SYED KAREEMUDDIN ALIAS BASHEERUDDIN Vs. SYED FASIUDDIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision petition is directed against the decree for possession passed in a suit filed under section 6 of the" Specific Relief Act. It is provided under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act that if any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. It is also provided therein that no suit under the section shall be brought after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession and no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in the suit and nothing in the section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof. Therefore, the provision provides a special and speedy remedy for a particular kind of grievance, viz., to replace a person in possession who had been evicted from immovable property of which he had been in possession otherwise than by process of law. Under this section, possession is sufficient evidence of right as against a trespasser. If the plaintiff can prove his previous possession, he may recover possession from the defendants who dispossessed him without reference to any question of title.

(2.) The property in question is a mulgi. Admittedly at the date of the alleged dispossession it is not the plaintiff who was in possession but a tenant to whom the mulgi was let out by the plaintiff. It is not the tenant, who was in possession on the date of dispossession that filed the suit, but it is the landlord who has filed it. Sri B.V. Subba Rayudu, learned counsel for the petitioner-2nd defendant, has argued the revision petition by raising two points, viz., (1) the suit is not within time as section 4 of the Limitation Act has no application since the period of six months limitation provided for filing the suit is not the one prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act; and (2) the suit filed by the landlord is not maintainable.

(3.) Point No. 1.-It is true that the six months period of limitation for the suit is not the one which is provided by the Limitation Act and the limitation for the suit is the one which is prescribed by section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. But it is provided under section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and tor the purpose of determining any period of limitation, prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (both inclusive) shall apply. Limitation Act is a general law which applies to all classes of cases dealt with by the Act. The provision made under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act which prescribed six months period from the date of dispossession within which the suit has to be filed is a special law as visaged under section. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is clear that section 4 of the Limitation Act also applies and the suit could be filed on the day when the Court reopened when the six months period mentioned in section 6 of the Specific Relief Act expired on a daywhen the Court was closed. In the present case admittedly that six months period expired earlier to the filing of the suit, it having expired on a day when the Court was closed and the suit was filed on the day when the Court reopened. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in D.P.Mishra v. K.N.Sharma, and by this Court in Ranganayakamma v. Subbamma and Nagabhushanan v. Raghavayya. Therefore, there is no substance in the first point submitted by the learned counsel.