LAWS(APH)-1995-8-78

HEMADRI CEMENTS PRIVATE LIMITED Vs. WALCHANDNAGAR INDUSTRIES LIMITED

Decided On August 01, 1995
HEMADRI CEMENTS PVT.LTD. Appellant
V/S
WALCHANDNAGAR INDUSTRIES LTD Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE instant appeal is preferred against the judgment in W.P. Nos. 11049 and 12938 of 1990 by a learned Single Judge of this court. Facts leading to the petitioner-respondent invoking this court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are in nutshell as follows : A dispute arose between the petitioner-respondent and the appellant herein in course of the execution of a contract for sale of cement manufacturing machinery. In accordance with the arbitration Clause 12(2) of the agreement the parties, nominated their respective arbitrators and the arbitrators appointed the umpire. THE arbitrators, however, gave an award on 2.2.1987 granting to the petitioner-respondent Rs. 17,74,858.00 together with interest of Rs. 3,05,000.00. THEy, however, gave no reasons to support their award. THE petitioner-respondent filed O.S. No. 249 of 1987 in the court of Additional Chief Judge (Temporary), Hyderabad, under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act (for short 'the Act') to make the award rule of the court. THE appellant filed O.S. No. 387 of 1987 re-numbered as O.P. No. 41 of 1988 under Section 33 of the Act, read with Section 30 thereof. THE learned Additional Chief Judge, however, delivered an ex parte judgment on 8.11.1988 which was set aside, however, in I.A. No. 453 of 1988 at the instance of the appellant on 1.2.1989. A civil revision against the said order in I.A. No. 453 of 1988 was also dismissed on 24.11.1989. While the award thus, was pending in the City Civil Court, A.P. Amendment Act 1 of 1990 came into force with effect from 19.2.1990. THE amendments in Sections 14 and 17 of the Act introduced a proviso to Section 14(1) and three provisions to Section 17 of the Act. THE relevant provisions after amendment read as follows : (1) '14. (1). When the arbitrator or umpire have made their award, they shall sign and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award. Provided that the arbitrator or umpire shall give reasons for any award made under this Section and no award shall be valid unless reasons therefore are given as aforesaid." (2) '17.

(2.) THE Act, (Central Act No. X of 1940), to consolidate and amend the law relating to arbitration, envisages a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not, called 'arbitration agreement' for arbitration without or with intervention of a court and provides for signing and filing of the award by arbitrators or umpire before a court at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the award, and recognises the court's power to remit the award from time to time for reconsideration of the arbitrators or umpire (Section 16) or for modifying or correcting the award (Section 15) and to give judgment in terms of the award where the court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration or to set aside the award. THE court's power to set aside the award is limited to the grounds specified under Section 30 of the Act. Pursuant to the amendment, the Civil Court remitted the matter to the arbitrators on 3.7.1990 to give reasons for the award. However, the arbitrator nominated by the appellant refused to act and it seems another person was appointed in his place on 26.7.1990. At this stage the petitioner-respondent filed W.P. No. 11049 of 1990. THE learned Single Judge has held that,

(3.) IN Lakshmi Narayan Guin v. Niranjan Modak (AIR 1985 SC 111), a Bench of the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the amendments to the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act after the trial Court had decreed the suit and had found that the respondent was a tenant of the appellants and that the appellants were entitled to possession and to recover the arrears of rent. The first appellate court had dismissed the appeal but the second appellate court i.e., the High Court allowed the appeal on the ground that the amendment required to set aside the decree of the trial Court and dismiss the suit. The amendment extended to the area of the premises involved in the proceeding provided that no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court in a landlord's suit against the tenant except on certain enumerated grounds. One of the arguments before the court was that any decree which had been passed in favour of the landlord before the extension of the said provision to the area of the premises was final and was not affected by the amendment. The Supreme Court has said upon this the following :