MANORANJAN Vs. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) 1. The short, but important, question of law, that falls for decision in this Writ Appeal, is whether the Government of Andhra Pradesh, in exercise of its powers under the proviso to Clause (5) of Article 371-D of the Constitution of India could, by a special order made in writing and for reasons to be specified therein, modify or annul an order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, without issuing a show cause notice or giving opportunity of being heard to the person against whom the said Government order was passed.

(2.) It is not considered necessary, for deciding this question of law, to state facts elaborately. The bare facts are : The appellant, while he was an Assistant Excise Superintendent, Guntur, was also holding additional charge of the post of Excise Superintendent from 23-2-1984 to 10-5-1984. By an order dated June 16, 1984, the second respondent the Commissioner of Excise kept the appellant-petitioner, under suspension pending enquiry. Against the said order of suspension, the appellant-petitioner filed his Representation petition (R.P. No. 693/85) before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribual. The Tribunal in and by its order dt. June 27,1985, for the reasons stated therein, directed that the appellant-petitioner should be reinstated into service. The Government, however, annulled this order in exercise of its powers under the proviso to Clause (5) of Article 371-D of the Constitution by G.O. Ms. No. 1082 (Revenue-Ex) Department, dated September 24, 1985. The appellant-petitioner filed the writ petition for quashing the Government order and for directing the respondents to reinstate him into service. In the Writ petition, two Miscellaneous Petitions, W.P. M.P.No. 15146/85 and WP.M.P. No. 15147/85 were filed, former for interim suspension of the Government Order, impugned in the writ petition, and the latter for interim direction for his reinstatement into service, pending disposal of the writ petition. The learned single Judge, who admitted the writ petition, passed an interim order in W.P.M.P, No. 15146/85 suspending the operation of the Government order; and also issued an interim direction in W.P.M.P. No. 15147/85 to reinstate the appellant-petitioner into service forthwith. Thereafter, the Government filed W.V.M.P. Nos. 1561/85 and 1562/85 respectively to vacate the direction and the order of suspension granted by the learned single Judge by his order dt October 1, 1985 in W.P.M.P. No. 15147/ 85and W.P.M.P. No. 15146/85. These petitions for vacating the interim orders came up for hearing before another learned Judge, who, after having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant and the learned Advocate-General, passed the order dated November 6, 1985 vacating the interim order directing the Government to reinstate the petitioner-appellant into service passed in W.P.M.P. No. 15147/85 on October 1, 1985. The learned Judge left open the question, relating to the validity of G.O. Ms. No. 1082 (Revenue-Ex) Department, dated September 24, 1985, impugned in the writ petition, to be decided in the writ petition. No further orders were passed W.V.M.P. No. 1562/85 in view of the orders in W.P.M.P. No. 15147/85 and W.V.M.P, No. 1561/85. This appealis directed against this order of the learned single single dated 6-11-1985 made in W. V. M. Ps. 1561 and 1562 of 1985.

(3.) The main contention raised on behalf of the appellant-petitioner is that the impugned Government order was passed in violation of principles of natural justice, inasmuch as neither a show cause notice was issued nor an opportunity of being heard was given to the appellant-petitioner; and, in that view the learned single Judge by the order against which the appeal has been filed, ought not to have interferred with the interim order passed earlier on 1-10-1985. The stand taken by the respondents, both before the learned single Judge and before us, is that the proviso to Clause (5) of Article 371-D did not provide for the issue of notice and it should be presumed that the intention of the Parliament was to exclude need for notice, and as such the order appealed against is perfectly valid.