(1.) This revision is directed against the order of the District Munsif, Gudur dated 2-1-1962 refusing to receive a plaint presented at his residence at about 8-30 p. m., that is, after court hours. The suit was sought to be filed on the foot of a promissory note dated 1-1-1959 on the last day of limitation, that is, 2-1-1962. When it was presented to the District Munsif at his residence after the court hours at 8-30 p. m., he refused to receive it. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Court had jurisdiction either to accept or reject it, but once the Court accepted it, it could not return the plaint with an endorsement refusing to accept it. In this connection, the learned counsel drew my attention to the case of Thakur Dinram v. Hari Das, ILR 34 All 482; Sattayya Padayachi v. Sundarathachi 46 Mad LJ 78 : (AIR 1924 Mad 448) (FB) and Tula Ram v. Bhajan Singh, AIR 1953 All 609.
(2.) Before discussing the authorities cited, I would like to refer to O. IV, R I C. P. C. It provides ; "(1) Every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the court of such Officer as it appoints in this behalf. (2) Every plaint shall comply with the rules contained in Orders VI and VII , so far as they are applicable." There is nothing in Order IV Rule I. C. P. C. to show that the presentation must be within office hours or must be to the officer appointed at the court or at any particular place. The question therefore that arises is whether the Judge has the discretion to accept the plaint or appeal presented to him after the court hours.
(3.) It is a matter of common knowledge that in cases of emergency, applications are made to Judges at their private residences and are received by them, and if Judge accepts the plaint or the appeal, it cannot be said that his act is without jurisdiction. I am supported in this view by the case of ILR 34 All 482. This was a case where a memorandum of appeal was presented to the District Judge at his private house after the court hours on the last day of limitation. It was held that the judge had jurisdiction to accept the memorandum of appeal so presented, though he was not obliged to do so. It is clear, therefore, that a judge has a discretion either to accept it or reject it. Following this decision, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court, in the case of Sattayya Padayachi v. Saundarathachi, 46 Mad L. J. 78 : (AIR 1924 Mad 448) (F. B.) , held that where a Judge accepts a plaint presented to him outside court and after the usual hours, he suit must be deemed to have been instituted on the date on which the plaint was so presented on the last day of limitation at the residence of the Judge by the Vakil at about 7-30 p. m. The learned Judge accepted the plaint and cancelled the stamp on it by writing upon it the words "presented to me by" giving the name of the Vakil, at 7-30 p.m. and signed and dated it. A question arose having regard to section 3 of the Limitation Act, and it was argued that even though the learned Judge had accepted the plaint, it was barred because it has not been instituted within the period of limitation. The Full Bench repelled this contention.