THOTA PICHAYYA Vs. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal against the order of Umamaheswaram J. dismissing the application filed by the appellant under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the order of the District Munsif, Tenali, in E. A. No. 971 of 1954 in E. P. No. 261 of 1954.

(2.) The 3rd respondent filed O. S. No. 104 of 1948 on the file of the District Munsif's Court Tenali against the appellant and others for possession of the suit land. The defendants, inter alia, contended that they had occupancy rights in the said land. The District Munsif decreed the suit. On appeal the Subordinate Judge, Tenali, confirmed the same. When the defendants preferred Second Appeals, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, of which one of us was a member, dismissed the appeals. Subsequent to the dismissal of the appeals, the 3rd respondent took out an execution application for possession and the learned District Munsif ordered delivery without giving any notice to the judgment-debtor. When the defendants came to know of the said order, they filed applications for reviewing the said order but they were also dismissed. The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 693 ; of 1954 in this court to quash the order of the District Munsif on the ground that Order 21 Rule 22 C. P. C. offends the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India and therefore is constitutionally void. The application came before Umamaheswaram J. who dismissed it in a short order on the ground that the appellant had a right of appeal, which was a substantial and efficacious remedy. This appeal is filed against that order.

(3.) Mr. Lakshmaiah, learned Counsel for the appellant, argued his case with ability and clarity. His contention may be stated thus: The validity of all laws has to be tested on the touchstone of the new Constitution. Uuder Art. 14 of the constitution, the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law of the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The said Article prohibits discriminatory and partial legislation in favour of particular persons as against others in like conditions. The same principle applies even in regard to procedural measures. Though legislative classification is permissible, it shall not be arbitrary but must be based upon some differences, which bear a just and proper relation to the attempted classification. The avowed object of Order 21 Rule 22 C. P. C. is to give an opportunity to the judgment-debtor to show cause why the decree should not be executed against him. The Legislature discriminates between the debtors against whom execution is levied after two years. There is no reasonable basis for distinguishing these two classes of debtors as there are no distinctive characteristics placing them in different categories. Both are debtors and both are equally entitled to have an opportunity to show cause why the decree should not be executed against them. The time factor cannot and does not endow them with different attributes. The alleged distinction does not, therefore furnish any basis for such a classification ; nor has that distinction any rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. The distinction between the two classes of debtors is not at all necessary to achieve the object viz., the principle of natural justice embodied in Order 21 Rule 22 G. P. C. Further, Order 21 Rule 22 is also bad in so far as it offends the principles of fundmental justice by depriving a particular class of debtors of the opportunity to show cause why the decree should not be executed against them.