(1.) The unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S. No.15 of 1996, on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Narsipatnam, filed the second appeal. He filed the suit for the relief of perpetual injunction, against the respondents, in respect of the suit schedule property. He pleaded that he entered into an agreement of sale, with the 1st respondent, on 27-3-1983, for purchase of the suit schedule property, for a consideration of Rs.15,000/-, and he paid a sum of Rs.5,100/- on the date of agreement. A further sum of Rs.8,000/- is said to have been paid on 20-4-1983 and Rs.1,000/- in June 1983. According to him, the possession of the property was delivered on the date of agreement itself. The 1st respondent was said to be under obligation, to arrange for execution of the sale deed, with the participation of the original owners, by name Macherla Seetharaatnam of Kakinada and Kadimisetti Saraswathi of Anakapalli. He alleged that notwithstanding his possession and enjoyment over the property since 1983, the respondents who belong to the same family, attempted to dispossess him on 23-1-1996. With these averments he filed the suit.
(2.) The 1st respondent filed written statement. He stated that he is only a lessee, in respect of the suit schedule property, and that he borrowed certain amount from the appellant. He alleged that the appellant brought about an alleged agreement of sale, with a mala fide intention, and that the appellant was never in possession of the suit schedule property. He further contends that the agreement of sale, even otherwise, was never intended to be acted upon. The trial Court dismissed the suit, through its judgment dated 26-4-2004. Thereupon, the appellant filed A.S. No.5 of 2004, in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Narsipatnam. The appeal was dismissed on 2-1-2006. Hence, this second appeal.
(3.) Sri Vedula Venkataramana, learned Counsel, advanced arguments on behalf of the appellant. He contends that the view taken by the Courts below, that a suit for mere injunction was not maintainable, without the prayer for specific performance of the agreement of sale, is untenable. He contends that apart from being used as a shield, under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, an agreement of sale can be pressed into service, to protect the possession, even by filing a suit. Learned Counsel further submits that the evidence on record clearly discloses not only that the agreement of sale was executed, but also that the appellant is in possession of the property.