VENIGANDLA SRINIVAS Vs. GOVT OF A P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two writ peri tions arise under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The issue relates to payment of interest. Advance possession of the lands in question was taken for submergence under Bairavai Cheruvu of Damarcherla Mandal and village of Nalgonda District for public purpose viz. to cater to the urgent needs of the agriculturists. Possession of the lands was taken over on 8-2-1971. The award was passed on 24-11-1992. The respondent has awarded interest at the rate of 4% for some period and 6% for the rest of the period that too on the notional value of the land at Rs. 1,500/- per acre. In fact, the market value fixed was at Rs.12,500/- per acre. Under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (for short 'the Act) the interest has to be awarded on the market value plus solatium of 30%.

(2.) The above injury suffered by the peti tioners and the anomaly created has got to be rectified. While the Land Acquisition Act mandates payment of interest on the market value, the land acquisition officer had grossly erred in computing the interest on the notional value @ Rs. 1500/- per acre. Likewise, while the land acquisition Act prescribes the payment of interest @ 9% per annum for the first year of taking possession and 15% per annum for the subsequent period till payment, the Land Acquisition Officer had awarded interest @ 4% per annum for some period andfor the rent of the period @ 6% per annum. It is ununderstandable as to on what basis, the land acquisition officer did so. Under the original Central Land Acquisition Act the interest was to be awarded @ 6% per annum on the compensation. While the same was reduced to 4% by an Act of Andhra Pradesh, by amending the Central Act. But in view of the Central Act, 68 of 1984 amending the Land Acquisition Act receiving the President's assent necessarily the interest has to be awarded @ 9% per annum for the first year of taking possession and 15% per annum for the subsequent period. There is no escape for the State from this statutory obligation. Discharge of this obligation is necessary to conform to the Constitutional guarantee under Article 300-Aof the Constitution of India. I do not countenance the argument of the learned Government Pleader that the petitioners had to approach the Civil Court for the remedy. I reiterate my view that alternative remedy theory is inapplicable whenever the State either violates the provisions of the Constitution or fails to discharge unconstitutional obligations. Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, which was hitherto a fundamental right under Article 31, guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his property, save by authority of law, the law being the Land Acquisition Act empowering the State to compulsorily acquire a person's property with corresponding obligation of payment of compensation and when and a guarantee is breached, a Constitutional Court like this, when approached, has to extend its hand to remedy the situation. I also reject the argument of Mr. A.PuIla Reddy that in addition to the interest, the petitioners are en titied for additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act. The said provision, which was also inserted under the amending Act 68 of 1984, provides for compensating the persons as the market value is frozen by issuance of notification under Section 4(1). The Parliament took note of the fact of Governments issuing Section 4(1) notification in order to freeze the prices and then leisurely passing the awards and taking possession as and when they choose. The Parliament had correctly plugged this loophole of unfair practice of the State, as after freezing the market value by issuing Section 4(1) notification, the State was taking itsown time either to pass the awards or to take possession. The deprived person was helpless as he was not entitled for any interest till the possession was taken over and there was no spedficperiod fixed under the statute for taking possession. Even, there was no period fixed for passing the award. Tomakeup this loss, the amendingActprovided additional compensation @ 12% per annum from Section 4(1) notification till the date of award or possession whichever is earlier and from such date of award or possession, the deprived person will get 9% per annum for the first year and 15% per annum for the subsequent years. As such, the only proper and harmonious construction of the Act is that for the period covered by Section ,23(1- A) of the Act, Section 34 of the Act which contemplates of payment of interest on the compensation and which is payable either from the date of the award or possession, whichever is earlier does not operate as both Sections 23 (1- A) and Section 34 of the Act are mutually exclusive and only one Section operates at a time. While Section34 of the Act does not come into play a t all for the period from Section 4(1) notification to the date of the award or possession and during which peirod only Section 23(1-A) of the Act operates obligating the State topay 12% additional compensation, the said Section23 (1-A) ipso facto ceases to operates the moment of either passing of the award or taking the possession and then Section 34 comes into play warranting payment of interest @ 9% per annum for the first year and 15% per annum for the subsequent years. In the instance cases, as the possession was already taken even before Section 4(1) notification, Section 23 (1-A) of the Act, did not come into play a tall and as such, thepetitionersare not en titled for the additionalcompensation of 12%per annum under Section 23(1-A).

(3.) Mr. A. Pulla Reddy has relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in Spl. Thnsildar (L.A.) PWD Schemes Vijayawada vs. M.A. Jabbar and As$tt/Commissioner,Gadag Sub-division, Gadagvs.Mathapathi Basavanneww and Others in support of his argument for the award of additional compensation @ 12%per annum under Section23 (1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, but those two decisions are not applicable to the facts of this case as in the said two decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, the interest was not awarded to the deprived property owners while in the instant case interest has been awarded to the petitioners, but on a wrong computation and calculation and the same is being rectified in this writ petition which now conforms fully to the Constitutional guarantee under Article 300-A of the Indian Constitution.