PRIYADARSHINI CEMENT LIMITED Vs. SRINIVASA RAO JAYANTHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner is the management. The first respondent has raised an Industrial Dispute No. 332 of 1992 which is pending before the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Visakhapatnam. In this writ petition, the management is seeking a direction restraining the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court from exercising its jurisdiction over the Industrial Dispute No. 332 of 1992 raised by the first respondent and to pass appropriates orders.

(2.) Sri Ramchandra Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner-management would place two fold arguments in support of the writ petition viz., (1) that the first respondent is not a workman within the meaning of that term as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act') and therefore the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute raised by the first respondent. (2) that the materials placed before the Court clinchingly prove the fact that the first respondent is guilty of the misconduct alleged against him and looking from that angle also, there is no warrant or any necessity for the Industrial Court to proceed with the adjudication. These arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner are not acceptable to the Court. In the first place the question whether the person is a workman or not within the meaning of the definition of the term under the Industrial Disputes Act is not a pure question of law but it is a mixed question of facts and law. The argument of the learned counsel is that the first respondent was employed in a supervisory capacity drawing wages exceeding Rs. 1,600.00 per mensem and he was authorised by the management to take independent decisions within the limit of his authority without the sanction of his superiors and therefore it could not be said that the petitioner is a workman. Any finding, that may be recorded on the contentions now raised by the management is required to be recorded on the basis of acceptable evidence only after affording opportunity to both the sides to lead evidence either to support the claim or to deny the claim. That is precisely the intendment of any adjudication before the Industrial Court.

(3.) The other contention of the learned counsel is that there is sufficient acceptable material already on record to bring home the charge of misconduct against the first respondent and therefore no useful purpose would be served by subjecting the petitioner-management to the industrial adjudication.