LAWS(APH)-2006-4-125

DEPURI RAMADEVI Vs. STATE OF A P

Decided On April 21, 2006
DEPURI RAMADEVI Appellant
V/S
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard Sri C. Praveen Kumar, the learned Counsel representing the petitioner, the learned Public Prosecutor and Sri T.M.K. Chaitanya, the learned Counsel representing Respondents 2 and 3 who were impleaded by virtue of the order of this Court dated 10/3/2005 in Crl. M.P. No.495/2005.

(2.) This episode is in relation to the death of one young lady by name Adilakshmi, a final year B.Com. student, the daughter of the petitioner/complainant. Respondents 2 and 3 who were impleaded in the present criminal petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter in short referred to as "Code" for the purpose of convenience) are shown as A-l and A-2 in P.R.C. No. 1/2000 on the file of VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam. The petitioner/complainant aggrieved of the order of the learned Magistrate in declining to take cognizance of the offences under Sections 302, 306 read with Section 201 I.P.C. as against Respondents 2 and 3 had preferred this criminal petition raising several grounds praying for the quashing of the said impugned order and to issue suitable directions. The learned Magistrate in fact had taken cognizance of the offence under Section 506 Part II I.P.C. as against Ananda Prasad @ Baji Naidu S/o Satyanarayana - A-2 shown as 3rd respondent in the present criminal petition. There appears to be some controversy between the parties relating to the maintainability of this criminal petition under Section 482 of the Code on the ground that the said order may fall or may not fall within the meaning of interlocutory order under Section 397(2) of the Code. This controversy is at the time of taking cognizance of the offences or declining to take cognizance of the offences by the learned Magistrate and incidentally the locus standi of the accused to participate in the enquiry and the limitations thereof at the pre-cognizance stage also had been raised. The Counsel on record made elaborate submissions relating to several of the aspects which had been referred to in the impugned order, the meticulous consideration of the report received from the police, sworn statements recorded by the Court, the contents of the complaint and also reference being made to the decisions in V. Sankaraiah v. State of A.P., 2002 (1) ALD (Crl.) 812 (AP) = 2002 Cri. LJ 3201 (AP) and Bura Manohar v. The State of A.P., 2002 Cri. LJ 3322 and would maintain that inasmuch as virtually the impugned order had been made by the learned Magistrate without just considering the prima facie case for taking cognizance but going into several details which may have to be gone into at the appropriate stage i.e., trial, the same cannot be sustained. Incidentally, the impugned order was referred to wherein it was stated that Sri S.K. Shareef, Advocate represented the accused before the VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam.

(3.) While dealing with an order releasing some of the accused on perusal of the police report and subsequent order summoning them, whether would fall under interlocutory order or not within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code, the Apex Court in Amarnath and others v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1977 SC 2185, observed that such order cannot be said to be an interlocutory order and does not fall within the mischief of subsection (2) of Section 397 of the Code and is not covered by the same and that being the position a revision against this order was fully competent under Section 397(1) or under Section 482 of the Code because the scope of both these sections in a matter of this kind is more or less the same. Strong reliance was placed on V.R. Nedunchezhian v. State, 2000 Crl. LJ 976 (Mad.), Madhu Lirnaye v. State of Maharashtra. AIR 1978 SC 47 = 1978 Crl. LJ 165, V.C. Shukla v. State, 1980 Crl. LJ 690 = AIR 1980 SC 962, Haryana Land Reclamation and Development Corporation v, State of Haryana, (1990) 3 SCC 588 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1. Further, elaborate submissions were made in relation to the framing of charges, alteration of charges, addition of accused at the appropriate stage, at the time of trial, on the strength of the evidence which may b= available before the Court and strong reliance was placed on State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan and another, 2004 (1) ALD (Crl.) 331 (SC) = 2004 Crl. LJ 920, State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan and another. 2003 (8) Supreme 861 and Sohan Lal v. State of Rajas than, (1990) 4 SCC 580. Reliance also was placed on R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein the nature and scope of inherent power of High Court to quash criminal proceedings at interlocutory stage had been dealt with. The Counsel representing the parties also placed reliance on Ashok Kumar v. Mariappan, 1993 (1) ALT (Crl.) 655 (Mad.), KM Mathew v. State of Kerala, ATR 2002 SC 2206 to explain the scope and ambit of Sections 202, 203 and 204 of the Code. Further, reliance was placed on Chandra Deo v. Prokash Chandra, 1963 (2) Crl. LJ 397 = AIR 1963 SC 1430, Nagawwa v. Veer anna, 1976 Crl. LJ 1533 = AIR 1976 SC 1947. Certain submissions were made in relation to whether an order issuing process or declining to issue process which may have the effect of termination of the proceedings would fall under interlocutory order or intermediate or final order and whether the remedy is by way of criminal revision case under Section 397 of the Code or by way of a criminal petition under Section 482 of the Code. This hair splitting thin distinction or the procedural technicality need not detain this Court any longer for the reason that a criminal revision case also would lie to the self-same Court though such order may be revisable even before the Court of Session.