plaintiff who, along with his father, the second defendant, received Rs. 1000, as consideration for the sale from the vendee and now seeks to retain both the property and the price, by pleading the illegality of the sale. It is not, for his sake, however, that the Court entertains the plea which, if one may say so, is contrary to the real justice between the parties but because of the principle that a Court should not recognise or give effect to a transaction which is illegal or opposed to public policy. The sale of offices with their emoluments, particularly of offices in the performance of the duties of which the public are interested, is void as being opposed to public policy. Public policy and public interest alike require that there should be no money consideration for appointments to offices in which the public are interested, for, if money may be given to those who appoint, unworthy or improper persons might get themselves appointed. Transfers of the emoluments of an office in which the public are interested, whether the emoluments take the shape of salaries or grants of land or their income, are void as tending to defeat the public objects for which the grants were intended.The presumption is that these emoluments are required for enabling the holder to perform the duties of his office in a proper manner. Traffic by way of sale of public offices and their emoluments, tends to prejudice public interests by interfering with the selection of the most qualified persons and therefore such arrangements are held to be void as being opposed to public policy. Contracts which tend to be injurious to the public or against the public good are void as being contrary to public policy. Where a transfer of properties is pr'ohibited by statute, whether the prohibition is express or implied , it is illegal and cannot be enforced. In India a public office is deemed to be a position of trust and section 6 (f) of the Transfer of Property Act provides that a public office cannot be transferred, nor can the salary of a public officer. The opinion has been expressed that an office of worship is a temple, which is heritable and partible, is not a public office within the meaning of section 6 (f) of the Transfer of Property Act. Hanmappa v. Hanmantgaud, I.L.R. (1947) Bom. 789.

(3.) There is, however, the main part of section 6 which hits at transfers made contrary to the provisions of the Act as well as " any law for the time being in force", an expression which is comprehensive enough to include transfers tending to defeat the Rules of Hindu Law. The cases on this branch of law have arisen principally in connection with transfers of religious and priestly offices. Hereditary priests attached to public temples in this part of the country often hold grants of land made in favour of their ancestors as emoluments of the office. A hereditary archaka office is regarded as a species of property which devolves like any other property according to the ordinary law of inheritance. Though heredity offers no guarantee of fitness for the office, still the law recognises hereditary succession to the office and emoluments of archakas as being in consonance with the presumed intentions of the grantor or the founder. That the hereditary archakaship is not merely office but property as well and, in the absence of proof of custom or usage of a different nature, is partible and heritable according to the Hindu Law of succession, has been recognised by the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Ganesh Chandra v. Lal Behari, 1936 71 M.L.J. 740 : L.R. 63 I.A. 448. and Bhabatarani v. Ashalatha, (1943) 2 M.L.J. 70 : L.R. 70 I.A. 57 : I.L.R. 2 Cal. 137 of the Supreme Court in Angurbala v. Debabrata, (1951) S.G.J. 394 and Raj Kali Kuer v. Ram Ratan Pandey, (1955) SCJ 493 and of the Madras High Court in Annaya Tanti v. Ammakka Hengsu, 1918 35 M.L.J. 196 : I.L.R. 41 Mad. .886 (F.B.). and Suryanarayana Charlu v. Seshammal, (1949) 2 M.L.J. 75.