VEMURL SOMLSETTI Vs. MESSRS VAGICHARLA GURAVAIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a revision petition under Section 22 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease Rent and Eviction)Control Act 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The landlord is the petitioner. He sought eviction of the tenant on two grounds (1) wilful default in payment of rent and (2) Requirements for personal occupation. The premises in question is a non-residential one. The agreed rent Is Rs, 125/- per mensem. The Rent Controller dismissed the petision. He held that there was no default and the requirement of personal occupation was not bona fide. On appeal, the order was confirmed. In this revision petition, the same grounds are canvassed by the landlord-petitioner.

(2.) The relevant facts which are not much in dispute may be stated. The petitioner is the owner of a non-residential building situated in Kavali town. The respondent is a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 125/- per mensem. The tenancy started on 1-12-1966. The period of tenancy was three years. The rent was payable as per the agreement by the 10th of the following month. It is not alleged in the petition the actual period for which the respondent is allaged to have comitted default in payment of rent. It would however appear from the evidence that the landlord has not alleged any wilful default in payment of rent for the period prior to December, 1969. The period of default in the course of the evidence turned out to be for the period December, 1969 to May, 1970. It is in evidence that successive attempts by the respondent to send the rent by money order proved ineffective, as the money orders were returned to him with endorsements of refusal by the landlord. The appellate court found that Exs. B-23 to B-27 were sent even before the 10th day of each following month as stipulated in rhe original agreement. Even for the month of December, 1969, the rent was sent within 15 days from the date fixed in the agreement. It is, therefore, clear that the tenant was tendering the rent within time and the same was being refused by the landlord. The appellate Judge found that having regard to the provisions of Section 10 of the Act, it cannot be said that the respondent had committed any default in payment of rent. It was also found that if the petitioner had accepted the rent sent to him by money orders, there was no question of the respondent falling Into any arrears In payment of rent. The appellate Judge held that it was the conduct of the appellant that was responsible for the arrears of rent to accrue and that he could not take advantage of his own conduct and seek to evict the tenant. I accept the finding of the appellate court that the arrears of rent had accrued only by reason of the conduct of the petitioner In refusing to accept the money orders sent and it cannot be said that there was any willful default committed by the tenant In payment of rent. This should dispose of the matter so far as the default in payment of rent is concerned as aground for eviction.

(3.) However, an argument was advanced before the appellate Judge that the tenant should have adopted the procedure prescribed under Section 8 of the Act. even though the petitioner had refused to receive the rent. Section 8 of the Act, it is contended, was enacted to meet the exact situation arising in the present case viz., where there was refusal on the part of the landlord to receive the rents though It was tendered. The same contention is now advanced before me. It, therefore, becomes necessary to read S. 8. of the Act, which is in the following terms:-