(1.) On the complaint filed by the first respondent, the Special judge for Economic Offences, Hyderabad, has taken cognizance of the offence under section 371(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 (for short, "the Act"), in C.C. No. 63 of 1991 against the petitioners and issued process. This petition is filed to quash the said proceedings.
(2.) Counsel for the petitioners has raised three contentions : the first contention is that the taking of cognizance of the offence is barred by limitation prescribed under section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "the Code'), the other contentions are that all the offenders liable for the offence are not arrayed as accused in the case, therefore, the prosecution is vitiated; and that the clubbing of offences arising out of two financial years is unlawful.
(3.) I will take up the first contention which is a precondition for taking cognizance of the offence. It is contended that the offence under sub-section (1) of section 371 of the Act being punishable with a term of imprisonment of six months, the period of limitation for taking cognizance of the offence under section 468(2)(b) of the Code is one year. Since the offence has been committed on 21/08/1991, and A 19/08/1992, the complaint ought to have been filed and the court ought to have taken cognizance of the offence within one year thereof. Since the complaint has been filed on 26/09/1994, the complaint is clearly barred by limitation and the prosecution is, therefore, unlawful. Sri Innayya Reddy; Standing Counsel for the Central Government, appearing for the first respondent, submits that the question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and this court cannot determine, at this stage, whether the complaint was barred by limitation, and the petitioner is entitled to raise this question before the Special judge and pray for dropping the proceedings.