JUPLLI SRINIVASA RAO Vs. COMMISSIONER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Jupalli Srinivas Rao, the writ petitioner had invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being aggrieved of the order made by the respondent dated 03-08-1996, by virtue of which, it is stated that the permission which was already granted in B/1686/93 dated 31-01-1994 vide No.B1/282/95, had been revoked.

(2.) Heard Sri. B.V. Bakshi, learned counsel representing the writ petitioner and Polisetti Radha Krishna, learned Standing Counsel representing the respondent-Commissioner Municipality, Sircilla.

(3.) The learned counsel representing the writ petitioner had pointed out that the Regional Deputy Director of Town and Country Planning, Warangal, vide proceedings in Roc.No.566/95/WRD/W2 dated 03-04-1996, in fact, had advised the Municipal Commissioner to follow the opinion given by the Municipal Standing Counsel at the reference 11th cited and granted building permission to applicants cited in reference No.3, 14, 15 and 16 and let the ownership of the property be decided by the Civil Court among the disputed people and the Town Planning staff may not interfere with their construction as long as the proposed constructions are satisfying the plans approved by the Municipality. The learned counsel also pointed out that No.16 in the said proceedings is the file No.G1/202/95 application of Sri Jupalli Srinivas Rao/the present writ petitioner, for granting permission. The learned counsel also contended that this is an administrative order, no doubt, involving civil consequences and not only it is not a reasoned order, but also it is an order made without following any procedure at all and totally contrary to the directions issued by the Regional Deputy Director of Town and country Planning, Warangal, in the reference cited supra. The learned counsel would maintain that even otherwise inasmuch as this is a case of revocation of the approved plan, Section 344 sub-section 6 proviso of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965 (herein after referred to as the Act for brevity) would come into play and in view of the same, the question of preferring an appeal under Section 345 of the said Act, would not arise.