LAWS(APH)-1985-11-7

YARA SFINIVASA RAO Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Decided On November 05, 1985
YARA SFINIVASA RAO Appellant
V/S
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case a juvenile has been charged u/s 436 IPC, which is sought to be tried by the Assistant Sessions Judge Kothagudem, and the said act is now challenged by the petitioner-accused in this revision, on the ground that the Assistant Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction in view of the provisions enacted in sees. 3 and 61 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Children Act, 1951. The defence in substance is u/s 3 only the following courts specifically have been empowered to try the cases in respect of the juveniles viz. (a) the High Court, (b.) a court of Sessions, (c) a District Magistrate, (d) Chief Magistrate City Magistrate's Court, (e) any Juvenile Court constituted u/s 40, and any Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, Since the Assistant Sessions Court had not been included in this section, this being special enactment, the said court has no jurisdiction to try the case against the petitioner. This is sought to be reinforced by the provisions enacted u/s 61 of the said Act, under which appeals lie from the orders passed by the Jucenile Court or the Magistrate's Court or Court of Session so forth, but this does not envisage any order being passed by an Assistant Sessions Court.

(2.) It is also argued that, no doubt an integrated enactment called the Andhra Pradesh Children Act has been passed and also received the assent of the President, but admiited it has not bean notified ay gazetting the same as mandatonly required, and therefore, the provisions enacted under the Andhra Pradssn: ( pelangana Area) Children Act, 1951, alone hold the field, in so far as this case is concerned. So the question is whather in the lace of the statutory provisions u/s 3 and sec. 61 of the said act, is it competent tor the Assistant Sessions Court to try the petitioner herein? the learned Public Prosecutor submited that the Sessions Court has been defined u/s 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as under:- 3. (1) The State Government shall establish a court of Sessions for every Sessions Division (2) ......................... (3) The High Court may also appoint Additional Sessions Judges and Assistd.it Sessions Judge to exercise juasdiction in a court ot Session' Based on this he submits that since Assistant Session Judge also has the Power similar to the Sessions Judge u/s if and, therefore, the omission in Section 3 or the said Act does not entail ouster of the juasdication of the Assistant Sessions Judge. I see substance in this submission. it is true that the Children Act is a special enactment, but, I do not see any express exclusion, the maxim Demg expressio untus est exclusio alienees', resuming in exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Assistant Session Judge. It is fairly settled triat a construction if placed upon the statutary provisions, resait in defeat of its object, though it may not omafwise cause any detriment in its beins acted upon, such interpreta tion must be eschewed. I, therefore, see no occasion for placing narrow construction on the provisions of sec 3 thereby restricting the scope of sec 3 to be confined to a court of Session to be presided over by a Sessions Judge. Hence, it is rather hard to accede to the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Since, I see no detriment being caused, it ir is given a liberal interpretation in view of the definition u/s 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defining the Session Court including to be presided by an Assistant Session Judge and, thereby, enabling tne Assistant Session Judge also to have jurisdiction in such matters, I have no hesitation to hold that the Assistant Session Judge has jurisdiction to try offences against the juvenile offenders under the A. P. Children Act. The Criminal Revision is dismissed. No costs.

(3.) However, in so far as the imposition of the sentence is concerned, it is quite appaent from the order of the first court as well as that of the appellate court that, while sentencing the accused to certified school obviously within the meaning of sec. 29 (1) (e) of the Act, they have missed the provisions of sec. 30 of the Act, which reads: