CHEVVAKUIA VEERRAJU Vs. NETA RATNAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner Is a tenant of respondent, No.1. He had taken the land in Survey Number 52/3 A and in Survey number 52/1 in Kaklnada village from the respondent No. I on rent of each year. The petitioner having defaulted the payment of the agreed rent the first respondent filed A. T. P. No. 12/1972 before the second respondent under Section 13 of the Andhra Tenancy Act, 1956 and prayed for the eviction of the petitioner on the ground that1 there was default in payment of rent of 22 bags of paddy from 1970-71 and 10 bags of paddy from 1971-72, The above petition was posted to 27-6-1972 for the appearance of the petitioner. On that day time wa granted for filing counter. Mean while a compromise was effected between the petitioner and the first respondent and on the basis of this compromise the second respondent passed an order of eviction in terms of the compremise. It Is the case of the petitioner that he continued to remain In possession of the land even after 10-6-73 which was the date on which the compromise was duly executed. Since no eviction could be ordered on the basis of compromise In matters arising under the Andhra Tenancy Act for eviction of the tenant, the petitioner contended the second respondent erred in passing the orders of eviction wholly on the basis of compromise. He, therefore, prayed for the issue of a writ of Certiorari quashing the order of the second respondent dated 21-7-1972 passed in A.T.P. No. 12/1972.

(2.) It would thus appear that the only contention of the petitioner is that having regard to the provisions of Section 13 of the Andhra Tenancy Act, the second respondent ought to have disposed of the petition for eviction on the basis of merits of the case and not on the basis of compromise. A perusal of the impugned order would show that the second respondent had based his decision solely on the compromise. Mr. M.S.R. Subramanyam, in support of this contention has relied upon the case of (I) 1973 A.P.H.N. 128 A. Padmavathamma vs. T.Narasimham, in W.P.No. 4384/1971 in which Ohul Reddy, J (as he then was) held, the question Is when there is no termination of tenancy under Sections 15 and 14 of the Act, whether the order of the Tahslldar made on the strength of the compromise memo filed by the parties can be said to be an 'order" or decision" under the provisions of the Andhra Tenancy Act so as to enable the petitioner to seek execution of the order made on compromise. The learned judge was of the view that the tenancy of a cultivating tenant could not be brought to an end in view of what is stated in Section 10 except in accordance with the provisions of Sections 13 and 14. When the Legislature has prescribed a particular period and also provides for the duration of tenancy and the mode by which the tenancy could be brought to an end, it :annot be brought to an end in any manner than the one provided In the Act. In coming to that conclusion the learned judge relied upon the ruling cited in Perozilal vs. Man Mal 1970 Supreme Court, Page 794. Mr. M. Jagannadha Rao appearing for the respondents submits that what was stated In 1970 Supreme Court, 794 has undergone certain changes in later ruling of the same Court. It is true that the Supreme Court had held In 1970 Supreme Court, 794. that tenancy could come to an end only In accordance with the modes provided in the Code and not by any other method. Now the Supreme Court has shifted its stand in (2) AIR 1973 Sec. 1511 K. K Chari v. R. M. Sheshadri wherein it was held as follows :

(3.) I called upon Mr. Jagannadha Rao to explain how that rulingcould apply to the facts of the instant case, because in that ruling the stage had already reached where a Tribunal could have formed its opinion because the petitioner in that case had already entered the witness box and had testified to the ground on which he was asking for eviction and it was then the parties had compromised the matter, While in the instant case immediately after the petition for eviction was filed and time for counter was granted, the parties had compromised. There was nothing before the Court to base its conclusion on any material except the compromise effected between the parties Mr, Jagannadha Rao contended that a perusal of the compromise would show that the petitioner herein had admitted that he was due 22 bags of paddy by way of rent to respondent No. I and that was a ground for eviction under section 13 of the Andhra Tenancy Act. The learned counsel for the respondents next cited the case of (3) (A.I.R-1974 S.C., 471) Nagan- das V. Daipatram to show that the stage of the enquiry was not a material factor. But, whereby admissions recorded in the compromise It could be gathered that the case of the petitioner therein was admitted by the respondent and that could be enough for passing orders of eviction. I am of the opinion that the contention advanced by Mr.Jagannadha Rao should prevail. No doubt in 1973 Supreme Court, 1311 a stage had reached where the Court could have formed an opinion on the base of the material which was there in the case and it was then a compromise was effected. But the observation of the Supreme Court in 1974 Supreme Court, page 471 would leave no one in doubt that the stage of enquiry Is not material. The main factor which has to be taken Into consideration is whether by means of this compromise a case for the petitoner in an eviction petition has been accepted or admitted by the respondent-tenant. The Supreme Court had observed in paragraph 26 of its Judgment as follows at page 477:-