H M T LIMITED Vs. M CHANDRASEKHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard : We do not find any merit in the appeals. But, at the same time, we do not see any requirement of a scheme for absorption on permanent basis of the casual employees. It is not in dispute before us that the appellants herein represent an industrial establishment for the purposes of Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the writ petitioner-respondents qualify as industrial workers for the protection under various provisions of the said Chapter read with Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is the case accepted by both parties before us that the writ petitioner-respondents have been in continuous employment of the appellants for more than 240 days in a calendar year and are qualified for the benefit of continuous service as contemplated under S. 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. They are accordingly protected from retrenchment under S. 25-N as well as S. 25-F read with Sections 25-G and 25-H thereof. The continuous service of the writ petitioner-respondents thus extends the protection against retrenchment by a statute which, it is conceded, is applicable to the appellants. They are also entitled to fair wages and the employers have no option but to pay the same wages to the writ petitioner respondents which are payable to the regular employees for the said purpose. If it is not so done and work is taken on less pay/wages to the writ petitioner-respondents, it will be in the teeth of Art. 23 of the Constitution of India. In People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982-II-LLJ-454) the Supreme Court has pointed out : 1. that right to wages as a return to the work is protected under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India, and 2. any work taken on less than due wages for the work is an infringement of the fundamental right of life as enshrined under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India and is in the teeth of the prohibition applied to the forced labour under Art. 23 thereof. This judgment is also an authority for the principle that if the employer is a State, it has a duty to pay to the employer fair wages and if the wages paid are less than the prescribed minimum wages, it is a forced labour. It is not in dispute that the HMT Ltd. the first appellant in all these appeals, is engaged in the manufacture and production of Machine Tools and is a Government undertaking. S. 2(g) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 has defined 'Scheduled employment' to mean an employment specified in the Schedule or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment and has given to the appropriate Government power to fix minimum rate of wages payable to employees by the employer. What is important, however, to notice here is that equal work must bring equal pay; otherwise it will cause discrimination. In State of U. P. v. J. P. Chaurasia, (1989-I-LLJ-309) to which learned counsel for the appellants has drawn our attention, it is laid down that in the matter of employment the Government of a Socialist State must protect the weaker Sections. It must be ensured that there is no exploitation of poor and ignorant. It is the duty of the State to see that the under-privileged or weaker Sections get their dues. Even if they have voluntarily accepted the employment on unequal terms, the State should not deny their basic-rights of equal treatment. It is against this background that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' has to be construed in the first place. Second. This principle has no mechanical application in every case of similar work which has to be read into Art. 14 of the Constitution. Art. 14 permits reasonable classification founded on different basis. It is now well established that the classification can be based on some qualities or characteristics of persons, grouped together and not in others who are left out. Those qualities or characteristics must, of course have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience could be the proper basis for classification to promote efficiency in administration. He or she also learns by experience as much as by other means. It cannot be denied that the quality of work performed by persons of longer experience is superior than the work of newcomers. In an earlier judgment in Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982-I-LLJ-344) the Supreme Court has pointed out : (at pp 347-348)

(2.) Keeping in view the above we are inclined to direct that the appellant No. 1 has a duty to pay to the writ petitioner-responsibilities such amount of wages/emoluments/salary, which it is paying to others who are engaged by it for work of same skill and responsibility as it has entrusted to the writ petitioner-respondents. Writ petitioner-respondents have brought to the notice of the Court the wage structure under which for the same kind of work others are paid a particular scale of pay. There is no reason, although an attempt is sought to be made by the appellants to dispute, since there is no material to the contrary not to accept the assertion of the writ petitioner-respondents in this case and to grant the relief to the extent that they must receive pay from the due date equal to the pay of those who are engaged for work of similar skill and responsibility.

(3.) To conclude, we are of the opinion that any direction to regularise the services as prayed for, or to frame a scheme for regularisation will not be necessary. It will also be not necessary in our view to examine whether the writ petitioner-respondents have been appointed by following any procedure of selection etc. or whether they have entered through a back door and whether they are entitled to absorption in a post to which they are not entitled to as asserted by the appellants. The above, however, in our opinion is a right accruing automatically to the writ petitioner-respondents by dint of the appointments provided to them by the appellants under the various enactments and the Constitution of India. Before we part with this judgment, we propose to record that it may appear reasonable if someone who has not committed a wrong urges that those who want to benefit themselves by a wrong should not be granted any relief. The Court shall not encourage any one to take advantage of a wrong done by him. The appellant No. 1 which itself and no one else is responsible for granting to the writ petitioner-respondents appointments, however, cannot turn back and say that it gave to them some irregular or wrong benefits by admitting them to the casual appointments in its establishment. No one can ask for a premium in his favour for his recalcitrance. If today the appellant No. 1 has found itself in such a predicament, it is its own doings and it must pay for it. We have not examined, for the above reasons, the case of the writ petitioner-respondents that they were given compassionate appointments for the loss of the bread-winners in harness. We have proceeded on the basis of the admitted facts to come to the above conclusion.