(1.) The petitioner, respondents 1, 2 and 4 are the sons of respondent No.3. The 1st respondent filed O.S.No.388 of 1997 in the Court of III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada, for the relief of declaration of title, injunction and certain other ancillary reliefs. The petitioner figured as defendant No.1. The trial of the suit commenced. The petitioner, as DW.1, sought to rely upon two documents, namely, memoranda of understanding, dated 23.01.1996 and 25.01.1997. Initially, the documents were received in evidence, subject to proof and admissibility. The 1st respondent filed C.R.P.No.4492 of 2005 before this Court. The C.R.P., was allowed on 26.04.2006 and the trial Court was directed to examine the admissibility of the documents at the threshold, without postponing the question, to a later point of time. It was in this context that the admissibility of the documents was examined in detail, by hearing both the parties. Through its order, dated 21.07.2006, the trial Court held that the documents are not admissible in evidence, on the ground that they were unstamped and unregistered. Hence, this C.R.P.
(2.) Sri K.V. Subrahmanya Narusu, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the first document is nothing but the summary of various developments that have taken place subsequent to the partition, among the parties and that no rights have accrued to either of them under it. He submits that such document does not require stamp duty or registration. So far as the second document is concerned, the learned counsel submits that though the rights of the parties vis--vis certain properties were sought to be defined, the document by itself did not confer rights, as is evident from a recital at the end. He contends that when the parties agreed that necessary documents must be executed to enforce the tentative arrangement indicated in the memorandum, there is no necessity to pay the stamp duty or to register it.
(3.) Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, on the other hand, submits that though on a casual reading, it may appear that of the first document, contains recitals about the developments, subsequent to the date of partition, there are certain observations, which would have the effect on the rights of the parties. As regards the second document, the learned counsel submits that even from its bare perusal, it is evident that complete change of ownership rights vis--vis the identified items was brought about and thereby, Section 17 of the Registration Act, gets attracted. He contends that when the document, by itself, altered rights that have accrued to the parties, and mere existence of a sentence suggesting that necessary documents must be executed at a later point of time, does not relieve the document, from the requirement of payment of stamp duty and registration.