DORAIIWAMY NAIDU Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Writ Petitioner challenges the order of the Government dismissing him from service on grounds (1) that the findings of the Tribunal which have been accepted by the Government are based on no evidence ; (2) that having regared to the provisions of the Hyderabad Public Servants (Tribunal of Inquiry) Act. (23 of 1950) (hereinafter called 'the Enquiry Act') the report of only one of the two members constituting the Tribunal is not a finding within the meanning of Section 8 and as such, the Government could not act upon it under Section 9. Taking the last point first, it is necessary to examine some of the provision of the Enquiry Act, But before we do so, we may state that the Enquiry Act. has been repealed by the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Act (11 of 1960), Section 11 whereof is in the following terms ;-

(2.) From the provisions of sub-section (2) of Sec, 11, referred to abo ve, it is clear that though the Tribunal is constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Act. the inquiry has to be disposed of under the repealed Act, namely the Enquiry Act. It is therefore necessary in order to determine the contentions advanced by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, to refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Enquiry Act. Section 2(c) defines Tribunal' as a Tribunal constituted under Section 3. Section 3 is in the follow ing terms .

(3.) This view of ours gain support by two decisions, one of the Supreme Court and the other of the Madras High Court. In United Commercial Bank v, Their Working a Tribunal consisting of three members had heard the matter before them on several occasions after which Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar was not available by respone of his having become a member of the Boundary Disputes Tribunal. Not withstanding the fact that the Government had recognised that a vacancy had occured, the two members of the Tribunal constituting the Tribunal continue I to pass interim awards and subsequently at the final hearing Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar joined in passing the final award and signed it. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal was challenged on two grounds. Firstly, there was no Tribunal as all after Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar was appointed to the Boundary Distpute Tribunal, the Government not having reconstituted the Tribunal. Secondly, even in. Mr. chandrasekhara Aiyar continued to be a member of the Tribunal, of the members oi the Tribunal did not. hear the matter before them throughout and as such Mr. Candrasekhara Aiyar could not sign the award. These conten times found favour with the majority of their Lordships ot the Supreme Court. C.J., and Meherchand Mahajan. Das, Vivian Bose and Mukherjee JJ). They hald that in respect of a Tribunal when the services of a member other than the Chairman have ceased to be available, the rest by themselves have no right to act as the Tribunal, without the Government reconstituting the Tribunal as a Tribunl of the remaining members. They further held that proceeding with the adjudiction, in the absence of one, undermines the basic principle of the joint work a.nd responsibility of the Tribunal and of all its members to make the anual and. all their awards are without jurisdiction and void. On the second question viz., whether one of the members, who was absent, could sit again, Karala. C. I., Mahajan, Das and Bose JJ. were of the view that where the services of one member have ceased to be available, he cannot sit again with the other members to form the Tribunal in the absence of a notification, and that even if it is accepted that the absent member continued throughout, a. member of the Tr ibunal, the members have no jurisdiction to make the award in terms of sec.15 and have therefore also no jurisdiction to sign the award under section 16. They further held that where the absent member sits again with the other members and takes active part in the deliberations and in the proceedings and influences 1. A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 230. the decision of the remaining members of the Tribunal by such discussion is signature on the award cannot be treated as surplusage. It will be obernted that even though the principle laid down in the above case is that the delibrations and award must be of all members and there is joint responsibility of all the members of the Tribunal, in the instant case, it is obvious even from a carraige reading of the section that the report and finding is the joint responsibility of the Tribunal which means of ail the members constituting it while the inquiry for the recording of evidence etc. is capable of being delegated statutorily to one of the members.