(1.) There are two revision petitions directed against two orders in Appeals No. 323/3 and 324/3 of the lower Court. It appears that the respondent-landlord filed an eviction petition on the ground that the tenant was a defaulter against a firm Messrs Jagadama Chemical Co. through three of the partners of the said firm. In that petition, the land lord filed an application under Section 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act 1960, seeking a direction against the tenant for the deposit of arrears . due, failing which for an order of eviction. The tenant disputed the rate of rent and the arrears. Upon a summary inquiry, a particular sum was found tobe due and the tenant therefore was directed to deposit the same within ten days from the date of the order. nstead of complying with that order, the tenant preferred an appeal to the Court of Small Causes, which is the appellate authority under the Act. Before the Appeal. was admitted, the appellate authority passed an order on 23-2-1963 in the following manner:
(2.) In both these appeals, preliminary objection was raised by the responden herein that the' firm, which was the tenant, stood dissolved, and instead, a new firm had come into existence and that firm has no locus standi to prosecute the appeal Against an order of eviction passed againit the tenant-firm. This objection was upheld by the Court below and consequently both the appeals were dismissed on that ground alone. These revision, petitions are directed agai-.ist that order. It is not in dispute that two of the partners of the said, firm nave left the partnership. It is also admitted that the remaining partner, who is the financing member of the present parnership firm, has in partnership with two other partners reconstituted the firm which is now occupying the suit house. It would thus be plain that the reconstituted firm is not the old firm but is altogether a new firm although one of the partners is also a partner in the new firm. It is also admitted that this partner does not live in Hyderabad but in Khammam. In these circumstances, when the new firm has come into existence, obviously it has no locus standi to prosecute the appeal against an order of eviction passed against the original tenant-firm. I am therefore satisfied that the lower Court was not wrong in dismissing the appeals on that ground.
(3.) Even otherwise, I am satisfied that there was no merit in at least the appeal filed against the subsequent order of the Rent Controller, whereby he had directed eviction under Section 11. The appellate authority, on the previous appeal, had merely granted 10 days' time to the appellant to deposit the whele arrears with a view to admit the appeal. The wording of Section 11 is that the tenant shall not be entitled to prefer an appeal unless he deposits the whole amount.It is perhaps in view of this wording that the appellate authority, bettue the appeal was admitted, granted 10 days' time at the request of the appellant. Admittedly that was not a stay order which could be said to be binding upon the Rent Controller. The 10 days time was granted only to deposit the amount so that his appeal may be admitted. When once it is admitted that the impurt ot that order is nothing more than what is stated above, then the Rent Controller was perfectly justified in reaching the conclusion that the tenant had not complied with the direction issued to him under Section 11 and had failed to deposit the arrears of rent. That entitled the landlord to obtain a direction for eviction under that provision of law. That order therefore is free from any flaw and there does not appear to me any substance in that appeal. When once that appeal is thus found to be without any substance, the other appeal loses significance.