LAWS(APH)-1955-2-13

MADIRAJU VENKATA SUBBA RAO Vs. MADIRAJU LALITAMBA

Decided On February 25, 1955
MADIRAJU VENKATA SUBBA RAO Appellant
V/S
MADIRAJU LALITAMBA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal against an interim order passed by the learned District Judge, Krishna, in lunacy proceedings. The facts may be briefly stated. The respondent is the wife of one Satyanarayana. The appellants are the sons of Satyanarayana by his predeceased wife. There was a partition of the family properties between Satyanarayana and his sons. The appellants are in possession of the lands that were allotted to the share of Satyanarayana and they have also leased 8 acres to tenants. The respondent, the second wife, filed O. P.No.61 of 1954 on the file of the District Court, Krishna, under section 62 of the Indian Lunacy Act (Act IV of 1912) for adjudging her husband lunatic. Pending the said proceedings, she filed I.A.No.322 of 1954 for the appointment of an interim receiver. The learned Judge, instead of appointing a receiver, passed a conditional order. Under that order, the appellants were directed to deposit into the District Court a sum of Rs. 500 on account and endorse the leases to the alleged lunatic within ten days from the date of the order failing which a receiver would be appointed to realise the crop on the 12 acres. The appellants question the validity of that order.

(2.) The learned counsel for the appellants contends that the District Court has no jurisdiction to pass an interim order pending the determination as to the person's state of mind. In support of that contention, reliance is placed upon the judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Saroj Basini Debi v. Mahendra Nath Bhaduri, (1927) I.L.R. 54 Cal. 836 at 847. There, the learned Judges elaborately considered the scope of the provisions of the Indian Lunacy Act (IV of 1912). Rankin, C.J., observed at page 847 of the report as follows :-

(3.) These observations certainly support the contention of the appellants. But, it must be observed that the learned Judges, who decided that case, were not specifically dealing with a case of appointment of a receiver pending inquisition proceedings. It does not appear from the judgment that any argument was addressed to the learned Judges based upon an analogy of the inherent powers exercised by the Court of Chancery in England and the application of section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code. That question was directly raised in Rajendra Kumar Gupta v. Sailendra Kumar Gupta, (1938) I.L.R.1 Cal. 180. There, the question was whether the District Judge of Faridpur had jurisdiction to appoint an interim receiver pending the lunacy proceedings. Costello, the acting Chief Justice, after considering the relevant decisions cited before him, expressed the following opinion : "In my opinion, that case, In re Fountain, (1888) L.R. 37 Ch.D. 609, is ample authority for saying that there is an inherent power in the Courts dealing with lunacy matters to appoint an interim receiver."