VENKATESWARHI Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Appellant is the Plaintiff. He was an employee of the Union of India working in the department of Income-tax. At the time when he joined in service the appellant had given his date of birth as 4-1-1930. "Now he wants that date of birth to be altered to 1-10-1931 by an order passed by a Civil Court in a declaratory action. For that purpose he has filed O.S.No.588 of 1980 on the file of the 2nd Additional District Munsif, Narsapur. THE relief which the appellant-plaintiff had asked for in that suit is that his correct date of birth should be declared as 1-10-1931 and that a mandatory injunction should be issued to the Union of India directing the Union of India to change his service register by inserting the declared date of birth. This relief was granted by the 2nd Additional District Munsif, Narsapur by decreeing the suit. But the learned Subordinate Judge, Narsapur in A.S.No. 3/82 reversed that decree mainly on the ground that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction. In holding so, the learned Subordinate Judge followed the decision reported in P.V. Rangareddy v. Government of A.P., represented by its Chief Secretary, Hyderabad, (1983)1 A.P.L.J.171. Against this, the present second appeal has been preferred by the Plaintiff. I have taken the view in Battala Gabriel v. THE Dr. Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C., Kurnool, (1981)2 A.P.L.J. 364, that appointment of a person into Government service is the result of a contract of service made possible by the acceptance of an offer made by the employee by the employer. I held in the above case that one of the important representations constituting that offer made by the employee relates to the date of birth of the employee, I, therefore, held that when the employer accepts that offer and appoints the person to be his employee that contract binds the parties and cannot be altered unless the statute permits such an alteration to be brought about I have referred in that the case to the circumstances that many may be called but few may be chosen, because of their age and experience. I have, therefore, held in that case that offer relating to the age constitutes a vital representation in the employer appointing a particular person. It is according to that view, I held that a Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to alter a contract of service unless authorised by law. I am still of the same opinion. Although I hold that the employee can seek a declaration regarding his correct date of birth and use that declaration for purposes other than for alteration of his contract of service in the matter of altering service contracts, I still hold the same opinion. Following that ruling I think that this second appeal should be dismissed because the second appeal is not a mere suit for a declaration regarding the date of birth of the appellant. It is a suit filed for a declaration of the correct date of birth and also for a mandatory injunction to carry out that correct date of birth into the service register, the consequence of which is to compel the Union of India to continue the appellant in its service till he is superannuated on the basis of the altered date of birth. I am clearly of the opinion that this cannot be done by a Civil Court unless law authorises it to be done. Accordingly, I dismiss this second appeal for the above reasons. THE argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that P.V.Rangareddy's case, (1983)2 A.P.L.J. 171, which the lower appellate Court followed is distinguished on the ground that in the case of a Central Government employee, there is no statutory prohibition relating to the filing of a suit for a declaration of his correct date of birth as there is in the case of a State Civil Servant. That may be. Yet to the principle on the basis of which I have held that a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to alter the terms of a service contract unless authorised by law still holds.

(2.) THE Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed. Second appeal dismissed.