RAJA REDDY Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These 47 Writ Petitions challenge the validity of the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue [Additional Assessment and Cess Revision) Act (XXII of 1962) and the Andhra Pradesh. Land Revenue (Additional Assessment and Cess Revision (Amendment)Act (XXIIIof 1962) (hereinafter called "the Act" and "the amending Act" respectively), both of which came into force from 1-7 1962. The grounds upon which they are challenged by the several advocates appearing in the respective Writ Petitions, inter alia, are as follows: Mr. Chowdary contends that under Sec. 4 (1) of the Act, land revenue on lands served by sources of irrigation specified in the schedule has been increased by 100% subject to a minimum of Rs.20/ and maximum of Rs.26/ per acre for single wet crop lands while the increase in the double wet crop lands is also 100% from a minimum of Rs.30/- to a maximum of Rs.39/--: and under Section 4 (2) of the Act, land revenue on lands served by Government sources other than those specified in the schedule has been increased by 100% for single wet crop lands form a minimum rate of Rs.9/- to a maximum of Rs.15/- per acre and for double wet crop lands 100% increase from a minimum of Rs. 13.50 P. to a maximum of Rs.22.50P. Under Section 4 (3) of the Act, for lands served by other tanks notified by the Collector there is an increase of 50% from a minimum of Rs.6/- to a maximum of Rs. 18/- per acre. These increases are, "based, on the assumption that there is a law validly imposing a land tax. It is the contention of Mr. Chowdary, which is supported by the other learned Advocates, that after the inauguration of the Constitution, any law which imposes a tax mast be a statute law under Article 265 of the Constitution, and there being no such statute, the land revenue imposed after the Constitution is without the authority of law: as such, any additional land revenue levied on the basis of an unenforceable tax is equally invalid. For this reason, Mr. Chowdary characterises the Act (Act XXII of 1962) as an Act without a bottom and has the same effect as multiplying a zero, and that it should be deemed to be non est. Further the Act is challenged on the ground that Section 8 empowers the Government to vary the schedule by an executive order; but if a schedule has to be added, it. could only be effected by placing the addition on the table of the Assembly. This power makes the schedule a provisional one and bad for the following reasons, viz.,

(2.) The amending Act itself offends Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution in the classification is irrational and discriminatory. Though there is an attempt made for classifying lands according to the tarams or bhagannas, its relationship with water sources as cnvisagd in the amending Act is irrational and must be struck down. It is also contended that both the Acts (22 and 23 of 1962) offend Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution, viz., the right to hold property and payment of just compensation on acquisition inasmuch as the increases in the assessments are such as to amount to expropriation of property and without compensation. It is also contended that the averments of the Government in Para 7 of the counter that these statutes have been passed to advance the goal of socialistic pattern of society, make it amply clear that the Government have the object of expropriating land in furtherance of that goal, which has as its basis the expropriation of all means of production and earning of wealth. Sri K.B. Krishnamurty contends that the special rate fixed in the two villages, object matter in writ Petition Nos. 303/63 and 497/64, does not conform either to the single crop wet lands or double crop wet lands for which there is a maximum and a minimum and because for these lands there is no maximum and a minimum provided by the statute, the provisions of the Act and the amending Act do not apply. He further contends that even after the 109 o/o increase the assessment in most of the cases is less than the minimum rates specified, but in spite of it, a further increase is authorised by fixing the minimum , The provisos to Sections 4 (1) (i), 4 (1) (ii) or 4 (1) (iii) of the Act or Sec. 4 of the amending Act cannot go beyond the provisions of the main Section and consequently are invalid. It is also contended by him that having regard to the classification in Section 4 of the amending Act, viz., a particular rate of assessment for an ayacut of 30,000 acres or above, a different rate for an ayacut of 30,000 acres or below but above 5,000 acres etc., the power conferred on the Collector to notify the classes of lands as specified in the Act if exercised in certain circumstances would lead to discrimination. For example, if source of water supplies 30,030 acres and above, and out of it 20,000 acres are in one district and the remaining 10,000 acres are in another district, the Collectors in the two Districts will have to issue Notifications, notifying them under the second class and third class water source respectively as specified in Sec. 4, while the Collector of another District has to issue a notification bringing it under Class, 1 if the entire ayacut of 30,000 acres and above is situate within that District alone. A power to discriminate in this manner which has been delegated to the executive is nothing but an abdication of the legislative power, prohibited by the Constitution. Mr. Krishnamurty lastly contends that there is a regional imbalance between the Andhra and the Telangana areas in that in the Andhra area there are a very large number of big projects, with large ayacuts the ryot in this area has to pay a higher revenue, while in the Telangana area, which is backward, where there are only a few projects, the ryot will be called on to pay only a smaller amount with respect to lands exactly similar which is again an unjustified discrimination between the ryots of the two areas. Mr. Kuppuswamy contends that when in Entry 45 of List II of the VII Schedule to the Constitution, exclusive power has been conferred on the State Legislatures to make laws in respect of land revenue including assessment and collection of revenue, maintenance of land records, survey for revenue purposes and records of rights,and alienation of revenues,it was conferring a power to impose a tax on the net yield of the land. That is how the word "land-revenue" mentioned in that item should be understood. Land-revenue is no doubt a tax, but it. is a tax in relation to the net produce of the land or its money value. If a statute impels a tax which has no relation to the produce of the land, then it is not a law dealing with land revenue. The other Entries viz. 46,47 and 48 of List II of the VII Schedule do not apply, because Entry 46 deals with agricultural income and must therefore, be differently understood than as an assessment of land revenue. The other two entries, 47 and 48,also do not apply,so that there is no other Entry under which this tax could be levied, and it is, therefore, for the Government to show under which other Entry the power has been exercised in making this Act or the amending Act. The amending Act seeks to impose an additional burden irrespective of the net yield and without relation to the productivity or any. other factor pertaining to production. Further, the classification under the amending Act is based on the extent of the Ayacut, but there is nothing to show that merely because a, water source is capable of serving a large ayacut necessarily results in each acre receiv. ing more water. Ayacut, he contends,is fixed in relation to the capacity of the tank and the area of the cultivable lands. But to classify irrigation sources merely on the extent cf Ayacut, does not give an indication as to the duration or abundance of the water received by the land. He also supported the contention of Mr, Chowdary that there is no law levying assessment on land after the Constitution and lias cited the observations of Bashyam Ayyangar, J., in Modathapu Ramayya v. The Sectary of State for India in Council following his own observations in Bell v. Municipal Commissioner for The City of Madras. He has also referred to the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala to the same effect. He further contended that the preamble to the Madras Revenue Recovery Act (II of 1864) as well as the provisions of that Act do not in any manner support the contention of the learned Government Pleader or the position taken by Ramachandra Ayyar, J. delivering the judgment of a. Bench in Gopalan v. State of Madras that that Act authorises imposition of land revenue assessment. Mr. Raghuvir dealt with the application of the Acts to the Telangana areas, and conceded that the contention that there is no statute expressly levying a land-revenue asses5ment, does not apply to Telangana area, inasmuch as there are provisions in Section 48 of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act VIII of 1317 Fasli,which Act is saved by Article 372 of the Constitution, empowering the Government to levy land revenue assessment. He however contends that under the provisions of these Acts, land revenue is not a tax but a rent, which is liable to be increased at certain intervals after hearing the persons effected and subject to a right of appeal etc. But in the impugned Acts, there is no such provision It is permanent and unaltered. The voice of the person affected is not heard and as such it is aibitrary. He challenged the validity of the Acts on other grounds as well namely, that the provisos to section 4 impose an increase beyond that imposed by the main section and are arbitrary. In the case of dry assessment also this arbitrariness is maintained. He illustrates it by saying that in the case of dry land, where even with the addition of 75o/o the land-revenue is less than the minimum, still the ryot is required to pay 50P. The object of fixing the maximum and mininmum therefore breaks down in this kind of classification Secondly the classification is arbitrary as it is not the availability of water, whether it is perennial or precarious, that is made the basis but the ayacut, which has no relalation to the source of water supply. According to him, discrimination is writ large on every provision of the Act. Sri Ramanujachary contends that for tarams 1 to 5 in Class I(a) which are also provided for in Class II (a) different rates are prescribed. Similarly, Class I(b) and (c) are made equivalent to Class II(b) viz., tarams 6 and above. But they have to pay different rates,merely because they are situated under sources of irrigation with larger or smaller ayacut as the case may be, which is not a rational classification.

(3.) The other learned advocates, Sri Suryaprakasa Rao, Sri Ranganadhachary, Sri Mangachary and Sri Venkatramayya have, apart from raising the general question, have also addressed arguments as to the applicability of the provisions to the facts of their respective cases. On behalf of the Government,Sr i Ramachandra Reddy, the learned Government Pleader contends in rebuttal that both for purposes of the Act and the amending Act, imposition of land revenue assessment was based on a law which was existing prior to the Constitution, and which law is saved by Article 372 of the Constitution. He refuted the contention of Mr. Chowdary and others that only statutory law is required to continue the imposition of land revenue assessment as not being correct. He contends that even if "Law" in Article 265 means statute law, what is laid down is that levy and collection must be under the authority of law, i. e. statute law. This test is satisfied if a law imposes a liability or charge for payment of tax, and either fixes a rate, or entrusts the fixation of a rate to an executive or administrative authority in accordance with certain principles laid down by the statute. It is enough if the land is subjected to liability; the Legislature can take for the purposes of quantification she existing assessment for fixing the additional tax, though it is itself not based on a statute. As we understand his argument, if prior to the Constitution, by virtue of a prerogative or immemorial custom or usage tax was imposed on agricultural lands, the land was burdened with tax, and the Legislature could, after the Constitution, add to that burden an additional tax, which additional tax is valid, notwithstanding the fact that there was no earlier statute. He further relies on the Madras Revenue Recovery Act (II of 1864) as authorising levy and collection of tax due on land and even granting that this Act in terms does not provide for levy, it at least recognises an enforceable obligation, and therefore is a statutory obligation. It is also contended that the Andhra Land Revenue Assessments (Standardizattion) Act, (XXIX of 1956) (hereinafter called the Standardization Act) as well as the present Acts levy and impose a tax on land.