DONDAPATI PUTTAMA NAIDU Vs. PERUGU VENKATA REDDI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) .This is the plaintiff's revision in whicn the sole question that falls for determination is whether the plaintiff's suit is within limitation. What happened was that the plaintifi instituted a suit for the recovery of Rs. 125 balance amount due on a promissory note dated 4th July, 1956 before the Panchayat Court on 23rd April, 1962. An objection was raised by the defendant that the Panchayat Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain that suit and consequently the plaint was returned on 15th November, 1962. The plaintiff, thereafter filed the suit before the District Munsif, Tirupathi on 16th November, 1962. It must be noted that the promissory note bears an endorsement of the payment of Re. 1 signed by the defendant dated 24th April, 1959.

(2.) The defendant raised question of limitation. The lower Court applying the provisions of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act held that even after excluding the period which was spent by the plaintiff in prosecuting his suit in a wrong Court, i.e., the Panchayat Court, the suit will be barred by limitation by one day, and dismissed the suit. It is argued that the learned District Munsiff has erred in computing the time which the plaintiff has spent in prosecuting the suit in the wrong Court. The contention is that both the days, i.e., the day on which the suit was filed and the day when the plaint was returned, have to be excluded and if exclusion takes place in this manner, the suit will be within time. I find sufficient force in this contention. It is not denied by the other side that the learned District Munsifi. has erred in computing the period.

(3.) It is, however, contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the lower Court has erred in assuming that all the requirements of section 14 have been satisfied in this case. His contention is that it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiff under Order 7, rule 6, Civil Procedure Code, to show in the plaint that he was bona fide prosecuting tne suit in a wrong Court and give the circumstances to establish that fact. As the plaintiff did not bring out the circumstance which would fulfil the requirements of section 14 of the Limitation Act, the lower Court has erred in applying the provisions of section 14 to the facts of this case. In support of this contention, he relied on Sri Kasikananda Gnanacharya Swamigal v. Samvanapemmal Pillai and another, I.L.R. (1941) Mad. 347 : (1941) 1 M.L.J. 257 : A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 319. and Madhavarao Narayan Rao Patwardhan v. The State of Bombay, (1958) S.G.J. 963 : (1958) 2 M.L.J. (S.G.)64 : (1958) 2 An.W.R. (S.G.) 164 : A.I.R. 1958 S.G. 767. It was, however, contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of Order 7, rule 6, Civil Procedure Code, are technical in their character, and mere omission to mention the grounds of exclusion in the plaint should not result in depriving the plaintiff from getting a decree. In support of that contention he relied on Manoharlal v. Jagmohanlal, A.I.R. 1957 M.B. 97. and another two cases, one of tne Madhya Pradesh and the other of Calcutta High Courts to the same effect.