SURYA PRAKASH Vs. MOHAMMAD YOUNOUS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In these revision petitions preferred under Section 22 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act'), the only question that arises for consideration is whether the Appellate Authority constituted under Section 20 of the Act is empowered to condone the delay in filing appeals on sufficient cause being shown by the appellants by invoking Section 5 of the (Indian) Limitation Act, 1963. The Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court (FAC) acting as an appellate authority under the Act, took the view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply and he, therefore, summarily rejected the un-numbered appeals by a common order passed in 19 cases. The aggrieved parties most of whom are tenants are questioning the correctness of the order passed by the appellate authority.

(2.) There is no uniformity in the views expressed in various judgments of the A.P. High Court. In some decisions, it was held that the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority under the Act were 'persona designate' but not a 'Court' and the Act being a special legislation on the subject of lease, rent and eviction, the general provisions contained in the Limitation Act have no application. A contrary view was expressed in certain other decisions. In the context of Industrial Disputes Act, a Full Bench of this Court in The Nalgonda Co-operative Market Society Ltd. vs. Labour Court, Hyderabad took the view that the Labour Court which is constituted as an Appellate Authority under the A.P. Shops & Establishments Act is not a 'Court' within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was held that judicial functions performed by a Labour Court are different from tnose performed by an ordinary Court of law. It was pointed out that the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act make Section 5 of the Act applicable to an appeal filed under special or local law in a civil or criminal Court insofar as Section 5 is not expressly excluded. The Labour Court, it was pointed out, cannot be regarded as an ordinary Court of law though it has certain trappings of a Court. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Town Municipal Council, Athany vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court. Purporting to follow the above judgment, the learned appellate authority-Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, held that the earlier decisions of this Court viz.,(l) GDM Rao vs. Ranga Panaiah (AIR 1975 AP 13); (2) P. Bhaskar Rao vs. Subbaraju (1967 (2) An.W.R.58); (3) M. Jagannadham vs. N. Rangaiah (1983 (1) ALT 106 SN); (4) Vinok Kumar vs. Ravindernath (1985 (1) APLJ 57); and (5) Srinivasa Rao vs. High Court ofA.P. (AIR 1989 AP 258) which arose under the Rent Control Act must be deemed to have been overruled by the Full Bench decision. He therefore, rejected the applications for condonation of delay in limine on the ground that there was no provision for condonation.

(3.) It is unnecessary to deal with the question whether the ratio of the Full Bench judgment which concerned itself with the powers of the Labour Court under A.P. Shops and Establishment Act is applicable to the present case and whether the earlier decisions of this Court must be deemed to have been overruled by the Full Bench. The recent judgment of the Supreme Court furnishes a complete answer to the issue onhand. The issue isno more re; Integra in view of that decision. But, on utterly untenable grounds, the appellate authority distinguished the judgment of the Supreme Court and declined to follow the same,' though it is a direct decision rendered with reference to an analogous enactment. In order to dispel the doubts in regard to the applicability of the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Mukri Gopalan vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker and to expose the untenability of the reasoning of the appellate authority, what all is required to be done is an analysis and reiteration of the principles laid down in the said Judgment of the Supreme Court.