COMMISSIONER MUNICIPALITY TIRUPATI Vs. M SRINIVASULU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Respondents 1 to 29 claiming to be workmen in the establishment of the petitioner-municipality on NMR basis and further contending that they have been discharging the same functions and duties attached to the regular post, made a joint application before the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Anantapur by filing a Miscellaneous Petition No. 152 of 1992 under Section 33-C(2) for the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 (for short 'the Act'). In that application, the workmen prayed for grant of relief of equal pay for equal work as well as payment of certain sums of money payable to them for having done over-time work. Before the Labour Court, the management contended in its statement of objections that the petitioner-municipality is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act and therefore the M.P. filed by the workmen was incompetent and no relief could be granted by the Labour court. That was the only contention raised in the counter filed by the petitioner-municipality. At this stage itself it is relevant to note that in the counter the management did not take the stand that the workmen-respondents did not/do not perform duties and functions attached to the regular post. In the course of enquiry on the said application, the management examined its Assistant Engineer as M.W. 1. M.W. 1 in his statement categorically stated that the respondents-workmen have been discharging the duties just like permanent employees and the duties discharged by the respondents workmen and the permanent employees are identical. On the basis of the evidence placed before it, the Labour Court passed the order granting the relief sought by the workmen. Hence, this Writ Petition by the municipality.

(2.) Sri. G. Chandrasekhara Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the Municipalities placed only one argument before the Court in support of the Writ Petition. According to the learned Standing Counsel, the M.P. filed by the workmen itself was incompetent and the relief sought by the workmen should not have been granted by the Labour Court by exercise of its power under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. Elaborating this argument, Sri Reddy would contend that the question whether the respondents-workmen have been discharging the same duties and functions as the permanent employees relates to an incidence of fact and any finding on such incidence of fact should be recorded by the Labour Court only in a properly instituted industrial dispute under Section 10 of the Act and not otherwise. According to the learned Standing Counsel, the Labour Court, under Section 33-C(2) of the Act is empowered to compute the pecuniary benefits payable to the workmen only in a case where there is no dispute between the parties relating to their entitlement. According to Sri Reddy, no Industrial Court has passed any award declaring that the respondents-workmen are entitled to the relief sought by them after recording a finding that they have been discharging the same functions and duties as the permanent employees. In support of his submission, Sri Reddy would place reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corpn., Delhi v. Ganesh Razak 1994 I CLR 370 (Del.).

(3.) It is true that the Labour Court, by virtue of the power under Section 33-C of the Act, cannot entertain application for computation of pecuniary benefits if that case involves determination of the entitlement for such relief. In such a case, the proper remedy for the workmen is to approach the Industrial Court by instituting an industrial dispute under Section 10 of the Act. The decision of the apex Court on which the learned Standing Counsel places reliance is not at all helpful to the petitioner-municipality. A reading of para 13 of the said judgment makes it clear that in that case the claim of the workmen that they should be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workmen on the principles of equal pay for equal work was disputed by the management. In those circumstances, the apex Court quite rights held that application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act was impermissible. That is not the situation obtaining in the present case. In the present case, the workmen specifically pleaded and contended that they have been discharging the same functions and duties as the permanent employees. That factual assertion made by the workmen is not at all traversed or denied by the management in its counter. Added to this, M.W. 1, in his evidence, categorically stated that the functions and duties discharged by the respondents-workmen and the permanent employees are identical and one and the same. If there is no dispute about this fact, then, immediately the constitutional creed 'equal pay for equal work' flowing from Article 14 of the Constitution should come into play and the management is required to obey the said constitutional command. Sri Reddy, quiet fairly does not dispute the correctness of this position in law. Sri Reddy is not in a position to place any authority to support his submission that even in a given case where the management does not dispute the plea of the workmen that they have been discharging the same duties and functions as the permanent employees, nevertheless it is necessary for the workmen to approach the Industrial Court and seek adjudication on their entitlement to the equal pay. This argument of the learned Standing Counsel is not at all acceptable to the Court. There is no question of adjudication by any Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court unless there is an issue arising out of the pleadings of the parties. That is the basic premise for any and every adjudication. When the management agrees that the concerned workmen have been discharging the same functions and duties as the regular or permanent employees, the workmen cannot be forced to go before the Industrial Court to prove the obvious and the admitted. No other point is argued in support of the writ petition. The Writ Petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 1,000.00.