NANDENDALA NARAYANAPPA Vs. AMILINENI PULLAYYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Second Appeal is brought by the plaintiff as against the judgment and decree of the District Judge of Anantapur in A. S. No. 35 of 1949, reversing the judgment and decree of the District Munsiff of Gooty in O. S. No. 94 of 1948. The suit was filed by the appellant herein for a declaration that the respondent is not the adopted son of late Venkataramana who held the office of the Village Munsiff of Bukkapuram and who died on 4th November, 1942. In the plaint, he alleged that on the death of Venkataramana in 1942, the office was registered in the name of the defendant, that the adoption was not true and that the deed of adoption was not valid and binding. In paragraph 5 of the written statement, the defendant contended that the plaintiff's application to register him as the village munsiff was rejected, that the defendant was registered as the village munsiff and that the suit was not maintainable. The District Munsiff of Gooty held that the defendant is not the adopted son of Venkataramana and granted the declaration accordingly. On appeal, the District Judge of Anantapur raised two preliminary legal objections, namely, as to whether the suit was maintainable and whether it was a fit and proper case to grant a declaratory decree. He held that, as no suit was filed by the plaintiff for recovery of the emoluments of the office within three years after the death of Venkataramana, under section 13 of the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, there was no purpose in granting a declaratory decree that the adoption was not true and valid. The simple question that arises for consideration, in the Second Appeal, is, whether the view of the appellate Judge is right.

(2.) Having carefully gone through the papers and the decisions cited by the advocates on both sides, I am inclined to agree with the decision of the District Judge. In the plaint, it is not stated that the adoption casts a cloud on his title in regard to any of the properties of Venkataramana, other than the office of the village munsiff, or, that it might affect his rights of collateral succession in future to any properties. The only ground stated by him in the plaint is that, with a view to prevent him from obtaining the office of the village munsiff, the adoptiom was set up As Venkataramana died in 1942, the suit for recovery of the emoluments of the office ought to have been filed within three years, under section 14 of the Act. As any declaration that might be granted in the suit will be futile and will not enable the appellant to obtain the office of village munsiff. I quite agree with the lower appellate Court that it is not necessary to go into the question of the truth and validity of the adoption. It was pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Sreenarain Mitter v. Sreemutty Kishen Soondery Dassee, (1873)11 Beng. L.R. 171 at 190, that :

(3.) The decision of Venkataramana Rao, J., in Kameswara Rao v. Jagannadha Sastry, (1941)1 M.L.J. 12, was referred to by the learned advocate for the appellant. I agree with the learned Judge that a suit for a declaration that an adoption is not true and valid, is maintainable in a civil Court and that the appellant is not precluded by the provisions, of section 21 of the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act from maintaining such a suit in the civil Court. But as the appellant will not be in a position to recover the office from the respondent, even if such a declaration is granted, I am not prepared to hold that the discretion exercised by the learned appellate Judge is wrong. The decision in Narasimha Rao v. Venkataramana Rao, (1941) 2 M.L.J. 439, has really no application to the facts of this case. In Healey v. Minister of Health, (1954) 3 W.R. 815, it was held that the Minister's decision that the appellant was not a mental health officer could not be challenged in a civil Court by reason of the provisions of the National Health Service (Superannuation) Regulations, 1950. Denning, L.J., pointed out that the plaintiff's object was clear, namely, that he was seeking in those proceedings to get the Court to say that the Minister's decision was wrong and that it was not permissible to question the correctness of the decision in the Court. Adopting those observations, I hold that as a suit under section 13 of the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act is barred by the law of limitation and the office cannot be recovered it is not necessary to go into the question of the truth and validity of the adoption and grant any declaration in the present proceedings. As evidence had already been recorded in regard to the truth and validity of the adoption, the appellant will not, in any way, be prejudiced if a vacancy for the office of the village munsiff arises and the appellant becomes entitled to claim it in future or if any dispute as to succession in regard to the properties of Venkataramana or any other collateral of Venkataramana should arise in future. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed. As this objection that the declaratory relief ought not to be granted was not raised, in specific terms, in the written statement, I think it is a fit case in which the parties should be directed to bear their costs in this Appeal. No leave. Appeal dismissed.