JANIKAMMA Vs. MATTAREDDI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IF the alienation by the alleged adopted son does not furnish a cause of action to the reversioner his right to property not being affected, the suit by a reversioner will not fie under Sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The alleged adopted son will only be in the position of a trespasser. Any alienation effected by a trespasser during the widow's life-time will not afford a cause of action to the reversioner as it will not amount to a denial of the title of the last male owner but only of the widow and there is consequently no danger to the inheritance. The status of the reversioner is also not affected by the alienation. Appeal against the Decree of the District Court, Guntur in Appeal Suit No. 322 of 1948 preferred against the Decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Guntur in Original Suit No. 113 of 1946. Messrs. K. V. Reddy, and S. V. Rami Reddy, for the Appellants. Messrs. A. Seetkapathi Rao and A. V. Krishna Rao, for the Respondents. Order of Reference to a Bench. Satyanarayana Rao, J. The defendants are the appellants in this Second Appeal. The suit was filed by the next presumptive reversioners to the estate of one late Venkata Reddy who died on 24-10-1918 leaving behind him his widow the 1st defendant. Defendants 4 to 11 are the presumptive reversioners and as they did not take any action, the plaintiffs, who are the reversioners next in degree to defendants 4 to 11, instituted the suit. The 1st defendant made ah earlier adoption which was attacked by defendants 4 to 7 in O.S.No.53 of 1925 Sub Court, Guntur. In that suit it was held that the will put forward by the widow of Venkatareddy was invalid and was not genuine and that the adoption made by the 1st defendant of the present 2nd defendant was invalid. She made an yet earlier adoption of the 2nd defendant's brother. He died and thereafter she adopted the 2nd defendant which adoption was questioned in O.S.No. 53 of 1925. The decision of the trial court was confirmed in first appeal and also in the second appeal by the High Court. That litigation terminated on 8-12-1936. The 1st defendant thereafter put forward a deed of consent from the reversioners dated 17-3-1937, executed by the presumptive reversioners. Defendants 4 to 11 gave their assent to the adoption of the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant which was followed by a deed of adoption dated 18-3-1937, Ex. B-2. The 2nd defendant and the 19th defendant brother of the 2nd defendant on 5-8-1943 alienated certain property belonging to the estate of Venkatareddy in favour of the 20th defendant. As the presumptive reversioners did not move in the matter the present plaintiffs who are next in order instituted this suit for a declaration that the alienation by defendants 2 and 19 of the plaint schedule properties in favour of the 20th defendant is invalid and inoperative and not binding on the reversionary heirs to the estate of late Venkatareddy after the death of the widow the 1st defendant. There is no specific prayer in the plaint asking for a declaration that the adoption of the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant is invalid and is not true nor is there any serious reference to the adoption in the plaint. In the courts below the truth and validity of the adoption was canvassed by the parties and the concurrent finding of the courts below is that there was never any adoption of the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant and there was merely execution of two deeds, a deed of consent by the reversioners, Ex. B-1, and a deed of adoption, Ex. B-2. It was also found that the consent of the reversioners was vitiated by the fact that it was purchased by the widow. In the result, both the courts below held that the adoption was not true and valid. These findings were accepted before me as they are findings of fact. The hearing, therefore, proceeded on the basis that these findings are correct. They cannot be questioned hereafter. There is another question raised in the courts below and that relates to the plea of limitation and that is the only question which survives in the appeal. The contention urged on behalf of the defendants was that as the plaintiffs failed to institute a suit for a declaration that the adoption was invalid within six years from the date of their knowledge and as their present suit is beyond time, they cannot, by framing the plaint as one for a declaration that the alienation by the 2nd defendant and the 19th defendant in favour of 20th defendant is invalid, raise the question of the validity of the adoption and that therefore the suit which is in substance one for a declaration that the adoption is invalid must be held to be barred. In the plaint, the plaintiff ignored the adoption altogether as it is not real but still if the 2nd defendant was put forward as the adopted son, whether it was incumbent upon the reversioners to institute a suit for a declaration that the adoption was invalid within six years as provided under Art. 118 of the Limitation Act before instituting a suit for declaration that the alienation made by the alleged adopted son is invalid, is a question which requires consideration by a Bench, as there seems to be some conflict of authority on the point. In Bapaiah v. Akkamma Sir John Wallis C. J. and Coutts Trotter. J. differed. Sir John Wallis C. J. was of the view that under the guise of suing for a declaration that an alienation is not binding, the period of limitation under Art. 118 for a declaratory suit regarding adoption could not be circumvented. Coutta Trotter. J., however, was of a different view. The decisions of the Lahore High Court do not seem to be uniform. Sadhu Ram v. Bishambar Dial and Bhoop Singh v. Ramji Lal take one view but there is a Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in Jholi v. Khazana which takes a different view after the Privy Council decision in Kalyandappa v. Chanbasappa. In the Privy Council case the question that was considered was whether, when a reversioner did not sue during the life-time of the widow to have the adoption declared invalid within the period prescribed by Art. 118 of the Limitation Act he can recover possession of the property after the death of the widow counting the period of limitation under Article 141 from the date of the death of the widow. The Judicial Committee adverted to the change in the language in the Limitation Act of 1871 and the subsequent Acts and observed that the decision in Jagadamba's Case ' was rendered under the earlier Act where the language was different from the language in the later Acts and that therefore the fact that the reversioner did not institute the suit for declaration that the adoption was invalid within the time prescribed under Art. 118, was no bar for recovery of the possession of the property after the death of the widow counting the period of limitation under Art. 141 from the date of the death of the widow. On this reasoning, it would seem that the opinion of Coutts Trotter, J. in Bapaiah v. Akkamma - is correct. Semba Parayana v. Moral is another case in which a similar question was considered but the learned Judges seem to restrict their view to the facts of the particular case. The decision in Bapaiah v. Akkamma- was the subject matter of a Letters Patent Appeal, but unfortunately the judgment is not available as it was not reported though reference was made to it in the decision in Semba Parcyana v. Moral. I think the question raised is of sufficient importance to be considered by a Bench and the papers may be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for directions regarding posting of the second appeal. Order Of Reference to the Full Bench. The Hon'ble The Chief Justice : This Second Appeal was referred by Satyanarayana Rao J. to a Bench. One Venkatareddi died on 24-10-1918, leaving behind him his widow, the 1st defendant. On 17-3-1937, the 1st defendant after obtaining the consent of presumptive reversioners, is alleged to have taken the 2nd defendant in adoption. The alleged adoption was supported by a deed of consent from the reversioners dated ) 7-3-1937 and a deed of adoption dated 18-3-1937. On 5-8-1943, the 2nd defendant and the 19th defendant alienated certain properties belonging to the estate in favour of the 20th defendant. Defendants 4 to 11 are the presumptive reversioners to the estate of Venkatareddi. As they did not take any steps to set aside the alienation, the plaintiffs, who are reversioners next in degree to defendants 4 to 11, filed O, S. No. 113 of 1946 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Guntur, for a declaration that the alienation made by defendants 2 and 19 of the plaint schedule properties was invalid and not binding on the reversionary heirs to the estate of Venkatareddi after the death of the 1st defendant. In the plaint, no direct reference was made to the adoption alleged to have been made on 17-3-1937. On those fajts, the question was raised whether the suit was barred under Art. 118 of the Limitation Act. Art. 118 of the Limitation Act reads: " To obtain a declaration that When the alleged adoption an alleged adoption is invalid, Six years. becomes known to the or never, in fact took place. plaintiff." Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the cause of action for the plaintiffs to seek a declaratory relief arose when they had knowledge of the alleged adoption and they, not having filed a suit within six years from that date and allowed the claim to become barred under Art. 118, could not rely upon a consequential act by the adopted son as affording a fresh cause of action. To put it differently, it was urged that a reversioner could not, by using clever phraseology, circumvent the period of limitation prescribed under the aforesaid Article. The respondents'learned Counsel, on the other hand, argued that when the alleged adoption was a nullity, a reversioner had the option to file a declaratory suit or not, and, if he exercised the option by ignoring it, he could in law file a suit for a declaration that a subsequent alienation made by the adopted son was not binding on him within six years from the date of knowledge of that alienation. This question was considered by various High Courts in India. But there is a sharp cleavage of judicial opinion. Indeed, even in Madras, there is a conflict of views on the subject. As this question arises very often, it is necessary to have an authoritative decision of a Full Bench. We therefore, refer the following questions to the Full Bench: (i) Whether a suit by a Hindu reversioner for a declaration that the alienation made by an alleged adopted son is not binding on him is maintainable ? (a) Whether a reversioner, who has not filed a suit for a declaration that an alleged adoption made by the widow is not binding on the reversion within the prescribed time under Art. 118 can, ignoring the said adoption, file a suit after the said prescribed time for a declaration that the alienation made by the adopted son is hot binding on the reversion? Opinion. The opinion of the Full Bench was delivered by The Hon'ble The Chief Justice. The following two questions have been referred to the Full Bench by a Division Bench of this Court. (1) Whether a suit by a Hindu reversioner for a declaration that the alienation made by an alleged adopted son is not binding on him is maintainable? (2) Whether a reversioner, who has not filed a suit for a declaration that an alleged adoption made by the widow is not binding on the reversion within the prescribed time under Art. 118 can, ignoring the said adoption, file a suit after the said prescribed time for a declaration that the alienation made by the adopted son is not binding on the reversion? To appreciate the scope of the aforesaid two questions, the necessary facts referred to in the order of reference may be briefly re-stated. One Venkata Reddy died on 24-10 19118 leaving behind his widow, the 1st defendant. On 17-3-1937 the 1st defendant, after obtaining the consent of the presumptive reversioners is alleged to have taken the 2nd defendant in adoption. The alleged adoption was supported by a deed of consent from the reversioners dated 17-3 1937 and a deed of adoption dated 18-3-1937 On 5-8-1943, the 2nd defendant and the 19th defendant, the brother of the 2nd defendant, alienated certain properties belonging to the estate in favour of the 20th defendant. Defendants 4 to 11 are the presumptive reversioners to the estate of Venkatareddi. As they did not take any steps to set aside the alienation, the plaintiffs, who are reversioners next in degree to defendants 4 to 11. filed O.S. No. 113 of l946 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court Guntur on 28-8-1946 i. e. more than six years from the date for the adoption but within six years from the date of the alienations for a declaration that the alienation made by the 2nd; and 19the defendants of the plaint schedule properties was invalid and not binding on the reversionary heirs to the estate of Venkatareddi, after the death of the 1st defendant. The Subordinate Judge of Guntur and, oin appeal, the District Judge, concurrently found that there was never any adoption and the consent of the reversioners was vitiated by the fact that it was purchased by the widow. They found that the suit was no barred by limitation under Art. 118 of the Limitation Act. In the result, they decreed the suit. Defendants 1 and 2 preferred the Second appeal to the High Court. for is only a decalaration that the alienation made by defendants 2 and 19 is not binding on the plaintiffs, it is in substance one for a declaration that the adoption was invalid, for it was the adoption that gave him the right to alienate the property and that, as the latter relief was barred by limitation under Art. l,8of the Limitation Act the plaintiff cannot, by using clever phraseology, circumvent the period of limitation prescribed under the said article. The argument of the learned Counel for the respondents may be summarised thus: The adoption as found by both the courts below is a nullity. The plaintiffs were also not parties to it. Though in their discretion they could have asked for a declaration that the adoption was invalide, they were not bound to do so. They could ignore it. The alienation made by the adopted son gave them a new cause of action and, therefore, the suit filed by them within six years from the date of the said alienation was within time under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act. It will be convenient at this stage to notice the history of the declaratory of the Specific Relief Act, which now governs declaratory reliefs in Iindia, had in its origin in Section 50 of the Chancery Procedure Act, 1852 ( 15 and 16 Victoria C.86). In 1854, Act VI of 1854 was passed for the Supreme Court of India and Section 19 of that Act was in terms similar to that Section 50 of the Chancery Procedure Act. That provision was re-enacted as Section 15 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859). Section 15 read : " No suit shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory decree or order is sought thereby and it shall be lawful for civil courts to make binding declarations of right without granting consequential relief. " The cases under this section evolved the principle that a declaratory relief would not be given unless the Court wherein the said declaration was asked for could itself give a consequential relief or where such a declaration was necessary for getting a consequential relief in some other Court. This section was later repealed by the Civil Procedure Code, 1877 and was introduced as Section 42 in the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Section 42 reads : "Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. Explanation: A trustee of property is a 'person interested to deny' title adverse to the title of some one who is not in existence, and for whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee. Eight illustrations are appended to the section. Section 42 is not a reproduction of Section 15 of the Civil Procedure Code. While it enlarges the scope of declaratory reliefs in one direction, it circumscribes its limits in another direction. While under Section 15 C. P. C., as interpreted by courts, a declaratory decree cannot be given unless the plaintiff is entitled to consequential relief in one court or other, under Section 42 it can be given if such a relief is not open to him in the Court wherein he has filed a suit for a declaration. While Section 15 does not define the characteristics of a person entitled to the reliefs, Section 42 prescribes the qualifications, viz., that the plaintiff must be entitled to any legal character or to any right as to any property. Under Section 42, the following conditions shall be complied with before a person is entitled to the declaration asked for : (i) he is entitled to a legal character (ii) or to any right as to any property, and (iii) denial of his right by a third party. Even if these three conditions exist, it is in the discretion of the Court to give relief or not. Illustrations (e) and (f) throw some light on the application of Section 42 to declaratory reliefs in respect of the acts of a widow. Illustrations (e) and (f) read: "(e) The widow of a sonless Hindu alienates part of the property of which she is in possession as such. The person presumptively entitled to possess the property if he survives her may, in a suit against the alienee, obtain a declaration that the alienation was made without legal necessity and was therefore void beyond the widow's life-time, (f) A Hindu widow in possession of property adopts a son to her deceased husband. The person presumptively entitled to possession of the property on her death without a son may, in a suit against the adopted son, obtain a declaration that the adoption was invalid." There illustrations among others given in Section 42 are not exhaustive. They only illustrate that the words "any person entitled to any legal character or to any right asa to any property" are comprehensive enough to take in a presumptive reversioner. It is a well-settled principle that a Hindu reversioner has no interest in prasenti and it is a mere spes successionis, which is neither transferable nor assignable. It is, therefore, obvious that he has no legal character or right to property within the meaning of the section. In Kalamanachiar v, Darasinga, the Judicial Committee dismissed the suit filed by 4 presumptive revisioner for a declaration that he was the next heir to the Sivaganga Zamindari after the death of the defendant. The Judicial Committee again negatived such a right in Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasand Ayyer on the ground that it is impossible to predicate at the moment who was the reversionary heir to the deceased proprietor. But the same thing cannot be said of a suit by a reversioner in a representative character. A presumptive reversioner is clothed with a representative capacity to enable him to preserve the estate for the reversion against deleterious acts committed or threatened to be committed by a widow. He can file a suit for the "conservation and just administration" of the property, if by the act or omission of the widow, the whole estate or a part of it is likely to be destroyed or dissipated. Familiar instances of such suits are those filed by a presumptive reversioner in his representative capacity to prevent waste by the widow of her estate, to declare the alienation made by her invalid, to obstruct the device adopted by her to divide the estate, to take steps to restore the property left in the hand of strangers to the estate and, in short, to take necessary steps to see that by the act or omission of the widow the estate or any part of it is not lost to the reversion. In Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasam Ayyet the Judicial Committee, dealing with the right of a reversioner to file such suits, made the following observations at page 638 : "It is also true that a reversionary heir, although having only those contingent interests which are differentiated little, if at all from a apes successionis, in recognised by Courts of law as having a right to demand that the estate be kept free from waste and free from danger during its enjoyment by the widow or other owner for life. But a reversionary heir thus appealing to the Court truly for the conservation And just administration of the property does so in a representative capacity, 10 that the corpus of the estate may pass unimpaired to those entitled to the reversion. " The Judicial Committee followed the law laid down by Ameer Ali J. in Venkatanaryana Pillai v. Subbammal. Sadaaiva Ayyar J. in Ramakrishan Patter v. Narayana Pattar equates a man's legal character with his status and observes at:page 82: " A man's status or legal character is constituted by the attributes which the law attaches to him in his individual and personal capacity, the distinctive mark or dress, as it were, with which the law clothes him apart from the attributes which may be said to belong to normal humanity in general. " The learned Judge enumerates the chief varieties of status as given by Holland. When the law clothes a presumptive reversioner with a status as the representative of the reversioners, it is not unreasonable to hold that he possesses a legal character within the meaning of Sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. In Surayya v. Subbamma Napier J. expressed the view that a presumptive reversioner when looked at in the character of a representative of the body of reversioners has a legal character within the meaning of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Can it be said that a presumptive reversioner, when acting in a representative capacity, is a person who has a right to any property ? The words " right to any property " are wide enough to take in contingent right to property. It may be a presumptive reversioner has no interest in praesenti and his right is only spes successionis. But in his capacity of representing the entire body of reversioners, he has a contingent interest in property, for, on the contingency of the widow dying, one or other of the reversioners must succeed to the estate. This distinction between relief in respect of the individual or personal title of the particular plaintiff and relief claimed for the benefit of the body of reversioners represented by the presumptive reversioner has been brought out by Varadachari J. in Desu Reddiar v. Srinivasa Reddi. At page 1057 Varadachari J. says: " In dealing with suits by reversioners, a distinction has been drawn between relief in respect of the individual or personal title of the particular plaintiff and relief claimed for the benefit of the body of reversioners represented by the presumptive reversioner. Relief of the former kind has generally been refused on the ground that an anticipatory declaration of the kind may be rendered valueless by future events ; but relief of the latter kind is not open to the same objection, especially after the recognition of the representative character of a reversioner's suit and of the consequent applicability of the rule of res judicata even in favour of or as against the actual reversioner, who might not have been a party to the presumptive reversioner's suit." To sum up, the object of the provision for a declaratory relief during the life-time of a widow is to perpetuate and to strengthen the testimony. Though a reversioner can wait till the widow expires and sue for possession, his relief may turn out to be nugatory for, during the life-time of the widow, the property may irretrieyably be lost or destroyed, or the evidence available during her life-time might disappear. To safeguard the reversionary estate against these consequences, declaratory relief is available to the reversioners. Illustrations (e) and (f) appended to Section 42, though they are not exhaustive, indicate in no uncertain terms that a reversioner in his representative capacity has a legal character /or a contingent right to any property within the meaning of that section. He is enabled to file a suit for the conservation or the proper administration of the estate. IF the estate is wasted or dissipated by the widow by her acts or omissions or if she seeks to confer title on another by an illegal or fictitious adoption or alienates it to strangers or even if the property is claimed by third parties in derogation of the title of the last male holder or adversely to the widow, a presumptive reversioner in his representative capacity can always step in to safeguard the interest. In every one of those cases, the interest of the reversioners is affected by an act or omission of the widow in not preserving the estate for the reversioners. It, therefore, followe that a presumptive reversioner in his representative capacity can file a suit for a declaration that the alienation made either by the widow or by the alleged adopted son or even by a third party is invalid and not binding on the reversion. The next question is what is the period of limitation prescribed for a pre- sumptive reversioner's suit during the life-time of the widow. Act XIV of 1859 provided a period of limitation of six years for all suits for which no period of limitation is expressly provided in the Act. Section 1(16) of that Act read: " To all suits for which no other limitation is hereby expressly providedthe period of six years from the time the cause of action arose." It has been held that the period of limitation prescribed by that section would apply to a suit for a declaration that adoption is invalid. The said Act was repealed by Act IX of 1871. Article 129 of that Act read : " To establish or set aside an adoption. 12 years The date of the adoption or at the option of the plaintiff the date of the death of the adoptive father. Article 142 of that Act prescribed 12 years period of limitation for suits for obtaining declaratory reliefs. That Act, in its turn, was superseded by Act XV of 1877. Under that Act, the provisions of Art. 129 of the earlier Act were enacted as Articles 118 and 119. They were as follows. 118. To obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid or never in fact took, place. 6 years. When the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff. 119. To obtain a declaration that an adoption is valid. 6 years. When the rights of the adopted son as such are interfered with. There waS a change in the language of the Articles not only in regard to the period of limitation but also in regard to the starting point of limitation. Further, Art. 118 is expressly made to apply not only to a suit for a declaration that an alleged adoption is 'invalid but also that it in fact never took place. Art. 125 corresponding to Art. 124 of Act IX of 1871 provided for a "declaratory suit by a reversioner that the alienation made by the widow is void except for the life-time of the widow and prescribed 12 years period of limitation from the date of the alienation. The scope of Art. 124 of Act IX of 1871 was enlarged so as to include Mohammadan females also. Art. 120 prescribing 6 years period of limitation for a suit for which no period of limitation is prescribed elsewhere in this schedule corresponds to Art. 118 of Act IX of 1871. Article 141, which provides for a suit by a Hindu or Mohammadan entitled to the possession of immoveable property on the death of a Hindu or Mohammadan female and which prescribes a period of limitation of 12 years from the date of the death of the female, corresponds to Art. 142 of Act IX of 1871. It may be mentioned that there was no corresponding provision under M Act XIV of 1859. Act IX of 1908, which repealed the Act of 1877, reonacts the same provisions. It will, therefore, be seen that under Act XIV of 1859 there was only an Article providing a period of limitation of six years for all suits for which no period of limitation is expressly provided. It was applied to a suit for a declaration that an adoption was invalid. There was no provision .at all corresponding to Art. 141 of Act XV of 1877 and Act IX of 1908 prescribing limitation for suits for possession after the death of the female. Act IX of 1871 introduced a comprehensive Article 129 providing a period of 12 years for every suit to establish or set aside an adoption, There were also general provisions for declaratory reliefs and also for suits for possession after the death of the widow. Act XV of 1877 omitted Art. 129 and instead prescribed a period of limitation of 6 years under Arts. 118 and 119 of that Act to different kinds of suits, the former for a declaration that the adoption was invalid or had not taken place and the latter for a declaration that the adoption was valid. It also enacted residuary Articles 125 and 141 in the place of Art. 142 of Act IX of 187! prescribing limitation for a suit for possession after a widow's death with some modifications. It is also necessary to point out that Act XV of 1877 (Limitation Act) was passed after the Specific Relief Act (Act I of 1877) "was passed. Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act deals with declaratory decrees and illustration (f), as already stated, dealt with a suit for a declaration by the presumptive reversioner that the adoption was invalid. It may, therefore, be safely concluded that Arts. 118 and 119 were intended to govern suits contemplated by illustration (f) under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The Legislature, therefore, prescribed different periods of limitation for different kinds of suits contemplated by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act that may be filed during the life-time of the widow and also for suits that may be filed after the death of the widow. Articles 118 and 119 govern suits for a declaration of the validity or invalidity of an adoption. Article 125 covers a suit for a declaration of the invalidity of an alienation made by a widow. Art. 120 brings within its fold all other declaratory suits by a reversioner filed to protect the estate, or for its proper administration not covered by Articles 118, 119 and 125. Article 141 is expressly reserved for a suit for possession by a reversioner after succession opened. The scope of the declaratory reliefs that can be filed at the instance of the reversioner during the life-time of the widow and after her death and the periods of limitation prescribed for different suits is an integrated scheme enabling the reversioner, if he chooses, to take immediate steps for the preservation of the estate during the life-time of the widow and to obtain delivery of possession after her death. For different kinds of suits, specific periods of limitation are prescribed and if a suit falls in effect and in substance under one or the other of the Articles of limitation, it is not open to a party to evade or elude that Article by using clever phraseology or adopting a device to circumvent it. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain in each "case, when a reversioner files a declaratory-suit, the- real scope of the suit. IF it is a suit in substance for a declaration that an adoption is invalid, the mere fact that he ignores the adoption and bases his right on some other act consequential on the adoption will not enable him to escape the period of limitation, for the adoption would be in the way of his getting consequential relief. This leads me to consider the cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondents in support of his contention that he can ignore the adoption as a nullity and can file a suit at a later stage after the period of limitation prescribed for a declaration that the adoption is invalid expired, on the basis of a new cause of action which accrued to him on an alienation made by the adopted son. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh ' the reversioners filed a suit for a declaratory decree and injunction restraining the widow from alienating her estate. The suit was dismissed for default. Subsequently, the plaintiffs in the earlier suit and others filed another suit for a declaration that the gift made by the widow in favour of her daughter's son would not operate against their right of succession on her death. The question arose whether the subsequent suit was maintainable in view of the dismissal of the earlier suit. The learned Judges held that the cause of action on which the second suit was based was different from that of the earlier one and indeed, the latter cause of action did not arise and could not arise until the gift deed was executed. As the cause of action on which the latter suit was based was different, it was held that the suit was maintainable. The proposition laid down by the Judicial Committee is unexceptionable. This decision can help the respondents only if they can establish that the cause of action for the present suit is different from that of the earlier one. As I have already pointed out, the cause of action for the present suit was the adoption and the relief in regard thereto having become barred, the present suit Would equally be barfed. Nor can the learned Counsel call in aid the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Srinioasa v. Venkaiaramana Bhattar " in support of his contention. There, the plaintiff as reversioner prayed for a declaration that an adoption alleged to have been made by a Hindu widow 18 years before suit was invalid and that the sale of certain property made by the widow and the adopted son two years before suit was not binding upon him. The learned Judges held that in substance the suit was to declare the invalidity of the alienation made by the widow and the alleged adopted son and that as an ancillary to that he asked for a declaration as to the invalidity of the adoption In that case, the widow, along with the adopted son, made the alienation and the learned Judges, treating the suit as one for setting aside that alienation, applied the period of limitation of 12 years prescribed under Art. 125 of the Limitation Act. It is not necessary to express my view whether on the facts the learned Judges were justified in holding that the suit was substantially for setting aside the alienation and that the relief in regard to the adoption was only 'ancillary. But, if the alienation was made only by the adopted son, it is not possible to hold that the substantial relief was for setting aside the alienation, for in that case the alienation by the adopted son is consequential upon the right conferred upon him by reason of the adoption. The decision of the Judicial Committee in Jagadamba Chowdharani v. Dakhina Mohan Roy Chowdhri turned upon the provisions of Art. 129 of Act IX of 1871. The plaintiffs, as collateral heirs of a childless Hindu, questioned adoptions purporting to have been made by his widows in pursuance of authority from him. On the ground that the alienations were brought into question more than 12 years after their date though less than 12 years after the plaintiffs' titles (if any) had accrued at the death of the surviving widow, the Judicial Gommitte, held that the suits were barred under Art. 129 of the said Act. It was so held in that case as the Judicial Committee was of the view that the terms of Art. 129 were very wide and comprehensive to take in every suit wherein an adoption was sought to be displaced. Though their Lordships noticed the change in the latter Act (XV of 1877), they left open the question regarding the scope of the Articles of limitation prescribed under the latter Act. This judgment, turning as it does on the interpretation of Art. 129 of the Limitation Act of 1871, has obviously no relevance to the question now raised. The Judicial Committee again considered the scope of the decision in Jagadamba Chaudharani v. Dakhina Mohun Ray Chowdhri in a later decision in Tirubhuwan Bahadur Singh v. Rameshar Baksh Singh . There, the defendant brought a suit in 1873 against a widow for possession of the property on the ground that he was validly adopted by her in 1858. The widow denied the factum of adoption. The first court held that the adoption was not true and the appeal filed by the defendant against the decree of the first court was dismissed for default. After the death of the widow in 1893, the plaintiff, claiming to be the nearest heir of the last male holder, filed the suit for possession of the property from the defendant. The defendant again set up his title under the adoption. It was held by the Judicial Committee that the suit was not barred by limitation. It was argued that Section 2 of Act XV of 1877 would not apply as the alleged adopted son acquired title as the adoption had taken place more than 12 years before Act XV of 1877 became law. Their Lordships held that the defendant did not acquire any title by the lapse of 12 years from the date of the adoption. I do not see how this judgment, which turned upon the provisions of Section 129 of Act IX of 1871 helps the respondents. It is not suggested that, if a declaratory suit is not filed, the plaintiffs cannot institute a suit for possession after the succession opens. The period of limitation raised is only for the limited purpose, namely, that the suit for a declaration filed during the life-time of the widow that the adoption is invalid is barred by limitation. That question certainly can be raised in the suit to be filed after the succession opens. The case law on this subject was reviewed elaborately by the Judicial Committee again in Kalyandappa v. Chanbasappa '. After pointing out the comparative scope and the differences between the Articles in the successive Limitation Acts, their Lordships definitely ruled that Art. 118 of the Limitation Act applied to a suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act for a declaratory relief that the adoption was invalid or that it did not take place and that the Article applicable to a suit by a reversioner for possession of immoveable property on the death of a Hindu female is Art. 141. At page 426, Lord Phillimore, after quoting the illustration in the provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, says : " It is to this class of suits that this particular limitation applies. The date from which the time begins to run is a subjective or personal date ; and the condition of obtaining the particular relief which is sought in a declaratory suit is that the plaintiff should not be guilty of laches, the measure of laches being fixed by the statute as six years. But if a claimant chooses to run the risk that an adoption which he has not attacked will have every presumption made in its favour by reason of its long standing, he can wait till his reversionary right has accrued, and even till the limit (no doubt a very wide limit) of 12 years from that accruer has passed." But it is contended that the principle behind that decision is that as the adoption is a nullity, it can be ignored and the question can be raised in a suit filed after the succession opens. Reliance is placed upon the following observations at page 427 : " The present case seems afortiori. The adoption of the first defendant was void and the plaintiff is entitled to brush it aside and sue for the possession to which he has a right. His time limit is 13 years from the death of the Hindu widow and he was in time." This passage no doubt indicates that a reversioner can ignore the adoption as a nullity and wait to recover possession till the death of the widow. But these observations cannot, in my view, be invoked to circumvent the period of limitation prescribed for a declaratory suit for a limited purpose. It is also true that the Judicial Committee in this decision accepted the principle laid down by the Calcutta High Court in Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Srimali Krishna Mahishi Debi -. that Art. 91 would apply to a case where a transaction has to be set aside and that if that Article has no application to a transaction, it is a nullity. The observations do not lay down any new proposition. It is a well settled principle of law that a party to a transaction, which is binding on him, cannot recover possession unless that transaction is set aside within the time prescribed by law. It does not necessarily follow from that that if the transaction or adoption as in the present case is a nullity, another suit or suits for the same relief covered by Art. 118 can be filed ignoring the express period of limitation prescribed. This decision, therefore, in my view, not only does not support the respondents but helps the appellants, for it lays down in clear terms that Art 118 applies to a suit for a declaration that an adoption is invalid. The learned Counsel then relied upon a long catena of decisions in support of his contention that every fresh act gives rise to a new cause of action for a declaratory relief and that the plaintiff at his option can pick and choose one of such acts to file a suit to obtain a declaratory relief. But a careful scrutiny of the said decisions discloses that they do not lay down any such broad proposition. Where a person's land was attached as if it belonged to another but was sold at a later date, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Anantharaju v. Narayana Raju held that the sale was a fresh and greater invasion of his right and gave him a fresh cause of action on which he could sue within six years from the date of the sale under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act. The reason for the decision is given at page 384 as follows : " The attachment gives the judgment-creditor certain rights in execution, but the title to the property continues in the owner, notwithstanding the attachment and it so continues even if the owner's objection to the attachment is disallowed. But when a sale takes place and is confirmed, the title passes to the purchaser from the date of the sale. The owner's title is affected by a sale in an altogether different and greater degree than it is by an attachment." The learned Judges held that, as the title of the plaintiff was really affected by the sale, that gave him the real cause of action to file the suit though he might have filed a suit at an earlier stage. Sundaram Chetty, J. in Suryanarayana v. Bullayya - on the same principle, held that the entry in the record of rights afforded a fresh cause of action to the plaintiffs for filing a declaratory suit and the omission to bring such a suit within six years from the date when the defendants previously set up rights of permanent occupancy in a written statement filed by them in a previous suit was immaterial. There, the suit was one filed under the proviso to Section 179 of the Madras Estates Land Act whereby any person, who is dissatisfied with any entry in a record of rights framed in pursuance of an order made under sub-section (1) of Section 164 which concerns a right of which he is in possession may institute a suit for declaration of his right under Chapter VI of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The suit was filed within six years under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act from the date of the entry in the record of rights. The learned Judge held that the entry gave the real cause of action for the suit provided under Sec. 179 of the Madras Estates Land Act and that the earlier denial was not the starting point. Another Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Koyasan Koya Haji v. Secretary of State for India in Council held that, in the case of a suit under the Land Encroachment Act, the plaintiff was entitled to elect by which of the proceedings under the Act he deems himself aggrieved so as to base it as a cause of action for a suit for declaration and injunction under the section. The plaintiff there ignored the notice given by the Deputy Collector but based his cause of action on a tangible definite order of the Deputy Collector. As that was a definite act, which really affected his rights, the Division Bench held that he could file the suit within six years from that date. The decision of the Judicial Committee in Jalandhar Thakur v.Jharula Das only related to a continuing cause of action. There, the defendant, who was not a Brahmin and who could not hold hereditary and religious office, was appropriating to his own use a share of the surplus daily income from the offerings. It was held that, on each occasion on which he received and wrongfully appropriated to his own use a share of the income to which the shebait was entitled, the defendant committed a fresh actionable wrong in respect of which a suit could be brought against him by the shebait. In Apparao v. Secretary of State for India in Council another Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that a bare repudiation of a person's title without even an overt act would not make it incumbent on him to bring a declaratory suit and that he has a right to elect as to when he can bring a suit for vindicating his right when there are successive denials of his title. It is not necessary to express my view on the correctness of the conclusions arrived at by the learned Judges in the aforesaid judgments. But the principle applied by them was that the cause of action for a declaratory relief arises when the right of the plaintiff is clearly and decisively denied. This principle was stated in clear terms in Thirumala Rao v. Jungammal wherein the learned Judges held that the plaintiff's right to sue for a declaratory relief accrued once and for all when his title was first definitely and finally denied to his knowledge. Sadasiva Ayyar and Spencer JJ. in Syed Mamshah Thiaka v. Secretary of State for India , following the aforesaid decision, held that the actual levy of penal assessment from the plaintiff was clearly an unequivocal denial of title on the part of the Government and that the notice of eviction under Section 9 of Act III of 1905, though it involved a denial of title, did not give a fresh starting point of limitation for a declaratory relief. In that view, they held that the claim for declaratory relief having been filed more than six months from the date of the actual levy of penal assessment was barred by limitation. Kumaraswami Sastri and Devadoss J J. in Chathu v. Neelakandhan following the same principle, ruled that the cause of action for a suit for declaration of title was the refusal of the revenue authorities to enter the plaintiff's name in the revenue register and that the starting point of limitation under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act was the date of the order of refusal by the revenue authority. They rejected the contention that a subsequent application for the same relief and the subsequent order of refusal by the revenue authority gave a fresh cause of action for the suit. In Ponnu Nadar v. Kumaru Reddiar Curgenven and King JJ. reviewed the case law on the subject and summarised their views at page 83 thus : " For this proposition ample authority will be found in Tirumala Rao v. Kadekar Durgi Shettethi (22 I. C. 883), Syed Mamshah Thaika v. The Secretary of State for India in Council (37 M. L. J. 213) Chathu v. Neelakandhan (42 M. L. J. 457) and Krishnaji Anajee v. Anajee Dhondajee (I. L. R. 54 Bombay 4). In special cases where for instance the later invasion is of a different and more serious kind, as a sale following an attachment of property (Anantharaju v. Narayanaraju, (I. L. R. 36 Madras 383) or where the enjoyment though disputed, is not actually interfered with (Muhammad Hanif v. Ratna Chand (I.L.R. 3 Lahore 43), an exception to this rule may be admitted." There, three Nadars sued to establish their own right and the right of their caste men to pass in procession over a certain route composed of public streets in their village. The defendants are other castemen of the village, who denied the right claimed by the plaintiffs. There was an order of the Joint Magistrate passed under Sec. 147 Cr. P. G. in 1900 directing that no organized procession of Shanars or Christians shoud pass along the route in question until a Civil Court had declared that there was a right to do so. The suit was filed more than six years after that order on the basis of further attempts made by the defendants in the year 1918. The lamed Judges held that the first invasion, which was a decisive one, gave the cause of action and the subsequent acts interfering with the plaintiffs' right would not give rise to any cause of action. I respectfully adopt the principle laid down in this decision. IF so, in the present case, the cause of action for a declaratory relief arose once and for all by the decisive act of the widow, when the alleged adoption was put forward and the subsequent acts which are only consequential on that adoption could not confer on the plaintiffs a fresh cause of action for a declaratory relief in regard to the validity of the adoption. I shall now proceed to consider the decisions, which directly bear on the question raised before us. In Bapayya v. Akkamma , a reversioner, who had allowed his right of suit to declare an alleged adoption invalid to become barred under Art. 118 of the Limitation Act, subsequently filed a suit on the basis of a mortgage executed by the adopted son in conjunction with the widow of the last male owner. The first prayer in the plaint was for a declaration that the adoption was invalid and the second prayer was that the mortgage deed did not in any way affect the reversionary right of the plaintiff and others after the death of the 1st defendant. Wallis C. J. says at page 69 : "As regards the adopted son, this alienation does not involve any further denial of the plaintiff's legal character or right of property than was involved in setting up the adoption in the first place and the plaintiff must, in my opinion, be held to be barred by law from claiming a declaration against him after the time prescribed under Art 118 has elapsed." But he expressed the view that though the suit might be maintainable against the mortgagee, no relief should be given to him by a Court in exercise of its discretion under Sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. On the other hand, Coutts Trotter J. expressed the view that the cause of action against the alienee arises for the first time upon the alienation being made and that it was open to the plantiff to show that the alienation is wholly bad as against the alienee and to show it by provng that the alleged adoption was nvalid. As the Chief Justice agreed with the view of the first Court, the appeal was dismissed. But the matter was taken up by Letters Patent Appeal. It was heard by three Judges. The learned Judges agreed with Wallis C. J. Abdur Rahim J. stated: "And he cannot get any such declaration as he wants unless he establishes that the adoption of the and defendant did not take place or was nvalid. The relief Which is sought n prayer (b) of the plaint is really consequential upon the relief the plaintiff has asked for in prayer (a) that is that the and defendant is not the adopted son of the late Kodali Ramayya. The plaintiff wants a declaration that the alienation which the and defendant joned is not binding only because the latter asserts that he is the adopted son and it is really to obtain a decision that the and defendant, does not possess any such status that the suit is brought. The object of suits of this character as ponted out by the learned Chief Justice is primarily to enable persons affected by certain' to have a decision at a time when the facts are fresh in the memory of people concerned. The suit of the plaintiff in my opinion comes within the description of suits in Art. 118 and he cannot avoid the application of this Article by merely juggling with the forms of relief." Oldfield J., agreed with Abdur Rahim, J, . Bakewell J., in a separate judgement observes : "The first cause of action gave the plaintiff a right to sue for a declaration that the adoption was invalid and the second cause of action enabled him to bring a suit to declare that the alienation by the widow effected only her life interest. I fail to see how by combining these two separate caues of action in one plaint he can obtain an extension of the period prescribed by the law of limitation." I respectfully agree with the observations made by the learned Judges. This decision would have concluded the matter against the respondents but for the fact that another Division Bench of the Madras High Court attempted to distinguish that case and in effect did not follow it. That was a decision of Waller and Madhavan Nair JJ., in Semba Parayan v. Moral . It is necessary to state the facts as, in my view, on the facts there is no scope for distinguishing the decision in the Letters Patent Appeal. The 1st defendant was the widow of the last male holder. She executed a release deed in favour of the 2nd defendant and both of them executed a sale deed and a mortgage deed in favour of the 3rd defendant. The plaintiffs, the reversionary heirs of the last male holder, sued for a declaration that the release, the mortgage and the sale were not binding upc n them. The 2nd defendant claimed to be the adopted son of the last male holder and he pleaded that as the suit was instituted more than six years after his adoption though within about two years after the suit transactions, it was barred under Art. 118 of the Limitation Act. The learned Judges held that the suit was not barred by limitation. In holding so, they distinguished the judgment in the Letters Patent Appeal at page 713 in the following terms : "In the L. P. A. case the plaint contained two material prayers the first being for a declaration that the and defendant in that case is not the adopted son of the late Kodaii Ramayya and the second that the mortgage deed, that defendants 1 and a have executed in favour of the 3rd defendant, does not in any way affect the reversionary right of the plaintiff and others after the death of the 1st defendant. The relief which was sought in the second prayer is consequential upon the relief asked for in the first prayer, viz., that the and defendant is not the adopted son of Kodaii Ramayya. As Sir Abdur Rahim points out in his judgment, it is really to obtain a decision that the and defendant does not possess any such status (i, e. the status of an adopted son) that'the suit was brought." Later on, the learned Judges proceed to state at page 714: "We may remark that the decision in the Letters Patent Appeal case does not appear in the authorised series .and has not been reported so far as we know in any of the private journals." The learned Judges therefore, distinguished the facts in the Letters Patent Appeal from the facts before them on two grounds, namely (i) that in that case there was a prayer to the effect that the second defendant was not the adopted son whereas in the case before them there was no such prayer and (ii) that judgment was not reported in the authorised series. In my view, the two reasons do not bear any scrutiny. As I have already mentioned in another context, the phraseology employed by the plaintiff is not decisive en the scope of the relief the plaintiff is entitled to. IF the plaintiff cannot get the relief he seeks without getting a decision on the invalidity of the adoption he cannot, by ignoring the adoption in the plaint, circumvent the period of limitation. In the case before the learned Judges, just like in the Letters Patent Appeal, the plaintiff could not get the declaration asked for without the Court deciding the question that the adoption was invalid. So, in effect and in substance, the suit involved a declaration of the invalidity of the adoption. The mere fact that the decision was not reported is not a ground for ignoring the decision of three Judges. I am definitely of the view that the decision in Semba Paravan v. Maral has been wrongly decided. This question also arose in the Lahore High Court. In Khushal Singh v. Kanda . a Hindu adopted his daughter's son and subsequently made a gift of his ancestral land jointly to the latter and his brother. The reversioner filed a suit for a declaration that the gift was not valid, aftet the suit for declaration that the adoption was invalid was barred by limitation. The learned Judges held that the suit was barred by limitation. At page 390, the learned Judges observed : "Having once allowed their suit for a declaration against the adoption of Labh Singh to become barred by time under Art. 118, the plaintiffs are not entitled to sue for a declaration that the subsequent gift by Kanda Singh is not binding on them because that gift does not give them a fresh cause of action, in that it does not involve any further denial of the rights of reversioners than was involved in setting up the adoption in the first place." In Joti v. Khazana though the suit for a declaration/ that the adoption was invalid was barred by limitation, it was held that a suit for a declaration that an alienation made by way of a gift by the 2nd defendant in favour of his adopted son, defendant No. 1, was maintainable. In so holding, the learned Judges relied upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Kalyandappa v. Chanbasappa and observed : "Their Lordships of the Privy Council held thart Art. 118 did not apply and that it applied only to a suit to obtain a declaration and that it was the option of the reversioner to treat an adoption as a nullity and bring a suit for possession whether the transaction in question was void or voidable." I have already indicated, in dealing with the aforesaid decision of the Judicial Committee, that their Lordships were cocerned in that case only with the question whether Art. 118 or Art. 141 would apply to a suit for possession after the death of the widow and their Lordships held that Art. 141 would apply. The fact that the adoption can be ignored and the reversioner can file a suit after the death of the widow for possession could not in any way affect the question of the application of Art. 118, if the plaintiff chooses to file a suit in substance for a declaration that the adoption was invalid. A single Judge of the Lahore High Court in Sadhu Ram v. Bhishambar Dial"' held that a suit for a declaration by the reversioners that an alienation by the adoptee of a widow was not binding on them, substantially has no cause of action other than the original adoption but is a suit to have it declared that a certain adoption was invalid and is governed by Art. 118. The same view was expressed by Shadi Lal C. J. and TappJ. in Bhoop Singh v. Ramji Lal. The learned Chief Justice stated the principle at page 439 thus: "IF the suit for a declaratory decree in respect of the factum of adoption is barred by time, the plaintiffs cannot elude the operation of Art. 118 by suing for a declaration that the gift made by the lady in favour of the adopted son should not bind them." The decision of the Lahore High Court in Hirde Ram v. Jhandu does not really touch the question now raised before us, for in that case, the suit was for possession of immoveable property on the death of a Hindu female and the learned Judge Abdul Rashid J. held that Art. 141 of the Limitation Act applied and the reversioner could file a suit after the death of the widow treating the adoption as a nullity. From the aforesaid discussion of the case law, two principles emerge which, though apparently conflicting, are really reconcilable. A reversioner is entitled to ignore an adoption as a nullity and file a suit for possession after the death of the widow. As the declaratory relief is only a discretionary relief it is at his option whether to seek that relief or not but, if he chooses to file a suit for a declaration that the adoption is not valid that suit is governed by Art.'118. IF so much is granted it follows that he cannot ask for a declaration on the basis of a consequential act ignoring the adoption if, as a matter of fact, the question of the validity of the adoption is substantially involved in the relief asked for. To illustrate, a suit for a declaration that an alienation made by an adopted son is invalid is, in substance, a suit for a declaration that the adoption is invalid for the alienation by the adopted son was only a consequential act flowing from his right as adopted son. IF the suit for a declaration that the adoption is invalid is barred by limitation, the other suit also would equally be barred, for it is the same suit in a different garb. To put it differently, it is the substance that matters and not the form in which the plaint is couched. In this view, a suit for a declaration that an alienation made by an adopted son is not binding on the plaintiff would be maintainable as the provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act are complied with but that suit would be barred by limitation if it is filed more than six years after the date of the adoption. I would, therefore, answer the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. Viswanathasastry, J. IF a Hindu widow in possession of her husband's estate as his heir commits waste or endangers the title of those next in succession, the latter may sue, during her life-time, to restrain such waste or to remove the cloud on the reversionary title cast by her acts. Sec. 54, Illustration (m) of the Specific Relief Act provides a remedy by injunction in the case of waste and Section 42 Illustrations (e) and (f) provide for suits by reversioners for a declaration that an alienation made by the limited owner is invalid beyond her life-time or that an adoption which is set up, is invalid or never in fact took place. These provisions were substituted for Section 15 of the G. P. Code of 1859 which was framed in wide and general terms. Section 1 (16) of Act XIV of 1859 which prescribed a period of six years, to commence with the time when the cause of action arose, to all suits not specially provided for, applied to a suit for a declaration of the invalidity of an adoption, the period of six years running from the date of the adoption. Suits for recovery of immoveable property including a suit by a Hindu reversioner for possession on the death of the widow, were governed by the twelve years' period of limitation prescribed by Section 1 (12) of that Act notwithstanding such suits involved the invalidity of an adoption relied upon by the defendant. This Act was superseded by the Limitation Act of 1871. Article 129 of the Limitation Act of 1871 prescribed with regard to suits to set a side an adoption, a period of 12 years from the date of the adoption or at the option of the plaintiff, the date of the death of the adoptive father. Article 142 of that Act prescribed a period of 12 years for suits for possession of immoveable property by Hindus entitled to possession on the death of a Hindu widow. Nevertheless in Jagadamba Chowdhrani v. Dakhina Mohan the Privy Council ruled that Article 129 governed suits for possession by 'Hindu reversioners on the death of the widow where the validity of an adoption purporting to have been made by the widow was brought in question. In other words the decision was to the effect that the validity of an adoption could not be challenged by the reversioners after the expiry of 12 years from the date of the adoption or the date of the death of the adoptive father, which ever was later, and it made no difference whether the suit was declaratory or was one for possession. This interpretation of the law by the Judicial Committee which worked considerable hardship and the unscientific language of Article 129 led to its repeal. Art. 129 was split into Articles 118 and 119 of the Limitation Act of 1877. These Articles were re-enacted in the Act of 1908, and they provide for declaratory suits with reference to adoptions. Article 141 of the Limitation Acts of 1877 and 1908, allowed a period of 12 years for a suit by the reversioner for recovery of possession of immoveable property on the death of the female limited owner, the starting point being the date of her death. In 1877, the Legislature was free to choose one of three courses. It might have prescribed that an adoption by the widow must be questioned, if at all, within a fixed period from the date of its taking place on pain of the reversioners losing their title to the estate when it vests in possession on the death of the widow. This was what the Legislature was supposed to have done in enacting Article 129 of the Limitation Act, 1871, according to Jagadamba Chowdhrani v. Dakhina Mohan '. The Legislature might have allowed, the reversioners to sue for declaratory relief as regards the invalidity of the adoption at any time during the life-time of the widow and also left them free to sue for recovery of possession of the property within 12 years after the succession opens on the death of the widow. The third course was to allow the reversioners to sue during the life-time of the widow for declaratory relief regarding the invalidity of an adoption only within a prescribed period leaving them free to wait, if they chose, until the widow's death and recover possesion of the property by establishing the invalidity of the adoption. It was this last course that was taken by the Legislature when it enacted Articles 118 and 141 of the Limitation Acts of 1877 and 1908. See Kayanadasappa v. Chanbasappa '-. In a suit by a reversioner to declare a Hindu widow's alienation invalid he sues as represnting the entire body of reversioners whose right to the property on the death of the widow is jeopardised. The interest of the reversioner is of a substantial character and is a right to property, though contingent, if it is remembered that in such a suit he represents the whole body of reversioners. An adoption by the widow involves a denial of the right of the reversioner as heir presumptive to the last owner, that is to say, his legal character as well as his presumptive right to succeed to the property of the last male owner. Here again, a suit to declare an adoption invalid is a representative suit. Suits by reversioners during the life-time of the widow to declare the invalidity of an alienation or adoption made by her are sanctioned by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and, as observed by Sir John Wallis in Bapayya v. Akkamma ', "resemble old English Bills quia timet or suits in equity for the perpetuation of testimony." The policy of the Legislature in enacting Section 42 with Illustrations (d), (e) and (f) of the Specific Relief Act and Articles 118 and 125 of the Limitation Acts of 1877 and 1908 alongside of Articles 140 and 141, was to afford an inducement to bring declaratory suits which are in the nature of suits to perpetuate testimony regarding title, while the recollection of the facts is fairly fresh. A condition of obtaining declaratory relief is that the plaintiff should not be guilty of laches, the measure of laches being fixed by Article 118 as 6 years in the case of a suit challenging an adoption. IF a claimant chooses to run the risk that an adoption which he has not attacked in time through a declaratory suit might be presumed to be good by reason of its long standing and the disappearance of evidence with the passage of time, he can wait till his reversionary right has accrued and also for a period of 12 years thereafter under Article 141 of the Limitation Act. Suits involving the issue of adoption or no adoption must, if of a declaratory nature, be brought within 6 years under Articles 118 and 119 of the Limitation Act. Though under the third column of Article 118 of the Limitation Act, the date from- which time beings to run is a subjective or a personal date with reference to the plaintiff suing for dic- laratory relief, it has been held by the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Venkatanarayana v, Subbammal and Janaki Animal v. Narayanaswami Iyer that a reversioner's suit to set aside adoption or alienation by the widow is a representative suit in which he represents not only himself but the whole body of possible reversioners of whom one who happens to be the nearest surviving on the death of the widow will succeed to the estate. As a logical result of this view it has been held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that all the reversioners have but a single cause of action to sue for a declaration of the invalidity of an adoption by the widow Varamma v. Gopaladasayya . Indeed, the High Court went further and held that a suit for a declaration that an alleged adoption by the widow is untrue or invalid instituted by a remoter reversioner more than 6 years after the adoption came to the knowledge of the next reversioner, would be barred under Article 118 of the Limitation Act even though the remoter reversioner who sued was born after the alleged adoption and before the suit became barred under Article 118Venkata Sivayya v. Ademma. The ratio decidendi was that Art. 118 did not give each reversioner a fresh cause of action on his birth or stop the running of time which had begun to can from the date of the knowledge of the adoption acquired by the next reversioner. Article 125 of the Limitation Act allows a period bf 12 years for a suit by a reversioner for declaring that an alienation by the limited owner is void except for her life. It may seem anomalous that where the title to a portion of the estate, however small, is endangered by an alienation by the limited owner, the reversioner should be allowed a period of 12 years for getting a declaration of the invalidity of the alienation while he has only 6 years for getting a declaration of the invalidity of an adoption which bars the reversionary title to the whole estate. It might be that it was thought that the question of adoption involving the status of the adoptee (in many cases a minor) and his relationship to the natural and adoptive families should not be left in doubt or dispute for an unduly long time. It was apparently for this reason that the adopted son is given a limited period of six years for obtaining a declaration of the validity of the adoption. Another reason might be that an alienation of property of the value of over Rs. 100 has to be made by a registered instrument which furnishes an authentic and contemporary record of the transaction. Actual giving and taking of the boy in adoption is essential to its validity and this could be proved only by oral evidence, the mere execution of a deed without actual giving and taking being of no avail. Oral evidence of such giving and taking is likely to become unavailable with lapse of time. Considerations like these might have led the Legislature to fix different periods of time under Art. 118 and Art. 125 of the Limitation Act for declaratory suits by reversioners with respect to adoptions and alienations by the limited owner. Whatever be the reason for the differential treatment the two classes of suits are different in their nature and scope. The first column of Article 125 of the Limitation Act statedly applies to an alienation of land by a Hindu female limited owner. IF a Hindu widow purports to make an adoption to her husband and the adopted son makes an alienation of what he claims to be the estate of his adoptive father, the alienation is made by the adopted son in his right as owner and is in no sense made by the adoptive mother and Art. 125 would have no application to the case. IF in such a case the reversioner sues to have the alienation declared invalid, he is virtually suing for declaring the invalidity of the adoption itself. The plaintiff reversioner cannot succeed without displacing the apparent adoption by virtue of which the adoptee and his alienee claim title to the property, and his suit is substantially one for a declaration of the invalidity of the adoption and would be governed by Article 118 of the Limitation Act. IF a suit for declaratory relief in respect of the adoption is barred by time, the plaintiff reversioner cannot evade the operation of Article 118 by professing to sue for a declaration during the life-time of the limited owner that an alienation made by the alleged adopted son would not bind him. Though the plaintiff reversioner may frame his suit as one merely for a declaration of the invalidity of such an alienation, the defence of title founded on the adoption directly raises the questionwas the adoption invalid ? The prayer for a declaration of the invalidity of the alienation is, in such cases, inconsistent with the adoption and cannot be granted unless the adoption is declared to be invalid and this cannot be done beyond the period limited by Article 118. Any other conclusion would mean that the right of the reversioner to sue for a declaration of the invalidity of an adoption could in effect be kept alive, say for 50 years after the adoption, if the widow happens to live so long and the adopted son makes an alienation 5o years after his adoption. One has to look at the substantial nature of the suit, its real purpose and object and the issues that fall to be decided before the declaratory relief claimed by the reversioner could be granted. The plaintiff reversioner cannot get over the bar of limitation under Article 118 by resorting to devices of pleading and by professing to sue only for a declaration of the invalidity of an alienation by a limited owner ignoring the adoption on which the alienee's title is founded. In my opinion, an alienation by the adopted son would not give a fresh cause of action to the reversioner for a declaration that the adoption is invalid, because the alienation does not involve any further denial of the reversioner's legal character or right to property than was involved in setting up the adoption in the first place. The attack on the reversioner's legal character or right to property was radical and complete when the adoption was set up and the alienation by the adopted son is merely consequential on the adoption. Where there is in effect a complete and wholesale denial of the reversioner's title by an adoption, any subsequent affirmation or reiteration of that denial by an alienation made by the adopted son is only a continuation of the prior cause of action and would not give a fresh right to sue for a declaration. In this connection I would express my respectful agreement with the principle laid down in Ponnu Nadar v. Kumaru Reddiar in these terms: "where there are successive invasions or denials of a right, time will in general run from the first of the series. For this proposition ample authority will be found in Thirumala Rao v. Kadekar Durgi Shette.thi '', Syed Mamshah Thaika v. The Secretary of State for India , Chothu v. .Neelakandham, Krishnajee v. Anajee Dhondajee . In special cases, where for instance, the later invasion is of a different and more serious kind, as a sale following an attachment of property (Anantharaju v. Narayananaju or where the enjoyment, though disputed, is not actually interfered with (Muhammad Hanif v. Rat anchand ) an exception to this rule may be admitted." The decided cases do not speak with one voice. The view that I am taking is supported by the opinion of the learned Chief Justice in this case and of Abdur Rahim C. J. and Oldfield J. in Bapayya v. Akkamma (L. P. A. 107 of 1916) which arose out of the dissent of Wallis C. J. and Gouts Trotter J. in Bapayya v. Ankamma and by the decision in Bhoop Singh v. Ramji Lal and Khushal Singh v. Kanda. I am unable to agree with the reasoning in Jholi v. Kazana purporting to be based on Kalyanandappa v. Chanbasappa which has no bearing on the question whether an alienation by an adopted son gives a new cause of action to the reversioner to bring a declaratory suit that the alienation is invalid beyond the life-time of the widow when a suit for a declaration of the invalidity of the adoption itself is barred under Article 118 of the Limitation Act. The decision in Semba Parayan v. Mara' is one on the facts of the case and if it purports to lay down that where a reversioner seeks only a declaration of the invalidity of an alienation made by a widow and her adopted son, ignoring the adoption altogether, the bar of limitation under Article 118 would not apply, I must express my respectful dissent from the decision. IF the widow makes an alienation ignoring the adopted son and without any reference to him, treating the property as held by her as a limited owner, Art. 125 of the Limitation Act would apply but not if the alienation is made during the widow's life-time by the adopted son claiming to be the owner of the property by virtue of his adoption. For these reasons I would answer the second question referred to us in the negative. In this connection, it must be observed that it is only an adoption purporting to be made to the last male owner that attracts the operation of Article 118 of the Limitation Act. IF an adoption of a son to herself has been made by a widow the Article would have no application. See. Tribhuvan Singh v. Rameshar Singh ; Luchman v. Kanhayya. Raj Bahadoor v. Achumbit Lal as explained by Judicial Committee in Jagadamba Choudhrani v. Dakhina Mohand5. and Valiappan Nayar v. Paru Nethiar . It has also to be observed that under Article 118 time begins to run when the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff and if in a suit filed beyond 6 years of the date of the adoption, the plaintiff gives evidence that he became aware of the adoption on a particular date within 6 years of the suit it is for the defendant to disprove it Lalchuman v. Kanhayya : Venkubayamma v. Narasimha Rao . The answer to the first question is that a suit by a reversioner for a declaration of the invalidity of an alienation by a person claiming to be the adopted son of the last male owner is maintainable during the life-time of the female limited owner, provided the suit is brought within the period prescribed by Article 118 of the Limitation Act. The omission to bring a declaratory suit will not stand in the way of the nearest reversioner recovering possession of the property on the death of the female limited owner by a suit filed within the time prescribed by Art. 141 of the Limitation Act and in such a suit it will be open to the reversioner to establish that the alleged adoption was untrue or invalid and that the adopted son was no better than a trespasser. As the arguments before us covered a wide ground touching the remedies available to reversioners in respect of acts or omissions of the limited owner which injuriously affect the reversion, I proceed to refer to a few typical cases. The commonest kinds of suits are for declaratory relief in respect of an adoption or alienation by the limited owner for which time is prescribied in Articles 118 and 125 of the Limitation Act. Article 125, however, refers to an alienation by the limited owner. Other acts or omissions of the limited owner likely to cause injury to the estate also give a cause of action to the reversioners to sue for appropriate relief. For instance, if the limited owner commits waste and causes destruction or material deterioration of the value of the estate, the reversioner can sue to restrain such waste. See Section 54 Illustration (m) of the Specific Relief Act. Janki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Iyer . In an appropriate case a receiver or a manager can be appointed to manage the estate and pay the income to the limited ownerJijayamba Bai Saheb v. Kamakshi Bai Saheb; Jijay&mba Ex Parte". Where there had been a trespass during the life-time of the last male owner but the trespasser had not acquired a prescriptive title before the death of the last male owner, it would be the duty of the widow to sue for eviction of the trespasser and prevent his acquiring title to the property. IF the widow refuses to do so, the reversioner can sue her and the trespasser and have the possession of the property restored to proper custody or to a manager or receiver appointed by the Court. Radha Mohan Dhar v. Ram Das Dey ; Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Issur Chunder Chuckerbutty ; Shankerbhai Dajbhai v, Bai Shiv. This rule was applied to the case of a widow in possession of moveables belonging to her husband's estate which she had alienated without any necessity or benefit. The Court held that where she committed waste of the corpus of such property the reversioner was entitled to file a suit praying that such corpus may be reduced into possession and handed over to a receiver appointed in the suit. The Court also went further and held that the transferees from the widow without consideration could be directed to replace any part of the corpus of the moveable property which can be traced into their hands and the widow herself could be directed to replace the moveable corpus of her husband's estate which she made away with, if she was in a position to do so, allowing her to enjoy the income of the fund so replaced. Venkamma v. Narasimham. The right of the reversioner is succinctly stated in Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Iyer as "a right to demand that the estate be kept free from waste and free from danger during its enjoyment by the widow or other owner for life." The danger might be one affecting the title to the property when the reversion opens. IF a person having no title is allowed by the widow to remain in possession of the whole or a portion of her husband's estate as owner or to deal with it as if he were the owner, the reversioner would have a right to sue for declaratory relief. IF a limited owner sued as representing the estate enters into a fraudulent or collusive compromise on terms personally advantageous to her but injurious to the estate, the reversioner could sue for a declaration that the compromise is not binding on the reversioners, impleading the limited owner and the other parties to the compromise as defendants. Where a widow claims an absolute title to property really forming part of her husband's estate, it is open to the reversioner to sue for a declaration that that property belongs to the husband's estate and that she has no more than a widow's estate in it -Surayya v. Subbamma ' It is not possible to enumerate all cases of this kind. There being no specific Article of the Limitation Act prescribing the period of limitation for such declaratory suits, the residuary Article, Art. 120 would apply. It has to be pointed out that the grant of declaratory relief is discretionary, that the limited owner represents the inheritance and is entitled to the full benefical enjoyment of the estate for her life and that declaratory suits should not be resorted to for harassment of the limited owner, who, like the manager of a family, must be allowed a reasonable latitude in the exercise of her powers, provided she acts fairly to the expectant heirs. Umamaheswaram, J. Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act enacts that any person entitled to any character, or to any right as to any property may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is soentit'ed. Illustration (e) provides for a suit by a presumptive reversioner against an alienee from the widow for a declaration that the alienation made without any legal necessity is not valid beyond the widow's life-time. Similarly, illustration (f) provides for a suit by the presumptive reversioner for a declaration that the adoption made by the widow is invalid. The two Articles of the Indian Limitation Act which deal with these two classes of suits are Articles 125 and 118 of Schedule I respectively. While Article 118 contains no restriction as to the person entitled to sue, Article 125 contemplates a suit to be brought by the person " who, if the female died at the date of instituting the suit, would be entitled to possession ". The suits brought by the presumptive reversioners in both the classes of cases are not for their personal benefit as their object is to remove the common apprehended danger to the interests of all the reversioners presumptive and contingent alike. While Art. 118 provides a period of six years from the date of the knowledge of the adoption, Article 125 provides a period of 12 years from the date of the alienation. Article 118 relates to status and involves the adjudication of a right in rem, while Article 125 raises a question whether the alienation is justified by legal necessity. These suits resemble old English Bills quia timet or suits in equity for perpetuation of testimony but they must be brought within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act. The right to sue is based on the danger to the inheritance common to the entire body of reversioners. IF the presumptive reversioners do not file declaratory suits within the period provided by the Limitation Act, the nearest reversioners, as on the date of the widow's death, are entitled to sue for recovery of possession of the immoveable property ignoring the adoption and the alienation effected by the widow within a period of twelve years from the date of the death of the widow under Article 141 of the Limitation Act. The second question referred to us does not, in my view, present much difficulty. The alienation made by the adopted son does not furnish a fresh cause of action to the presumptive reversioner. IF the adoption made by the widow is true and valid, the estate of the last male-owner vests in him and he is entitled to deal with his estate as he pleases and the reversioner has no locus standi to maintain a suit challenging his alienation. IF the adoption did not take place or is invalid, the estate continues to vest in the widow and any alienation effected by him, under colour of his adoption, does not affect the reversioner. Any suit for a declaration that the alienation effected by the adopted son is not valid and binding necessarily involves the determination of the question, whether the adoption is true and valid. So by a trick of pleading, the period of limitation prescribed in Art. 118 of the Limitation Act cannot be circumvented. What has to be looked into is the substantial character and nature of the suit. The omission to refer to the adoption or to seek a declaration that the adoption did not take place or is invalid, does not avoid the application of Article 118. What really affects the reversioner is the adoption and the deflection of the estate. I do not agree with the learned Council for the respondent, Sri A. Seethapathirao, that every alienation by the adopted son affords a fresh cause of action to the reversioner to file a declaratory suit. I agree with the observations of Abdur Rahim J. in Kodali Bapayya v. Kodali Ankamma that the plaintiff " cannot avoid the application of this Article (Article 118) by merely juggling with the forms of relief". I do not agree with the views of Wallis G. J. and Coutts Trotter J. in Kodali Bapayya v. Ankamma that the mortgage executed by the adopted son involved a denial of the next reversioner's title by the mortgagee and gave rise to a fresh cause of action as against him. In my opinion, as already stated, it is only the claim, as an adopted son, that infringes the rights of the reversioner.s and not the alienation effected by him. I do not agree with Coutts Trotter J. in the case stated supra that the adoption may do the reversioner no harm but that only the alienation or act of waste committed by him against the estate affects him. I do not wish to rest my judgment on the ground mentioned by Wallis C. J. that as the remedy provided by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act is discretionary, it would be advisable not to make a declaration in regard to the validity of the alienation. I agree that the decision in Semba Parayan v. Moral; is wrongly decided. The reasons given by the learned Judges that the decision in L. P. A. No. 107o f 1916 should be limited to the facts of that case or that it was not binding on the ground that it was not published in the authorised series or in any of the legal journals, are, in my view, fallacious and unsupportable. So far as the Lahore High Court is concerned, all the decisions except the decision in Jolt v, Khazana support our view. The learned Judges in Joli v. Khazana' however based their conclusions on the decision of the Privy Council in Kalyandappa v. Chanbasappa. I shall consider the effect of that Privy Council decision hereunder. One of the grounds on which Satyanarayana Rao, J, referred the case to a Bench was that the opinion of Courts Trotter J. in Bapayya v. Ankamma was supported by the Privy Council in Kalayandappa v. Chanbasappa . In Semba Parayan v. Maral, the effect of the Privy Council decision on the decision of the Special Bench in L. P. A. No. 107 of 1916 was left open. Sri Seetha pathirao strongly relied on the decision of the Privy Council and contended as follows : An adoption which has not taken place or is invalid is not binding upon the reversioner and he is entitled to brush it aside and sue for recovery of possession on the death of the widow. In such a suit, the truth and validity of the adoption may be enquired, though a declaratory suit regarding the invalidity of the adoption was not brought within the period prescribed under Art. 118. IF so, on the same principle, the question as to the truth and validtiy of the adoption, though barred under Article 118, may be determined in a suit filed for a declaration that the alienation affected by the adopted son is invalid. I do not think that the decision supports the wide contention put forward by the learned Advocate. What was held in that case was that when the widow dies, a fresh cause of action accrues to the actual reversioner to sue for recovery of possession of immoveable property from the alleged adopted son. The suit filed by him is one contemplated under Article 141 and does not fall within the terms of Article 118 which applies only to a suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act for a declaratory decree that the adoption is invalid and did not take place. There is a detailed discussion by Lord Phillimore of the earlier Privy Council cases dealing with the Limitation Acts of 1871 and 1877. It was pointed out by the learned Law Lord that in Jagadamba Chowdhrani v. Dakhina Mohan it was held on an interpretation of Article 129 in the Limitation Act of 1871 that the words " to establish or set aside an adoption " were not techincal words and did not describe with accuracy any known form of suit and that therefore any suit which brought the validity of an adoption into question must be considered as a suit to set aside an adoption even though it might also be looked at as a suit by the man entitled to recover possession; and that therefore Article 129 and not 142 (as then numbered) applied. At page 425, Lord Phillimore held that the words "a suit to obtain a declaration" are terms of art and discussed the scope and effect of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and observed as follows: "It is to this class of suit that this praticular limitation applies The date from which the time begins to run is a subjective or personal date and the condition of obatining the particular relief which is sought in a declaratory suit is that the plaintiff should not be guilty of laches, the measure of laches being fixed by the statute as six years. But if a claimant chooses to run the risk that an adoption which he has not attacked will have every presumption made in its favour by reason of its long standing he can wait till his reversionary right has accrued, and even till the limit (no doubt a very wide limit) of twelve years from that accruer has passed." It is therefore clear from this discussion that the right to recover possession on the death of the widow is quite distinct and different from the cause of action conferred on the presumptive reversioners under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act to obtain a declaratory decree that the adoption is invalid. It cannot be contended on the basis of the Privy Council decision that the alienation by the alleged adopted son furnishes a fresh cause of action or that the terms of Article 118 can be circumvented and the validity of the adoption can be gone into in a suit for a declaration that the alienation is invalid, after the period prescribed under Art. 118 has expired. IF the reversioner does not choose to impeach the adoption within the prescribed time, the only course open to him is to challange the adoption when the succession opens. In this view, we hold that the decision of the Special Bench in L. P. A. No. 107 of 1916 is right and that the decision of the Lahore High Court in Joli v. Khazana (I. L. R. 8 Lahore 48) is wrong. As a result of our answer to question No. 2, Question No. 1, does not really arise for decision. IF the alienation by the alleged adopted son does not furnish a cause of action to the reversioner on the grounds stated supra that his right to property is not affected, the suit by the reversioner will not lie under Section" 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Any alienation effected by a trespasser during the widow's life-time will not afford a cause of action to the reversioner as it will not amount to a denial of the title of the last male owner but only of the widow and there is consequently no danger to the inheritance. The status of the reversioner is also not affected by the alienation. My answer to question No. 1 is also in the negative. Judgment. After the expression of the opinion expressed by the Full Bench the Judgment of the Court (Division Bench) was delivered by The Hon'ble The Chief Justice. Pursuant to the opinion expressed by the Full Bench, we hold that the suit is barred by limitation. The result is that the appeal is allowed with costs throughout. Bhimasankaram J. I agree. T. A. B. Appeal allowed.