LAWS(APH)-2006-3-117

DUNA VENKATA RAO Vs. MOOTHA RAMAKOTI

Decided On March 07, 2006
DUMA VENKATA RAO Appellant
V/S
MOOTHA RAMAKOTI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) CRP No.6850 of 2003 is filed by the petitioner-tenant in R.C.C. No.64 of 1983 on the file of the Rent Controller-cum-Principal District Munsif, Kakinada as against the order made in R.C.A. No.9 of 1995 on the file of the Rent Control Appellate Authority-cum-Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada reversing the order made in the aforesaid R.C.C. The respondent-landlord in R.C.C. No.64 of 1983 is the respondent in the present C.R.P. The said R.C.C. was filed under Section 8(3) of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter in short referred to as the 'Act' for the purpose of convenience) praying permission of the Court to deposit rents. The learned Rent Controller allowed the said R.C.C. and the same was reversed by the appellate authority. R.C.C. No.33 of 1984 on the file of the Rent Controller-cum-Principal District Munsiff, Kakinada filed by the respondent-landlord herein for eviction on certain grounds was dismissed by the learned Rent Controller and the same was reversed by the Appellate Authority-cum-Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada in R.C.A. No.8 of 1995. Aggrieved by the same, the tenant respondent in R.C.C. No.33 of 1984 had preferred the present C.R.P. No.6851 of 2003 under Section 22 of the Act. For the purpose of convenience and to avoid confusion hereinafter the parties would be referred to as 'landlord' and 'tenant'.

(2.) Contentions of Sri Subba Reddy Sri Subba Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the revision petitioner-tenant in these matters made the following submissions.

(3.) The learned Counsel had taken this Court through the evidence available on record and the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller and also the appellate authority. The Counsel also pointed out to the pleadings of the parties and would comment that in the pleadings specific stand relating to wilful default or the particulars of the months had not been clearly spelt out. Even relating to bonafide personal requirement, the learned Counsel would maintain that in the eviction petition it was pleaded that the landlord is not having any other premises but while deposing as PW.1, he admitted about his ownership in relation to other premises as well and hence the landlord is coming up with a false version. On the aspect of the ground of reconstruction or acts of nuisance, the learned Counsel would maintain that absolutely no acceptable evidence is available and hence these grounds are to be negatived forthwith. The learned Counsel also had pointed out to the admission said to have been made by PW.l in relation to the refusal of receipt of rent for the month of July. The Counsel had taken this Court through the relevant portion of evidence of PW.l in this regard. While further making his submissions inasmuch as by the date of filing of the eviction petition R.C.C.No.33 of 1984 since the tenant was not in any arrears whatsoever the ground of wilful default is not available to the landlord in the light of the view expressed by the decision of the Full Bench in Vinukonda Venkata Ramana v. Mootha Venkateshwar Rao, 2001 (6) ALD 27 (FB) = AIR 2002 AP 52, following the view in Dakaya alias Dakaiah v. Anjani, AIR 1996 SC 383 = 1996 (1) ALD (SCSN) 21. The learned Counsel also while further elaborating the submissions had pointed out that the receipts produced were disbelieved by the appellate authority on the ground that there are absolutely no postal endorsements and hence these cannot be said to be authenticated documents. This approach of the appellate authority definitely cannot be sustained. The Counsel also would maintain that the ground taken that the premises is required for bona fide personal requirement also cannot be sustained for the reason that virtually what had been deposed by PW.l is in fact for expansion of the business which would amount to additional accommodation. The Counsel also would maintain that the ingredients to be satisfied to establish the ground of additional accommodation would stand on a different footing. The learned Counsel also placed strong reliance in Kollipara Venkat Rao v. Moturi Lakshmi Sulochana, 2002 (1) LD 590 = 2002 (2) An.WR 6, Hari Prasad Badruka v, Tellukunta Laxmi, 2000 (1) ALT 551 and Fakruddin Ali Tarwala v. Ved Prakash Mishra, 2002 (6) ALT 421. The Counsel also made certain submissions in relation to the findings recorded by the appellate authority on the ground of wilful default and would comment that unless the procedure under Section 11 of the Act is followed, it cannot be said that the tenant had committed wilful default and hence in that view of the matter especially taking conduct of the parties into consideration that the tenant filed R.C.C.No.64 of 1983 praying for permission to deposit the rents and also in the light of the vague stand taken by the landlord eviction cannot be ordered on any one of the grounds. On the aspect of the suosequent events, the learned Counsel would comment that there is no acceptable evidence available on record and the way in which the ledger in R.C.C. No.64 of 1983 was considered also is not in accordance with law.