T RAMESHWAR Vs. COMMISSIONER MUNICIPAL ORPORATION OF HYDRABAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The dispute in these two writ petitions is in relation to a piece of land admeasuring 1022 Sq.yards bearing MCH No.2-2-63/1 in Survey No. 119 situated at Bagh Amberpet, Hyderabad (hereafter called, the subject property). There is no dispute however that the father of T. Rameshwar and the husband of the lessor of S. Jagadeeshwar Rao (fourth and third respondents in W.P. No.23731 of 2005) were joint owners of the total extent of land admeasuring 2200 Sq. yards. After death of her husband, Namuri Lakshmamma, W/o. Anjaiah Goud along with her sons claimed to have succeeded to the property. She executed a lease deed in respect of the subject property in favour of third respondent, who obtained a dealership from the Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL, the petitioner in W.P.No.23731 of 2005), who in turn executed another document in favour of the petitioner subleasing the premises for setting up petroleum outlet. So as to set up/ construct such outlet, the petitioner on its own submitted an application to the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (MCH) under Sections 428 and 433 of Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act, 1955 (HMC Act, for short) on 10.2.2005. In the meanwhile, the fourth respondent filed a writ petition being W.P.No. 14025 of 2005 before this Court seeking a writ of mandamus directing the MCH and District Collector, Hyderabad not to accord any permission including the permission to make constructions on the subject property. In W.P.No.23731 of 2005, the fourth respondent allege that he filed a suit being O.S. No.4185 of 2004 on the file of the Court of the VII Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for cancellation of the lease deed executed by Lakshmamma in favour of third respondent and, therefore, pending such suit if any permission is granted he would suffer legal wrong. This Court while admitting W.P.No. 14025 of 2005 on 18.7.2005 observed that any construction made by the IOCL, would be subject to result of the writ petition. On 19.7.2005 (a day after this Court admitted W.P.No. 14025 of 2005), MCH through its Chief City Planner addressed a communication dated 19.7.2005 to the petitioner informing that the application submitted by them cannot be considered as there is a title dispute among the legal heirs in respect of the subject property. Feeling aggrieved by the same, IOCL filed W.P.No.23731 of 2005. Thus for and hereafter the description/reference to the parties is in accordance with their status as they are arrayed in W.P. No.23731 of 2005.

(2.) The petitioner besides averring the background as above, further states that the fourth respondent filed LA. No.1711 of 2004 in O.S. No.4185 of 2004 for ad interim injunction restraining IOCL from changing the nature of the property by making constructions. The said I.A., was dismissed by the trial Court on 17.1.2005, that thereafter the petitioner filed W.P. No. 14025 of 2005 for a direction to the MCH not to accord any permission for construction of petroleum outlet, that this Court only observed that any construction made by the petitioner would be subject to result of the writ petition and, therefore, it was wrong for MCH to reject the building permission on the ground that there is a title dispute. Secondly, it is contended that even according to the fourth respondent, Lakshmamma and her son are entitled to half share in the entire extent of 2200 Sq.yards and, therefore, the lease executed by them in favour of the third respondent is not rendered illegal or unenforceable. Thirdly, it is the contention of the petitioner that when it has submitted all the documents along with the application under Section 428 of HMC Act, the building application was not considered on a complaint petition submitted by the fourth respondent without giving any notice to the petitioner or third respondent and, therefore, the same is unsustainable.

(3.) The fourth respondent has filed a counter-affidavit inter alia stating that the Court of the VII Senior Civil Judge dismissed LA. No.1711 of 2004 based on a misrepresentation made by the petitioner and the third respondent to the effect that it has already obtained necessary permissions and established outlet. Therefore, the fourth respondent alleges that the pendency of the civil suit itself bars the consideration of the application filed by the petitioner for grant of building permission. The fourth respondent, however, does not deny that the petitioner obtained necessary permission from the Commissioner of Police and other authorities.