LAKSHMI RICE MILL Vs. B VENKATARAMAIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Second Appeal is directed against the reversing judgment in a suit arising under Partnership Act for dissolution and rendition of accounts. The plaintiff who is the 8th respondent herein filed O.S. No.479 of 1980 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Machilipatnam, for dissolution and rendition of accounts. While dissolution is of the firm defendant No.l, the relief of rendition of accounts is sought for only against defendant No.2, who is the appellant herein. In the suit the firm was defendant No.l and the partners were defendants 2 to 9. Defendant No.l firm was to do a business of rice-milling which was obtained on lease for the period from 21-1-1977 to 30-11-1978. The firm conducted the rice-milling business upto 17-11-1977. But on 17-11-1977 the firm was dissolved on the ground that it was not at all enabled for conducting the firm business any further. Meeting of the partners of the firm was held on 17-11-1977 and a majority of the partners resolved to dissolve the firm and permit defendant No.3 to continue the lease for the unexpired portion from 17-11-1977 to 30-11-1978. The said resolution is Ex.B-2 which is not disputed. Basing on Ex.B-2 resolution, Ex.B-1 letter jointly signed by defendants 2 and 3 was addressed to the District Supply Officer to transfer the licence from defendant No.l firm in the name of defendant No.3 for conducting the rice- milling business. Issuance of Ex.B-1 is also not disputed. The dispute is only as regards rendition of accounts for the period from 21-1-1977 to 17-11-1977. The plea of the plaintiff for dissolution has to be rejected outright and was rightly was rejected by the trial Court holding that there was dissolution of the defendant No.l firm on 17-11-1977. The said finding of fact wasalso con firmed by the lower appellate Court. The correctness of the said finding of dissolution is not canvassed before this Court and the same had become final. Then only remains is rendition of accounts. According to the plaintiff the only person who was liable to render accounts was defendant No.2. But according to defendant No.2 it was defendant No.3 who was liable to render accounts, as not only defendant No.3 was a partner of the firm but was also a working partner even though he was a managing partner and that as a working partner defendant No.3 was the custodian of the account books as he was transacting the business. The trial Court had concurred with the contention of defendant No.2 disagreeing with the claim of plaintiff and granted decree for rendition of accounts against defendant No.3 for the period from 21-1-1977 to 17-11-1977. Such a plea was not at all sought for by the plaintiff. It is not that the trial Court had no power to granta decree against defendant No.3, but there is no such plea by the plaintiff and there is no such issue and defendant No.3 was not alerted on that aspect to get prepared for either adduction of evidence or to address arguments. The parties are expected to adduce evidence and address arguments on the pleadingsand triable issues. Pleadings must necessarily be of the plaintiff and the pleading of defendant No.2 against defendant No.3 is not of that relevance. When the plaintiff himself did not want a decree for rendition of accounts against defendant No.3 it was not proper on the part of the trial Court to direct defendant No.3 for rendition of accounts without an alternative pleading and prayer by the plaintiff in that regard. On appeal by defendant No.3 the lower appellate Court has reversed the judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court and held that inasmuch as defendant No.2 was the managing partner and in accordance with Section 69(3) of the Indian Partnership Act he was liable to render accounts and not defendant No.3. I do not concur with this finding of the lower appellate Court for the reason that Ex.D-2 do not cast such an obligation on the part of defendant No.2. In fact defendant No.3 is made liable to render accounts not only for the period from 17-11-1977 onwards but also for the past transactions as the words: The said words make it very crystal clear that for the past transactions i.e., anterior to 17-11-1977 defendant No.3 is made laible to render accounts. But when the plaintiff did not want rendition of accounts against defendant No.3 it was not desirable to grant a decree against defendant No.3 that too without alerting defendant No.3 of die possibility of passing such a decree. When a decree is sought for specifically against a particular party, the Court is enjoined to embark upon an inquiry as to whether such a party as against whom the decree is sought for is liable or not. If he is liable, a decree shall be passed and if he is not liable, the suit shall be dismissed. But another defendant against whom no specific relief is sought for cannot be mulcted with any liability particularly without any alternative pleading, issue therefor and opportunity of adduction of evidence and addressing of arguments.

(2.) In view of what is stated supra, I set aside the judgment and decree rendered by the lower appellate Court and also the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismiss O.S. No.479 of 1980. In the circumstances of the case, I direct all the parties to bear their own costs throughout.

(3.) The Second Appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.