B VENKAMMA Vs. D NARLSI REDDY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A short but an important question of general importance which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether a petition filed by an injured person before me Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for short 'M. A.C.T.' on 24-11-1990 for compensation in respect of an accident which took place on 16-3-1989 is hit by limitation or it is saved by the subsequent change in law brought about by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 54 of 1994 which was brought into force with effect from 14-11-1994. This precise question arises for consideration and resolution in the back drop of the following facts: It is the case of the appellant Bakka Venkamma that she sustained certain physical injuries on account of an accident occurred on 16-3-1989 involving a motor vehicle owned by the second respondent, driven by the first respondent and insured by the third respondent Insurance Company. The appellant filed original petition for compensation on 24-11-1990. This O.P. purported to have been filed under Sec.l 10-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is relevant to note at this stage itself that by the time the O.P. was filed on 24-11-1990 the old Act was repealed and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short 'the Act, was enacted and brought into force with effect from 1-7-1989. Therefore the original petition should have been filed under Sec.l66(l) of the Act and not under Sec.ll0-A of the old Act. When the accident took place on 16-3-1989 the old Act was in operation. The owner and the driver of the motor vehicle did not contest the claim of the appellant before the M. A.C.T. Only the third respondent Insurance Company contested the claim by filing a counter. After filing the counter and after the M.A.C.T. framed the issues the Insurance Company raised an additional issue contending that the original petition filed by the appellant on 24-11-1990 was hit by limitation and therefore it was incompetent and not maintainable. In that view of the matter the M.A.C.T. framed an additional issue relating to the question whether the original petition filed by the appellant is hit by limitation or not and the M. A.C.T. by its order under appeal dated 12-7-1991 upheld the contention of the Insurance Company and held that the O.P. filed by the appellant is hit by limitation and therefore not maintainable. In that view of the matter the original petition is dismissed.

(2.) At the outset I deem it fit to place on record my appreciation for the services rendered by Sri M. Narender Reddy as Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant as well as Sri Kota Subba Rao, the learned Counsel and a member of this Bar in assisting the Court placing all the relevant authorities before the Court. In this case Sri P.V.R. Mohan Rao has filed vakalat for the appellant. When this case was posted for final hearing before this Court on 7-9-1995 none appeared nor any representation was made on behalf of the appellant or her counsel. Since it was a final hearing matter and filed by an illiterate village woman seeking compensation for the injuries suffered by her in the accident occurred on 16-3-1989 involving the vehicle owned by the second respondent and driven by the first respondent and insured by the third respondent- insurance company, I thought it not just to dismiss the appeal for non- prosecution and requested Sri M. Narender Reddy, a learned member of mis Bar to appear as Amicus Curiae and argue the matter on behalf of the appellant. Sri M. Narender Reddy readily agreed and assisted the Court. Sri Kota Subba Rao who quite often appears for the Insurance Companies also came forward to assist the Court and accordingly he was also heard in the case.

(3.) Sri Narender Reddy, the learned Counsel submitted that the rejection of the O.P. by the M.A.C.T. on the ground that it was hit by limitation was justified on the date of the order i.e., 12-7-1991. According to him, when O.P. was filed on24-ll-1990matapplication was obviously under Sec.166 of the New Act and in that view of the matter the M.A.C.T. had no power to condone the delay in making the application unless such an application was made within the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. In the present case the accident occurred on 16-3-1989 and therefore the application ought to have been made by the appellant on or before 16-3-1990 whereas the application was made only on 24-11-1990. In that view of the matter the M. A.C.T. had no power to condone the delay in making the application beyond 12 months from the date of occurrence of the accident. However, Sri Narender Reddy the learned Counsel does not stop there but would argue mat the present appeal was preferred to this Court in time and this appeal being a continuous proceedings of the original proceedings, this Court should take into account any change in law subsequent to the date of the order under appeal and if there is any change in law such a law should be applied. Sri Narender Reddy would point out that after the M.A.C.T. made the order under appeal on 12-7-1991, the Act was amended by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act No.54 of 1994 and brought into force with effect from 14-11-1994. By Amendment Act 54 of 1994 subsection3 (3) of Section 166 of the Act is deleted and the resultant position is that after this amendment there is no limitation at all to make an application for compensation. Sri Narender Reddy would argue that since the limitation prescribed for making application for compensation is only a procedural matter, the amendment brought about by Amendment Act 54 of 1994 should apply retrospectively, mat is to say from the inception of the Act. In support of his submission Sri Narender Reddy placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar vs. national Insurance Company Ltd. and others. On the other hand Sri Kota Subba Rao, the learned Counsel who assisted the Court placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Mohd. Riyazuddin vs. The General Manager, APSRTC, Hyderabad, and in Maqbal Bee vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation to contend that the law which governs an action is the law that is prevailing at the time of institution of the claim petition but not the law brought into force subsequent to the institution of the claim petition. Sri Subba Rao would also place reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in para 11 of the judgment in Vinod Gurudas Raikar vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.