DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE Vs. T MADHAVA RAO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard: Writ petitioner-respondent was subjected to a disciplinary enquiry, served with the memo of charges, called upon to participate in the enquiry and after a full-dressed enquiry punished by an order of compulsory retirement from service. He has moved this Court and invoked its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge has found no fault either with the enquiry or the findings in respect of the charges, but has held that punishment is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct and substituted the punishment of compulsory retirement by an order withholding increments.

(2.) We do not think it necessary in this case to narrate in our order how at the first instance the writ petition was ordered by substituting the punishment of compulsory retirement by the punishment of reduction in rank and how on an application for review of the judgment and order the petition was restored for a fresh hearing and after a hearing again the above order has been passed for in our view there is an error apparent on the face of the record in the Court entering into the area of discretion of disciplinary authority to decide about the sufficiency or otherwise of the punishment which has been imposed by the disciplinary authority. The scope of judicial review of a quasi-judicial order is well known and well established. Judicial review of an order is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. The Supreme Court has explained this power of judicial review in the case of H.B. Gandhi vs. Gopinat to mean a proceeding to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. It has been pointed out in a number of decisions that the High Court is not constituted for a proceeding under Art.226 of the Constitution, a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Art.226 of the Constitution, to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some consideration extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person would ever have arrived at that conclusion or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of the facts and if there be some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence isnota matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding under Art.226 of the Constitution. In a series of judgments, the leading one being the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, it is pointed out

(3.) Learned Single Judge has committed exactly that mistake which the Courts have always opined it should not do, i.e., he has almost entered into the merits to decide the adequacy of the punishment and substituted his order for the order of the disciplinary authority. While such a thing as pointed out above can be done by the appellate authority, it cannot be done in a proceeding for judicial review of an order imposing punishment which is passed in a disciplinary proceeding in accordance with law. Learned Counsel for the respondent has however, urged before us that the writ petitioner-respondent, when found that another person similarly charged, and according to her of no serious misdemeanour than the charge against the writ petitioner-respondent, has been reinstated in service, the writ petitioner thought this to be a ground to move the Court on its judicial side and invoke its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. If at all such a ground is available to the writ petitioner-respondent he could have taken the matter in appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority. In view of the principles above stated, it could not be taken as a ground for judicial review of the order of punishment which is passed in a departmental proceeding. Since we have found that the learned Single Judge has committed an obvious error of law, we have no hesitation in interfering with the impugned order.