NAZIR AHMED ANSARI Vs. LATEEF BI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Criminal Revision Case is filed questioning the order dated 9-7-1993 passed in Crl. R.P. No. 31 of 1992, by the III Additional Sessions Judge, Kurnool. The respondent filed Crl. M.P. No. 131 of 1991 in M.C. No. 83 of 1979, on the file of the Additional Judicial 1st Class Magistrate, Kurnool, under Section 127 Cr.P.C. (for short, `the Code') for cancellation of the order of maintenance dated 1-8-1980 in M.C. No. 83 of 1979, on the sole ground that after the enactment of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 (for short, `the Act') a divorced woman is no more entitled to claim maintenance beyond iddat period. The learned Magistrate allowed the petition by an order dated 8-5-1992. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent filed Crl. R.P. No. 31 of 1992. The III Additional Sessions Judge, Karnool, allowed the Crl. R.P. and set aside the order passed by the Magistrate on the ground that the Act is only prospective in operation and does not affect the orders of maintenance already passed under Ss. 125 to 128 of the Code, granting maintenance to divorced woman and on the ground that the decision in Usman Khan Bhamani v. Fathimunnisa Begum, AIR 1990 Andh Pra 225 : (1990 Cri LJ 1364) (FB), did not consider the question of retrospectivity of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner forcefully contends before me that after the enactment of the Act, a divorced Muslim woman is not entitled for maintenance from the former husband beyond the period of iddat. He argues that the decision of this Court in Usman Khan Bahamani v. Fathimunnisa Begum, AIR 1990 Andh Pra 225 : (1990 Cri LJ 1364) (FB), has considered all aspects of and elucidated the scope and ambit of the Act and categorically held that the right of the divorced Muslim woman to obtain maintenance is obliterated except for the period of Iddat, under Section 125 of the Code, after the advent of the Act.

(2.) The respondent is not present, though she was served. She is also not represented by an advocate.

(3.) The short question that falls for consideration is whether the petitioner can still be held liable to pay the maintenance granted to the respondent under Section 127 of the Code in view of the Act.