BANU PRASAD CH Vs. P SUBBA RAO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This C.R.P. arises out of an order in C.M.A. No.169/94 filed against the order in LA. 166/93 passed by the VI Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The petitioners are the plaintiffs in the suit for injunction. They sought for a temporary injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The I.A. was dismissed. On appeal, the learned Additional Chief Judge confirmed the said order. Hence this Civil Revision Petition.

(2.) The Courts below, on a prima facie view of the case, have rightly negatived the case of the petitioners that they are statutory tenants. Admittedly the tenancy was in favour of the Andhra Bank, of which the first petitioner was an employee. It is also not in dispute that the Andhra Bank surrendered the tenancy. When the Bank itself has surrendered the tenancy, the employee who was allotted accommodation by the Bank has to necessarily vacate the premises. If the employee clings over to the possession even after the surrender of tenancy by the Bank, as rightly held by the Appellate Court, his possession will be that of a trespasser and therefore no injunction can be granted.

(3.) The second aspect of the case is whether by virtue of the agreement of sale dated 7-4-1991 said to have been entered into between the sixth respondent herein and the second petitioner (first petitioner's wife), the petitioners are entitled to continue in possession. It is alleged that the sixth respondent purchased the property from the owners, namely, respondents 1 and 2 and the sixth respondent in turn executed an agreement of sale. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that pursuant to that agreement, the petitioners are entitled to remain in possession notwithstanding the fact that the tenancy rights have come to an end. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that this aspect of the matter had not been gone into by the appellate Court. My attention was drawn to paragraph 6 of the plaint wherein a reference to the agreement of sale was made. It is not clear from the judgment whether this point was raised before the appellate Court. In the affidavit filed in support of the I. A., it does not appear that the petitioners tried to defend their possession on the strength of the agreement of sale. I am, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the appellate Court. However, I would like to advert to one aspect. It is stated that a suit O.S. No. 1087/94, which is a suit filed by the petitioners herein against the same parties, is pending on the file of the II Additional Judge. That suit was filed for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 7-4-1991. An order of ad interim injunction was also granted in that suit. There again, the question would arise whether the petitioners are entitled to remain in possession by virtue of the alleged agreement of sale till the disposal of the suit. Suffice it to observe that the question whether the petitioners are entitled to remain in possession by virtue of the agreement of sale and whether temporary injunction ought to be continued in favour o.f the petitioners, is a matter that can be decided independently by the learned II Additional Judge without being fettered by the findings in the impugned order.