BOLLA PERAYYA Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In these two Writ Petitions the point that arises for consideration is when ther the Assistant Settlement Officer could hold an enquiry as to the natureof the grant notwithstanding the fact that on an earlier occassion it was decided by the Estates Abolition Tribunal that the grant in question was not of an entire village and so would not be an inam estate within the meaning of the Act The facts giving rise to these writ petitions are: The Assistant Settlement Officer suo motu started an enquiry under Section 9 of the Estates Abolition Act of 19.48. Accordingly, a notice was .published in the, village and served on the inatndars and Collector of the District under Sec. 9(2) of the Act. It appears that in spite of the notice, none of the ryots appeared. The purpose of enquiry seems to be to determine under Sec.9(1)of the Estates Aboltion Act whether Chakrayapalem was inam village or hamlet or khandriga granted as inam and fell within the defintion of an inam estate or not. On the material placed before him the Assistant Settlement Officer held that the inam was neither a whole Village nor a khandriga nor a hamlet and was, therefore, not an Estate as defined under Sec. 3(2) (d) of the Estates Land Act as amended by Act XXXV of 1958 and XVI of 1957. He also found that it was not an inam estate under Sec. 9 of of the Estates Abolition Act. On appeal under Sec. 9(4) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, the Estates Abolition Tribunal agreed with the finding of the Assistant Settlement Officer and dismissed the appeal. It is these two orders that are now challenged in these writ petitions. The contention of Sri. Venkatarama Sastry, the learned counsel for the petitioners, is that the Assistant: Settlement Officer and the Appellate Tribunal have both erred in holding that the scope of the enquiry under Sec. 9 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act was only to see whether what was granted was a hamlet or a khandriga and not whether it was a grant of a whole village or an estate as defined in the Madras Estates Land Act, and that the previous decision of the Tribunal precluded the Assistant Settlement Officer front going into the question as to whether what was granted would constitute an estate or not within the meaning of Sec. 3(2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. The second argument advanced is that the Assistant Settlement Officer and the Appellate Tribunal have both erred in coming to the conclusion that what' was granted was not the whole village and that therefore it did not constitute an estate under Section 3(2) (d) of the Esrates Land Act.

(2.) The contention of Sri Kodanderamayya, the learned Counsel for the respondent is that both the authorities have rightly held that the scope of Sec 9 of the Act was only limited to the enquiry whether the grant was a hamlet or khandriga in an inam village and not that the grant was of a village. He next urged that even otherwise the authorities have rightly held that the grant was not of an entire village. His third contention is that since the Writ Petitioners have purchased melewaram rights also they cannot be said to be aggrieved by the order of the Settlement: Officer and the Tribunal, so as to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and their object seem only to avoid the decrees passad against them. Lastly, it is argued that the second writ petition (W.P. No.865 of 1963) is filed nearly two years after the order of the Tribunal and without preferring appeal which is sufficient to dismiss the writ petition.

(3.) In order to appreciate the respective contentions, I have to refer to the definition of "estate" in the: Madras Estates Land Act, both before and after the amendment and tha definition given in the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Aet, and to Section 9 of the Estates Abolition Act. By Section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act of 1908, as it originally stood 'estate' was defined as mearring :