DANAVATH BICHYA Vs. DIST COLLECTOR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ petition which has been filed questioning the notification under Land Acquisition Act, 1894, raises a question as to whether the land of a weaker section can be acquired for providing house sites to other weaker sections of the society.

(2.) A draft notification under Sec. 4(1) of the LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was gazetted on 9-9-1986 which was followed by Sec. 6 declaration dated 27-1-1987. Non-publication of the substance of the . notification, be it in the locality or newspapers, though raised, has got no basis as the said legal formality has been complied with, as I am satisfied that the substance of Sec. 4(1) notification was published in the . locality on 26-9-1986 and in two newspapers, one English and another vernacular on 10-1-1987 and 12-1-1987. Draft declaration under Sec. 6(1) of the Act was gazetted on 27-1-1987 while the same was published in two newspapers, one in English and another in vernacular language on 13-2-1987 and 18-2-1987. As such, the notifications under Sec. 4(1) and Sec. 6(1) of the Act are not liable to be struck down on. the ground of non-observance of formalities.

(3.) The extent of lands owned by the petitioners and notified for acquisition is Ac.3-21 cts in S.No. 479/2, Ac. 1-52 cts. in S.No. 482/2, and Ac.1-02 cts in S.No. 482/3 respectively situated at Dilwarpur village of Damercherla Mandal of Nalgonda District. The concept of public purpose is not static. It varies from time to time and according to circumstances of thought prevailing in the Country or State, as the case may be. There is no definition of public purpose. It is also not capable of precise and comprehensive definition. It is a generic term implying general interest of community as opposed to the particular interest of the individuals. The purpose in view should contemplate the public good. Where the Legislature confers powers on anybody to take lands compulsorily for a particular purpose, it is on the ground that using of that land for that purpose will be for public good. As the purpose of acquisition is to provide houses to the weaker sections of the society, nobody can deny that the same is for a public purpose. The Government in a welfare State has to necessarily take steps to provide house-sites to the weaker sections of the society. Hardship to the individuals cannot be the criterion as providing house sites to weaker sections, as a class, is for common good and individual interest should always subserve the common good. But the scheduled tribes (the petitioners are Lambadas in this case) form a class themselves. It is well recognised that scheduled tribes in this Country and in the State are considered to be more down-trodden and they are the weakest of the weaker sections. Viewed in that context, even if the petitioners owned some meagre extents of dry lands, it does not mean to say that they ceased to be down-trodden and that they are the landlords in the real sense. Inspite of the small holdings of the petitioners, they still remain the down trodden. The allegation of the respondents that apart from this land acquired, the petitioners own some other land also is very vague, as no particulars have been mentioned. Even if the allegation is taken as true, petitioners will be left with six acres of land jointly even after the acquisition of the above land. That does not make any difference, as the petitioners do not cease to be down-trodden and as they are scheduled tribes, their cases have to be considered in the context of their being STs and not in ordinary sense. So many reform and protective laws were enacted for safeguarding the rights of the tribals. The prime consideration of the Government is to see that the tribals are not exploited by anybody. Even the government is not an exception. In fact, according to the governmental guidelines including that of Government Memo No. 3309-C2/83-2, dated 23-3-1984 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, the consent of scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and small farmers should not be taken as primary consideration for selecting the lands for acquisition for the purpose of house sites. That apart, protection of the rights of the scheduled tribe being a public policy, the same cannot be waived at all. There can be no waiver of the said right. A reading of the counter makes it clear that the stress is on the consent said to have been given by the petitioners for acquisition of their lands and not on the inevitability of the acquisition. In fact, inevitability plea is too vague to be accepted and it rather sounds incredible that in a large revenue village, no land of non-tribal is ', available for providing house sites excepting the land of these poor and gullible tribals. As such, the element of consent projected by the respondents cannot be accepted at all. In so far as the compulsory acquisition is concerned, the public policy being to protect the rights of the tribals, the said public policy cannot be denied by another public policy of acquiring land to other down- trodden. While acquiring the lands for distribution of house sites to the poor, public purpose can be infered when the non-weaker section class is subjected to acquisition of their lands and then only there is a public purpose as individual interest of the said non- weaker sections (particularly non-tribals in this case) shall subserve the common good of the weaker sections. But, it cannot be said that there is element of public purpose when the land of tribals is subjected to acquisition who are more weaker among the weaker sections. In that view of the matter, the acquisition in the instant case in so far as the lands of the petitioners are concerned, has to fail, as being devoid of public purpose. I make it clear that this proposition is being laid only in the context of public purpose relating to the provision of house sites to weaker sections. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.