(1.) THIS Revision Petition filed by the plaintiff is directed against the Judgment and decree of the District Munsif, Srikakulam, given on 27-4-1962. The necessary facts to appreciate the contention raised before me are, that the pliantiff instituted a suit to recover Rs. 471-95 nP together with interest for arrears of rent for the year 1959 and for tht balance of the ambaram due for 1960 and 1961 from the defendint who was the cultivating tenant of the plaintiff's land. The principal contention of the defendant was that the plaintiff had filed an application for eviction on the ground of default and it was found by the Tenancy Court that the defendant was not a defaulter. That judgment of the Tenancy Court operates as res judicata. I am not concerned with the other contentions raised by the defendant in his written statement as nothing turns upon them in this Revision Petition. After recording the evidence adduced by the parries, the Additional Distr.ct Munsif Srikakulam, although reached the conclusion that the suit amount is due, dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the judgment of the Tenancy Court in A. T. A. No, 45 of 1960 operates as res judicata. It is this view which is now assailed in this Revision Petition. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that whether the cultivating tenant was a defaulter or not was an incidental question before the Tenancy Court Its decision op such a question, therefore, does not operate as res judicata. In support of this contention. he relied upon the following two decisions. U Venkatraya v, Louis Souza and Venkatachala Odayar v Ramachandra Odayar. The contention of the leamed counsel for the respondent, however, is that though S. 11 C P. C. in terms is not applicable to a judgment given by the Tenancy Court of exclusive jurisdiction, the analogous principles of S. 11 will govern and when the Tenancy Court was required to give a decision whether the cultivating tenant was a defaulter or not, its decision falling within its exclusive juridiction must operate as res judicata urder the general principles of law. He relied upon a passage appearing at page 40 in Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen. It cannot be in doubt that where the former Court is a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, matters decided by it will be beyond the competence of a Court trying a subsequent suit, which has no such exclusive jurisdiction On general principles of res judicata, the decision of the Tenancy Court, which admittedly has exclusive junsdiction, will be conclusive on matters which are exclusively left for its decision under the Act. It is not in such a case necessary that such a tenancy Court having exclusive jurisdiction should be competent to thear a subsequenely filed suit. Under the said general principle even if the tenancy Court is not competent under the Tenancy Act to grant a decree for rent as is claimed in the subsequent suit, the question in regard to the eviction, the determination of which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tenancy Court, its decision on such a question would undoubtedly operate as res judicata on general principles of res judicata. The following passage from the decision of the. Supreme Court is relevant in this context:-